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The on-going defense drawdown has left leaders in both Government and industry 
concerned over the survival of the U.S. defense industrial base. The purpose of this thesis 
is to explore whether or not such concern is warranted, given the various strategic efforts 
undertaken by the management of U.S. defense firms to ensure that their companies 
remain competitive, profitable, and financially viable despite shrinking defense budgets. 
Using eight different financial ratios as performance measures of solvency, efficiency, and 
profitability, this thesis examines the financial viability of 28 defense contractors from 
1986 through 1994. Graphical and statistical analytical techniques are used to: identify 
ratio trends; measure defense industry performance compared to U.S. manufacturing 
industry averages; and identify the relationship between defense firms' strategic 
commitment to/dependence on defense business and their financial viability over the period 
of the defense drawdown. The thesis concludes that the solvency ratio trends show steady 
to improving conditions, while the trends for efficiency and profitability ratios are 
somewhat mixed. Analysis also shows that, compared to the U.S. manufacturing industry 
at large, the defense industry was less solvent, less efficient, and more profitable over the 
period of the drawdown. However, the more defense-dependent firms were generally 
more solvent, more efficient, and less profitable than defense firms whose strategies 
indicated less dependence on defense business. 
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With the end of the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) is 
faced with the task of downsizing the very same Armed Forces which contributed to the 
Cold War victory. However, caution must be taken to ensure that we maintain a strong 
and viable military which is both well-trained and well-equipped. Military commanders are 
responsible for the training and readiness of the forces, but they must rely on the defense 
industrial base to continue to provide them with state-of-the-art equipment. As clearly 
demonstrated during the Gulf War, the U.S. military is both technically and tactically 
superior to any military in the world. The world watched as we showed off the 
sophisticated weaponry which had been developed through lengthy and expensive research 
and development (R&D) efforts conceived to counter the threat from our Cold War 
adversary. But gone are the days of military expansion and technological advancement 
brought on by enormous defense budgets. 
Without an identifiably strong threat, the DoD is faced with the difficult tasks of 
"right sizing" the military force structure, and reducing spending for the research and 
development (R&D) and procurement of expensive new weapon systems to replace those 
which have already proven to be the best in the world. By 1997, the DoD expects the 
defense budget to have declined by 41% from its peak in the mid 1980's. Furthermore, by 
fiscal year '98, the defense budget is expected to have fallen to about 3% of the Gross 
National Product (GNP), compared to over 6% in the mid-'80s. [Ref. 63: p. 1] Many of 
these reductions will be achieved through cancellation or scaling back of weapons 
procurement and R&D programs. But what effect will taking this peace dividend from 
defense contractors have on the viability of the defense industry? Perhaps William Anders, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Dynamics (GD), one of this country's 
premier defense prime contractors, best expresses the concerns of many defense firms in 
his March, 1991 letter to GD's shareholders, 
The easing of Cold War tensions, welcomed from a humanitarian 
point of view, is removing the major market stimulus for U.S. defense 
spending which was already under stress due to the increasing Federal 
deficits. In addition, ill-conceived alterations of Department of Defense 
contract terms and conditions, along with contractor overcapacity, have 
adversely affected profit margins and cash flows throughout the defense 
industry over the past several years. [Ref. 11: '91, p. 5] 
There is much debate among politicians, the DoD, defense industry executives, and 
lobbyists on how best to convert defense savings to cure the social and economic ills of a 
country which, despite its stature as the world's only superpower, is rapidly becoming a 
second-rate economic power. The Defense Conversion Commission (DCC), a DoD 
organization formed in 1992 to assess the consequences of the defense drawdown, and to 
make recommendations constructively addressing them, spoke of the peace dividend as 
not just the amount of money saved on defense spending, but rather, 
... the opportunity to reallocate to other productive activities the 
resources and talent made available as defense spending declines.... The 
national challenge of conversion is to seize this opportunity and accomplish 
the reallocation in the most timely and efficient way possible while still 
preserving the appropriate defense industrial base. [Ref. 61: p. 5] 
Indeed, the defense industrial base provides different opportunities to many 
stakeholders. To Congress collectively, it is an easy (since defense spending is 
discretionary) way to reduce the Federal deficit, but to individual lawmakers it provides 
high-tech, high-paying jobs to voters. According to the Congress' Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) [Ref. 54], in 1991, nearly one-half of all defense-related jobs (both 
Government and private sector) and spending occur collectively in the following states: 
California, Texas, Virginia, New York, Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
Obviously, elected officials in these states might have less of a nationalistic view of the 
defense drawdown. This "not in my back yard" paradox exemplifies the complexity of 
drawing down the defense industry. Defense firms rely on defense contracts to achieve 
profits and returns to shareholders, and to provide jobs and therefore larger tax bases to 
local communities. To the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who must rely on 
sophisticated modern weaponry produced by it, the defense industrial base provides the 
capability of fighting and winning our Nation's military conflicts with minimal casualties. 
To the men and women in uniform, superior weaponry is more vital to national security in 
today's environment, where the threat is largely undefined, than it was during the Cold 
War, when we knew both our enemy and the area of operations. To small and 
minority-owned businesses, the defense industry offers the opportunity to compete via 
various socio-economic programs mandated by law and DoD regulation. However, the 
recent "anti-Affirmative Action" sentiments among many conservatives may threaten these 
businesses which were previously guaranteed receipt of Government contracts which were 
statutorily set aside for such businesses. 
Without knowing the true effect of the drawdown, both Government and industry 
proponents of these defense programs argue that "the defense industry's sky is falling", 
and favor continued "Government support" (synonymous with budget appropriations) for 
efforts to preserve a strong and capable defense industrial base. Equally unaware of the 
true impact of the drawdown on industrial base viability, opponents of these programs 
argue to let competition and the free enterprise system drive the financial viability of the 
defense industry. 
2. The Defense Industrial Base 
The U.S. defense industrial base is made up a multitude of private and public 
companies, most of which also produce goods and services in the commercial 
marketplace. These companies range from huge, high-tech, Fortune 500 companies with 
globally diversified business interests, to small, low-tech, "Mom and Pop" operations 
which manufacture selected piece parts used in other components, systems and 
sub-systems. Defense industry companies operate in many tiers ranging from: prime and 
sub-contractors of systems and sub-assemblies, to vendors and suppliers of component 
parts and raw materials. The Services and installations within the DoD rely on the defense 
industrial base for a broad array of products and services from development and 
production of complex major weapons systems such as aircraft, ships and tanks, to base 
support such as phone service, and consumables such as fuels and subsistence items. 
The industrial base also consists of a number of Government laboratories and 
maintenance depots. Many of the labs are operated by major universities and conduct 
much of the Nation's basic and applied research. Many of the Government maintenance 
and ammunition depots are operated by defense contractors under Government-owned 
contractor-operated (GOCO) arrangements. However, these Government laboratories 
and depots not only complement the efforts of defense contractors, but, to the dismay of 
defense firms, often compete with them. The active pursuit of new business by 
Government entities within the defense industrial base has been brought on by ongoing 
efforts to down size the defense infrastructure through the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) process. Indeed, this is a case of competition fostered by the survival instinct. 
The largest amount of defense spending, in terms of contract dollar value, goes to 
a shrinking number of large defense prime contractors. The degree of reliance on defense 
sales for these companies varies widely. One group, exemplified by firms like General 
Dynamics, Grumman, and McDonnell Douglas, rely on the DoD for over one-half of their 
total sales. Another group, such as Martin Marietta, Lockheed, and Raytheon, are not 
only defense-dependent, but they are also largely dependent on business from other 
Government agencies, such as the National Aeronautical and Space Administration 
(NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). A third group consists of firms 
which are commercially diversified, and rely on the DoD for less than one-third of their 
business. Examples of such firms are United Technologies, Boeing, and Rockwell 
International. Still a final group consists of firms which are fundamentally commercial, but 
maintain defense divisions or subsidiaries. Example firms are Westinghouse, General 
Motors, IBM, ITT, and GTE. [Ref. 54: p. 29] 
Defense industry firms have developed a variety of strategies for addressing the 
defense drawdown. The first, and most fundamental, strategic decision to be addressed by 
these firms is whether to stay concentrated on defense business or broaden their business 
bases to include more commercial enterprises. The OTA discusses the following eight 
strategic options to cope with defense downsizing: shrinking in size; exporting arms and 
military technologies; shifting to similar commercial products; sales to civilian (non- 
defense) Government agencies; spin-off companies; corporate diversification; and defense 
conversion. In an attempt to cut overhead and reduce idle capacity, many firms have 
chosen to shrink by closing plants and laying off workers in order to concentrate on core 
defense businesses. A popular strategy for keeping production lines warm is to expand 
production to include sales to foreign customers. This option, which includes the Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) program and the exporting of technology to enable co-production 
within friendly nations, also helps reduce the unit costs to the U.S. defense customers. 
However, in an uncertain world, this option is risky, as today's ally could potentially 
become tomorrow's enemy during some regional conflict. The option of shifting defense 
business assets to commercial businesses is directly related to the degree of similarity 
between the firm's defense and commercial products. For instance, this option is 
especially attractive to manufacturers of products such as: transport aircraft, aircraft 
engines, and communications and electronics. On the other hand, such a strategy is 
infeasible for makers of tanks, fighter aircraft and battleships for which, fortunately, there 
are no commercial customers. As a "first line of retreat" strategy, some firms have 
increasingly sought after and received business from other Government agencies such as: 
NASA, the FAA, the National Weather Service, the Department of Energy (DoE), and the 
Department of Transportation (DoT). This option is attractive to defense firms which 
develop and produce space systems, satellites, and electronic sensors and control systems. 
Some defense firms have formed separate companies to exploit military technologies for 
commercial use. The value of this spin-off strategy is in transfer of military technology 
into commercial products and services. The strategy among defense firms of diversifying 
into commercial markets through the purchase of going concerns which are already 
somewhat successful in their respective lines of commercial business. By operating these 
commercial business units as subsidiaries, the parent company hopes to reap profits with 
little managerial or marketing involvement in unfamiliar markets. This strategy was 
popular in the '60s and 70s as U.S. firms (not just defense firms) acquired diverse strings 
of business as a method of hedging against declining corporate profits. However, 
historically many of these diversification efforts failed as corporate management became 
too heavily involved in businesses they knew nothing about, thereby resulting in huge 
corporate losses as subsidiary profits often fell below the expectations of the parent. The 
last strategy available to defense contractors is that of defense conversion. This option, 
whereby defense firms develop, produce and bring to market commercial products using 
assets (i.e., capital, plant, property and equipment, and intellectual property/engineering 
know-how) previously devoted to defense products, is the least attractive strategy among 
the major defense contractors, and warrants further discussion. [Ref. 54] 
Although the definition of defense conversion will change with the party providing 
the definition, it is generally defined as the process of/for demilitarization of the 
contractors making up the defense industrial base [Ref. 25: Sec. 2, p. 6]. Note this 
definition avoids the political pitfalls of a more specific (and politically correct) definition 
provided by the General Accounting Office (GAO): "Defense conversion refers to a 
number of Federal programs intended to help individuals and communities cope with 
cutbacks in military spending and to support the defense technology and industrial base." 
[Ref 70: p. 1] A concept which is directly related to defense conversion is dual-use 
technology. Dual-use refers to the components, processes, and systems which have both 
military and commercial uses [Ref. 3: p. 1]. Dual-use is not a "cure-all", but a key piece in 
the defense conversion puzzle which is controlled by a multitude of disjointed policies and 
organizations. 
The DoD Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, formerly known as 
DARPA) defines the term dual-use "with respect to products, services, standards, 
processes, or acquisition practices, respectively, that are capable of meeting requirements 
for military and non-military application." [Ref. 58: p. 6] Note, technology can flow in 
either direction after originating in either defense or commercial markets. This flow ties 
dual-use to technology transfer and defense conversion. "Dual-use is the end result of a 
successful technology transfer program, but it is also the end result of a successful defense 
conversion process." [Ref. 25: Sec. 1, p. 7] ARPA has established a unique niche as 
DoD's agency for fostering and managing dual-use efforts. ARPA is a lean organization 
of only 160 employees, but wields a great deal of respect, and controls an ever-increasing 
budget [Ref. 31: p. 124]. Five of ARPA's offices control direct research toward core 
technologies in electronics, microelectronics, computing, software, and materials, and 
control over 80% of its $2.25 billion budget. In a move intended to formalize ARPA's 
previously de facto role as the dual-use technology agency, in February 1993, President 
Clinton ordered them to drop the "Defense" from their name [Ref. 55: p. 29]. 
Although large defense firms remain somewhat cautious and reluctant to pursue 
dual-use product development, the Electronics Industries Association (EIA) reports that 
firms within the defense electronics industry are embracing the concept as a cause for 
optimism in the face of declining defense budgets [Ref. 7]. A number of factors support 
the EIA position. First of all, DoD no longer leads, but follows the commercial sector in 
key technology fields such as electronics and information processing. Since commercial 
customers are driving product demand and development, leading edge technologies are 
frequently being developed first for the commercial users. DoD is finding its needs are 
being given lower priority, and must therefore hope to "spin on" promising new 
commercial advancements into military applications [Ref. 61: p. 23]. Any defense market 
losses are expected to be made up for in commercial markets. Secondly, as funding for 
major weapon systems is reduced, some new start programs will be canceled in favor of 
upgrading/enhancing current systems. By extending weapon system life cycles through 
the addition of more capable electronics, this strategy supports goals of cost reduction and 
industrial base sustainment. Lastly, most analysts feel that electronics, in general, are the 
easiest types of technology to transfer from military to commercial applications. The 
Global Positioning System (GPS) and heads-up display technologies are good examples of 
new-found, easily transferred dual-use technologies [Ref. 44: p. 4-4]. While corporate 
managers within the defense electronics industry understand the necessity to embrace the 
dual-use concept, there is a cultural hurdle to cross in order to move into commercial 
markets. Business practices have changed from the "good old days" of boundless R&D, 
funded by DoD under cost-plus-fee contracts. Customers in the commercial electronics 
sector demand quality, value, and service. They seldom pay for R&D, and almost never 
buy from suppliers under cost-reimbursable types of contracts [Ref. 66: p. G-2]. Because 
of this, the dual-use concept has become an extremely attractive method for getting the 
Government to share the risks and costs of R&D which the commercial customer is 
unwilling to support. 
Although some defense firms consider their strategies toward their future business 
activity their business alone, a key defense industrial base issue is that of the Government's 
role (if any) in the transition of defense firms into more commercial activities. Indeed, 
some have argued that the best U.S. defense industrial base policy is none at all. 
Concerning the need for and content of a national industrial/technology base policy, there 
are as many opinions as there are bureaucrats in Washington. While conservative 
politicians generally favor letting global markets decide technological and economical 
winners and losers, their liberal counterparts tend to support a more active Government 
role in this area. President Clinton believes that an industrial policy will soon become a 
major part of efforts to rebuild U.S. global competitiveness, but supports a less 
Government and more private sector solution. His views were expressed in a written 
statement, in September 1992, as a candidate for President: 
America cannot continue to rely on a trickle down technology from 
the military to the competitiveness of its high tech and manufacturing 
industries. Civilian industry, not the military, is the drawing force behind 
advanced technology today.... Although the Government has a role to play 
in restoring America's competitiveness, most responsibilities must be with 
the private sector. [Ref. 5] 
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The major defense contractors recognize that industry firms themselves can and 
will make the majority of the changes needed to rationalize the defense industrial base, but 
caution that the Government's industrial base role should be to provide policies which help 
rather than hinder the process. A particular example of such a hindering Government 
policy is that which dictates second-sourcing acquisition strategies in defense 
procurement. The criticism of dual-sourcing was expressed by the CEO of GD in the 
company's 1991 Annual Report as follows: 
This practice redirects production volumes and transfers critical 
data and innovative designs to program losers, thereby keeping winners 
from achieving efficiency and reducing their incentives to invest in new 
technology for the future. [Ref. 11: '91, pp. 6-7] 
Although criticized by the General Accounting Office (GAO) as,"... not a realistic 
strategy for ensuring that government decisions and industry adjustments will result in the 
industrial and technological capabilities needed to meet future national security 
requirements", the DoD has taken the position that free market forces will generally guide 
the restructuring of the defense industrial base. The GAO cites as a key reason for this 
criticism that defense firm managers are concerned with maximizing returns for investors, 
and are therefore neither concerned with nor accountable for how the long-term changes 
within the defense industry affect national security. Espousing a somewhat "isolationist" 
point of view, the GAO also criticizes the DoD industrial base strategy for not playing a 
proactive role in assessing the U.S. reliance on foreign sources and foreign investment 
within the defense industry. However, the DoD industrial base strategy does call for its 
active role in monitoring and assessing the defense industry to ensure the preservation of 
products, processes, and industrial capabilities which are critical to national security. [Ref. 
71] 
In July 1995, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic 
Security, ASD(EA), published a draft DoD Directive entitled Assessing Defense 
Industrial Capabilities which provides defense and service acquisition officials with policy 
and guidance concerning assessment of critical defense capabilities. The following 
statements summarize the directive: 
The DoD shall not take an action or make an investment to 
preserve an industrial capability unless the action is the only cost and time 
effective alternative to meeting national security requirements.... Any 
proposed action or investment to preserve a capability with an anticipated 
cost of $10 million or more annually requires the approval of the [Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology] USD(A&T). [Ref. 
59] 
The ASD(EA) also published a companion DoD handbook with the same name. The 
handbook provides various analytical techniques for assessing which industrial capabilities 
are critical to national defense, truly unique, and endangered by the defense drawdown. It 
provides the structure and techniques for acquisition officials to conduct in-depth analysis 
of the following questions [Ref. 66]: 
• Is there a valid national security requirement for the product or service of 
concern to meet current or future military missions, readiness, or sustainment? 
• What industrial capabilities are essential to making the product or service? 
• Is any capability truly unique? Is any capability truly endangered? 
• Have the cost, risk, and benefit of all feasible alternatives been evaluated? 
• Is the recommended action the only avenue to ensure the DoD can meet its 
mission? Is it the most cost and mission effective solution? 
The handbook also identifies the following courses of action and the decision criteria used 
to evaluate them: (1) take no action; (2) rely on a foreign source of supply; (3) use 
existing substitute products or capabilities; (4) make a buy-out to meet all future DoD 
needs; (5) apply a new solution involving new technology; (6) invest in a "smart 
shutdown"; (7) invest in an acquisition action to preserve the capability; and (8) rely on 
DoD procurement relief or restriction, export assistance, or policy relief The handbook 
also details procedures for conducting cost-benefit, break-even, and financial analyses. 
Finally, the document mentions two strategies the DoD will undertake to ensure the U.S. 
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maintains a superior technology and industrial capabilities at an affordable price. The first 
strategy is to rely on an industrial base that is sustained by commercial demand, but 
capable of meeting defense needs. By using commercial products and services, the DoD 
benefits from cost efficiencies and technological innovations which are available from a 
much larger commercial market. The second strategy is to take advantage of cost and 
technological benefits afforded the DoD by access to the best global suppliers. In support 
of this strategy, the DoD is pursuing cooperative international development programs 
because they provide sharing of development costs, access to new technologies, and 
access to an international industrial base. [Ref. 66] 
3. The Defense Budget 
Revenues received from the DoD by firms which provide defense-related products 
and services are derived from annual Defense Appropriations Bills passed by Congress and 
signed into law by the President. More commonly referred to as the annual defense 
budget, the defense appropriation provides the services and defense agencies the budget 
authority which allows various procurement activities to enter into contracts which 
obligate these monies. When the defense contractor fulfills the terms and conditions of 
the contract, the previously obligated monies are paid to the contractor in the form of 
outlays from the U.S. Treasury. The defense budget is categorized by type (also known 
as "color") of funding as follows: Operations and Maintenance (O&M); Military Personnel 
(MILPERS); Military Construction (MDXON); Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E); and Procurement. These funding categories not only relate to the 
different purposes of their expenditures, but also have different durations during which the 
appropriated funds must be obligated. For instance, O&M and MILPERS funds expire 
annually; and RDT&E, Procurement, and MDLCON funds expire in two, three, and five 
years respectively. The procurement and R&D funding categories still represent the 
largest portion of the defense budget, and provide funding for development and 
procurement of defense systems. 
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During the Cold War, the defense budget consumed a substantial amount of the 
country's resources. As a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), defense 
spending ranged from 4.8% in 1978 to 14.5% in 1953. Its most recent peak was at 6.5% 
of GDP in 1986 during the height of the "Reagan build-up".   A 1993 report by the DoD's 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) estimated that, "Because of major changes 
in the geopolitical environment and pressing social and economic needs... By 1997, the 
DoD budget is expected to fall to 3.6% of GDP, the lowest... since the end of World War 
II". [Ref. 58: p. iii] 
Defense budget outlays are planned to decline from $380 billion in 1987 to $237 
billion in 1997 (a 30% reduction). The largest outlay reductions (46%) over this period 
will come from military procurement accounts. At the same time, DoD R&D outlays are 
expected to shrink by nearly 24%. However, these reduction plans are less severe than 
those following World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Not only is the current 
drawdown expected to be a smaller reduction in terms of percentage of GDP, it will occur 
at a slower rate than its three predecessors. [Ref. 61: pp. 9-10] 
In support of over 700 Federal laboratories, the Government pays for 43% of the 
Nation's R&D. Most (69% in the mid '80s) of this R&D was spent on defense. In 1992, 
the Federal Government spent $68.2 billion overall on R&D out of a national total of 
$157.4 billion; $41.5 billion of this was defense-related. [Ref. 38] 
Figures 1-1 through 1-4 reflect the changing nature of the most recent defense 
budget authority and outlays, in actual (then year) dollars and constant (1987) dollars 
respectively, for calendar years '86-'94 (equivalent to fiscal years (FY) '87-95). 
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DoD Budget Authority 
Current Dollars 
87 88 89 90 91 92 
FY 
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government 
93 94 95 
Figure 1-1. DoD Budget Authority, Current Dollars, FY '87-'95. 
DoD Budget Authority 
Constant ('87) Dollars 
87 88 89 90 91 92 
FY 
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government 
93 94 95 






Source: Budget of the U.S. Government 
Figure 1-3. DoD Outlays, Current Dollars, FY '87-'95. 
DoD Outlays 
Constant ('87) Dollars 
91 92 
FY 
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government 
Figure 1-4. DoD Outlays, Constant ('87) Dollars, FY '87-'95. 
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4. The Defense Acquisition System 
The DoD procures products and services through the defense acquisition system. 
This system consists of a myriad of laws, regulations and management practices which 
were adopted for laudable purposes such as: to protect the Government's interests; to 
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of tax dollars; to ensure the Government acquisition 
process is fair; and to further social and economic objectives. The August 1993 Defense 
Performance Review/Strategic Plan for Acquisition Reform cited the following examples 
as policies, regulations, or practices which may have outlived their utility in the post-Cold 
War era [Ref. 63: p.4]: 
• Military specifications were adopted to ensure we got a quality product that 
would meet the user's needs while using a procurement process that would 
allow us to buy from the lowest bidder; 
• Cost Accounting Standards and the requirement to provide cost and pricing 
data were adopted to ensure the government could make an "apples-to-apples" 
comparison of the bids of various contractors and as a mechanism to ensure the 
government paid a fair and reasonable price for what it was purchasing; 
• Checks on the government's authority were established to in essence "protect 
the people," in this case suppliers, from certain government demands; 
• Technical data has been requested to ensure the government can operate, repair 
and maintain its equipment without fear of being held hostage to a sole-source 
supplier for spare parts and to obtain reasonable spare parts prices through 
competition; 
Other provisions of law, such as the Davis-Bacon Act, requirements to use 
small businesses, and buy only American-made products were adopted to 
further a particular interest; and finally, 
Oversight within DoD and oversight of its contractors has burgeoned and the 
process increasingly criminalized to ensure there is no fraud, waste, or abuse of 
the system. 
The report considers these and other such rules and regulations to be "barriers to the use 




defense and commercial industrial bases." [Ref. 63: p. 5] The report also criticizes the 
current defense acquisition system as follows, 
The combined net effect of these laws, regulations and practices is a 
system which: adds unnecessary costs to the products of defense 
contractors, making it harder for them to be competitive in the commercial 
marketplace, prevents the government from acquiring products from 
commercial contractors unwilling to change their practices to 
accommodate rules unique to government contractors, and adds to DoD's 
cost of doing business ~ its "management and control" costs. [Ref. 63: p. 
5] 
In order to successfully implement industrial base policy, DoD and other 
Government agencies must eliminate various regulatory barriers to defense conversion and 
commercial diversification efforts. Two specific barriers have been targeted for change 
under the umbrella of acquisition reform: overuse of military specifications and standards; 
and Government business practices, audit, and oversight requirements. These and other 
sweeping acquisition reforms are addressed in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994 (FASA), for which Government agencies are currently drafting implementing 
regulations and guidance. 
For years all companies manufacturing goods for the Government have complained 
of our reliance on cumbersome, outdated, unnecessary, and costly military specs. For 
years these complaints have fallen on the deaf ears of Government procurement officials 
accustomed to using detailed design specs to tell defense contractors precisely "how" to 
manufacture items. Finally, Defense Secretary Perry has directed DoD, "to use 
performance and commercial specifications and standards in lieu of military specifications 
and standards, unless no practical alternative exists to meet the user's needs." [Ref. 67] 
Additional regulatory barriers to companies in the defense industry are the 
Government-unique oversight, accounting, and management practices imposed upon 
Government contractors. As stated previously, excessive Government oversight drives up 
the prices the DoD pays for defense systems. The requirement for contractors to submit 
cost or pricing data is valid in some instances to ensure that both the Government and the 
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contractor are negotiating on a level playing field. The requirement for contractors to use 
Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) can also help the Government achieve cost oversight 
and reduce fraud, but the additional costs caused by these and other oversight 
requirements are significant, as indicated by the studies of RAND and others, 
... the existing regulatory regime imposes additional costs of 
between 10 and 50 percent on the cost of doing business with the DoD. 
How much fraud the regulations deter is impossible to estimate, but it must 
certainly be less than the $15 to $75 billion represented by 10 to 50 percent 
of the acquisition budget. [Ref. 56: p. 71] 
In fact, these additional costs are so high that any losses incurred by eliminating such 
stringent and costly oversight requirements would certainly be acceptable by commercial 
standards [Ref. 3: p. 19]. These requirements discourage defense contractors from 
consolidating their commercial and Government business within the same plants. Unless 
they segregate their facilities, labor, and material, companies will be forced to charge 
higher overhead rates to both their Government and commercial customers. Any effort to 
force higher overhead onto commercial products will stifle efforts such as defense 
conversion, dual-use, and consolidation of the defense and commercial industrial bases. 
In 1993, in support of efforts to identify barriers and facilitate defense-commercial 
transition, the El A conducted a survey of 33 companies which collectively received a third 
of the defense budget [Ref. 7]. The survey revealed that DoD firms perceived significant 
changes in Government laws and regulations were required if they were to be competitive 
in commercial markets. Specifically, industry sources identified: excess Government 
paperwork requirements, concerns over safeguarding of proprietary information, 
Government audit/accounting procedures which force separate Government and 
commercial sides to business units. [Ref. 25: Sec. 2, p. 14] 
Just as the defense industrial base has a number of different stakeholders with 
differing agendas, so too has the defense acquisition system. Among these interested 
parties are: Congressional representatives; defense and service acquisition executives; 
defense contractors; lobbying groups from industry groups and those representing social 
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causes; defense and Service program managers (PMs) and procuring contracting officers 
(PCOs); Government audit and oversight groups such as the GAO, the DoD Inspector 
General (DoDIG), and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA); and the operational 
military forces (i.e., the "user"). Each of these participants have strong incentives for 
supporting or opposing defense acquisition programs. 
To a defense contractor, such programs represent new business opportunities and 
profits to shareholders. However, defense contracts do not guarantee profits, as can be 
illustrated by the Navy's terminated A-12 program. In 1988, the contractor team of 
McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics signed a fixed-price-incentive contract to 
develop the high-tech, radar-evading, stealthy attack aircraft. In 1991, the program was 
terminated for default after the contractor team experienced schedule delays and costs 
which exceeded the value of the contract by $2.7 billion. Although a prudent business 
person might question the selection of a fixed-price contract type for such a technically 
complex program, these contracts offer the potential of higher profits for contractors with 
superior technology, who understand the risks and costs associated with the program. 
Cost-type contracts, on the other hand, place most of the cost and technical risks on the 
Government, as contractors are guaranteed reimbursement for all of their reasonable, 
allowable, and allocable costs, in addition to a specified range of profit, for merely their 
best developmental efforts. Generally, fixed-price contracts are used for production, and 
cost-reimbursable contracts are used during system development. However, historically 
this has not always been the case. After World War II, during the 1950s, 
cost-reimbursable defense contracts were the norm. However, in the 1960s Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) McNamara restricted the use of such contracts in favor of fixed-price 
contracts. This preference was overturned in 1970, as Deputy SECDEF David Packard 
influenced a policy whereby the contract type was to be tailored to the risks involved with 
a particular program. [Ref. 47: pp. 207-9] 
Support or opposition of defense acquisition programs by members of Congress is 
often incentivized by constituency interests. As previously discussed, most members of 
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Congress outwardly favor cutting defense spending, but the individual members disagree 
as to which programs should be affected and how. The following excerpt from a GAO 
report illustrates the nature of Congressional involvement in defense acquisition, 
Even when DoD makes the difficult choice of canceling a program, 
the Congress, in some instances, continues to support it. Such was the 
case during the 1992 budget process, when DoD decided to discontinue 
the M-l tank modernization, the V-22 Osprey aircraft, and SSN-21 
Seawolf submarine programs. Each of these programs continued to 
receive support by key congressional committees, and DoD eventually 
withdrew its opposition. [Ref. 72: p. 39] 
Clearly these decisions had more to do with jobs than with defense requirements. The 
DoD did not plan to discontinue these programs because they lacked military merit, but in 
an environment of lean defense budgets, tradeoffs must be made to bring defense needs in 
line with defense affordability. Such Congressional actions circumvent and upset the 
defense planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). The 1993 Report of the 
Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Acquisition Reform likewise criticized 
Congress for adding $8 billion in the FY '92 budget for weapons procurements which it 
explicitly stated was for maintaining the defense industrial base. Not only did some of 
these actions result in grossly inefficient program stretch-outs, but much of this funding 
was not even requested by DoD. [Ref. 64: p. C-10] 
DoD and Service acquisition executives, and PMs are often incentivized to 
"oversell" their respective programs to other stakeholders in order to maintain reputations, 
careers, and shares of the defense budget for their programs. The present culture of 
defense PMs provides that their programs must meet the exit criteria for the next major 
milestone in order for them to succeed in their military or civil service careers. Since a 
PM's statutory period of service is only for four years or the next major milestone (which 
ever comes first), they often inherit troubled programs that are already behind schedule 
and over cost, have infeasible acquisition strategies, or no longer enjoy the support of the 
user (in terms of requirements) or Congress (in terms of steady funding). After speaking 
with and working with a number of military PMs from all three Services, it is clear to this 
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researcher that no PM was ever promoted for recommending that his program be 
canceled! To the nominated or appointed defense acquisition officials and Service 
executives, whose tenures are often relatively short, defense programs can be an effective 
way to leave a legacy by making short-term decisions with long-term consequences. The 
GAO elaborates that, with such motivation, 
... programs ~ like the B-l - that are eventually fielded despite 
performance, cost, and other significant problems are often considered 
more successful than programs ~ like the Sergeant York ~ that are 
canceled because serious flaws were discovered before fielding. When in 
conflict with responsible management, "successful" outcomes may carry 
more rewards. [Ref. 72: p. 38] 
When the topic of Government audit, inspection and oversight is discussed, one 
cannot help but think of the "rice bowls" involved within the various agencies which 
conduct these functions. These enormous bureaucracies have traditionally served as the 
watch dogs for Congress and the DoD, but as the defense drawdown threatens to reduce 
the size of these organizations, many believe that their primary mission has become one of 
self-preservation. One point is clear, these participants in the defense acquisition process 
often receive much of the blame for the so called "adversarial relationship" between the 
DoD and defense contractors. These organizations have traditionally inspected defense 
acquisition programs for shortcomings as they were approaching major milestones. 
However, SECDEF Perry has recently embraced the common private sector concept of 
Integrated Process and Product Development QPPD) for use by DoD to, 
... make team decisions based on timely input from the entire team 
(e.g., program management, engineering, manufacturing, test, logistics, 
financial management, procurement, and contract administration) including 
customers and suppliers. [Ref. 68] 
The concept calls for all acquisition functions, to include oversight, to employ a spirit of 
teamwork to "design in" success, not "inspect out" failure. 
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B. OBJECTIVE 
The on-going drawdown in U.S. defense spending has left leaders in both 
Government and industry concerned over the survival of the U.S. defense industrial base. 
Although the industrial base debate has a number of aspects, the most important aspect of 
its long-term survival is the financial viability of the firms which conduct defense business. 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to explore whether or not such concern for the 
defense industry is warranted, given various strategic efforts undertaken by the corporate 
management of U.S. defense firms to ensure that their companies remain competitive, 
profitable, and viable as going concerns despite shrinking defense spending. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question to be addressed is: 
• How has the post Cold War defense drawdown affected the financial viability 
of major U.S. defense prime contractors? 
The subsidiary questions to be addressed are: 
• What strategic measures have major defense prime contractors taken to 
enhance their corporate financial viability in the face of shrinking U.S. 
defense spending? 
• How has the defense drawdown affected the solvency of US defense firms? 
• How has the defense drawdown affected the efficiency of US defense firms? 
• How has the defense drawdown affected the profitability of US defense firms? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
While there are a variety of techniques used to conduct financial analysis, most 
include the use of various financial ratios as metrics for determining and conveying 
financial information. Such ratio analysis involves the collection of data elements from 
financial statements such as balance sheets and income statements, and combining these 
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data to form fractions. The mathematical relationships between numerator and 
denominator values serve as measures of financial effectiveness and performance. But a 
ratio value, whether represented as a whole number, percentage value, or number of days, 
is meaningless by itself. It is only when such ratios are compared with other ratio values 
that they can be used for analysis. "Ratios help analysts make meaningful comparisons of 
one firm with another by removing most of the effects of size differences." [Ref. 8: p. 690] 
This study was conducted in five phases: (1) literature research; (2) financial ratio 
selection; (3) sample selection; (4) data collection and synthesis; and (5) data analysis. 
First, a thorough review of available literature was conducted via the libraries of the Naval 
Postgraduate School and the Monterey Institute for International Studies, the Defense 
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), and the Defense Technical Information 
Center (DTIC). The literature review focused on studies of the defense industry, in 
general, and financial ratio analyses, specifically. 
The next phase involved the selection of the most appropriate financial ratios to 
use as measures of financial effectiveness/performance. Financial ratios are generally 
categorized by function, and are thus classified as: solvency, efficiency or profitability 
ratios. While there are other ratio classifications, these are the ones most commonly 
referred to in the accounting literature. The following ratios were chosen as being most 
indicative of: (1) solvency - debt to equity (DE), current ratio (CR), and collection period 
(CP); (2) efficiency - working capital to total assets (WCTA), inventory turnover (ITO), 
and collection period (CP); (3) profitability - return on assets (ROA), gross margin ratio 
(GMR), and return on investment (ROI). 
The next phase required the selection of a sample of defense prime contractors 
which was both manageable within the constraints of this thesis, and representative of the 
defense industry at large. The following 28 companies were selected for evaluation and 
are listed by industry in Value Line's Investment Survey as follows: (1) aerospace/defense - 
Boeing, E-Systems, General Dynamics, General Motors, Litton Industries, Lockheed, 
Martin Marietta (note: Lockheed Martin formed in March 1995), Loral, McDonnell 
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Douglas, Northrop, Grumman (note: Northrop Grumman formed in April 1994), 
Raytheon, (note: Raytheon now owns E-Systems) and Rockwell International; (2) 
diversified - ITT, Textron, and United Technologies; (3) computers and peripherals - IBM 
and Unisys; (4) natural gas - Tenneco; (5) steel (integrated) - LTV; (6) telecom service - 
GTE; (7) machinery - FMC; (8) semiconductor - Motorola and Texas Instruments; (9) 
electronics - Harris; (10) electrical equipment - General Electric, Honeywell, and 
Westinghouse. These companies were chosen by the researcher because they consistently 
(over the period of study) represented the largest dollar values of defense contracts, 
manufacture a variety of both defense and commercial products, and have diverse 
corporate strategies towards their defense business in the post Cold War era. 
Data collection consisted of obtaining the annual reports for corporate fiscal years 
(equivalent to calendar years for most firms) 1986 to 1994 from the sample companies. 
Additionally, during this phase, line of business information was gathered in order to fully 
understand corporate organizations and nature of business bases for the sample 
companies. Business line information was required to separate the sample companies into 
sub-groups based on factors such as: relative sizes (percentage) of defense and 
commercial business bases, industry labeling/categorizing, and strategic efforts such as 
acquisition or divestiture of defense business sectors. Financial ratio data and corporate 
strategies were gleaned from these reports. These data were supplemented by Value 
Line's Investment Survey, Standard & Poor's Corporate Records, and Dun & Bradstreet's 
Industry Norms and Key Business Ratios. These data were entered into a series of Lotus 
1-2-3 spreadsheets for synthesis and computations of financial ratios for individual firms 
and stratified groups, as well as various descriptive statistics used to conduct the graphical 
and statistical analysis during the analysis phase of the research. 
During data collection and synthesis, the sample firms were not only segregated by 
lines of business, they were also separated according to their level of participation in the 
defense industry. The criteria used to group sample firms were: the Value Line Investment 
Survey industry classification of each firm; the amount of defense/Government business 
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relative to commercial business; and strategy toward their existing and future participation 
in the defense industry. For instance, firms which are classified by Value Line as 
aerospace/defense firms, and/or receive a large portion of their sales revenue from DoD, 
and/or have adopted strategies which indicate a desire to remain competitive in the 
defense industry are classified as "defense-dependent" firms. On the other hand, those 
firms whose Value Line classification, defense sales volume, and corporate strategies so 
indicate are classified as "defense-indifferent" firms. These groupings facilitated statistical 
analysis of the data. 
The research concluded with a comparative analysis of the financial data. This 
analysis utilized two analytical techniques: graphical/visual analysis and statistical tests of 
hypotheses. In order to evaluate the solvency, efficiency, and profitability of each 
individual sample firm, the ratio data were used to create a series of line charts displaying 
the value of all eight ratios for each firm over the entire period of study. These charts 
were used to graphically display and evaluate trends and anomalies over the nine year 
period '86-'94. The charts and a brief evaluation of the financial ratios of each of the 
sample firms are presented in Chapter III of this thesis ~ DATA PRESENTATION. 
Similarly, line charts were used to visually display and evaluate sample defense contractor 
ratio values compared to industry averages or norms for these same ratios. In order to 
create these charts, an analysis was conducted to determine the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes in which sample defense contractors most often operated. The 
norms for the various manufacturing industry SICs were obtained from Dun & 
Bradstreet's Industry Norms & Key Business Ratios, and included the median, upper 
quartile, and lower quartile data. These charts are presented in Chapter IV of the thesis ~ 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The statistical analysis of this thesis consisted of tests of a variety of hypotheses 
about the average (or mean) values of various ratios of the sample firms as compared to 
each other and to industry averages. The statistical concept of hypothesis testing allows 
researchers to assess the validity of some conjecture about an unknown population 
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parameter based on data from a representative sample of the population. A series of 
one-sample, one-sided t-tests of hypotheses were conducted to determine whether or not, 
with regard to selected financial ratios, the defense industry (as represented by the sample 
firms) was either better off, the same as, or worse off than all manufacturing firms in 
selected manufacturing industry groups. The financial ratios used for these tests were: the 
current ratio (CR), collection period (CP), and return on assets (ROA). 
Similarly, a series of two-sample, one-sided t-tests of hypotheses were conducted 
to determine whether or not, with regard to selected financial ratios, the defense- 
dependent firms within the sample were either better off, the same as, or worse off than 
the defense-indifferent firms within the sample. The financial ratios used for these tests 
were: the current ratio (CR); inventory turn over (ITO); and the gross margin ratio 
(GMR). The results of the hypothesis testing are presented in Chapter IV — 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS- of the thesis: 
E. SCOPE, ASSUMPTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
As previously mentioned, there are a number of issues surrounding defense 
industrial base viability in an era of defense downsizing. These aspects include, but are not 
limited to: U.S. technology and industrial base policy; surge capability and capacity (i.e., 
industrial mobilization); foreign penetration into U.S. defense markets; raw materials 
supply (excesses and shortages) and foreign dependency; the impacts on American jobs 
and communities; and the financial viability of U.S. defense firms. However, this thesis 
attempts only to analyze the latter aspect. While these and other industrial base concerns 
are interrelated, the author believes financial viability to be the most important aspect of 
defense industry health and survival. Although this thesis mentions some of these other 
industrial base issues, their in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the previously mentioned background information on the defense industrial 
base, the defense budget, and the defense acquisition system is intended to give the reader 
some insight into the environment in which defense firms operate. Although policy 
makers should benefit from the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this 
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research, detailed analysis of U.S. policies and procedures concerning the aforementioned 
topics is also beyond the scope of this thesis. Also, in defining the scope of this thesis, the 
time span chosen to represent the current defense drawdown was from 1986 (the height of 
the Reagan build-up) to 1994 (the last year complete annual corporate financial data were 
available). 
It is assumed that the financial viability of the defense industrial base depends 
strongly on the financial positions of the major defense prime contractors. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that these companies have been under contract for the 
majority of total defense spending (approximately 50%) over the period of study. 
Although some of the classical statistical techniques used during this research require 
random sampling techniques, this requirement was not met, as random sampling is 
required only to ensure that the sample is representative of the population being studied. 
Since these sample firms contract for nearly half of all defense spending, and they 
collectively develop and produce every type of system, product, and service the DoD 
buys, randomness is unimportant. Gathering data from a random sample of defense 
contractors would also have proven prohibitive, given the time constraints of the study, 
and ultimately would not have increased the accuracy of statistical tests. Another major 
assumption is that the financial ratio data for U.S. defense contractors are normally 
distributed, since the formulae used during the statistical analysis require them to be. 
Although it is practically impossible (short of computing the ratio values of every U.S. 
corporation) to determine that the population distribution is precisely normal, such an 
assumption can be inferred for the data used in this thesis. First of all, the literature review 
revealed several similar, previously published financial analyses which also assumed 
normality of such data. Secondly, the Central Limit Theorem holds that the assumption of 
normality is relaxed in cases with a relatively large sample size. In fact, this theorem 
allows us to conclude that for large samples, the sampling distribution of the sample mean 
will be approximately normal, even when the population distribution is not normal. [Ref. 
39: pp. 329-337] 
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Finally, there were a number of limitations encountered during the research. First 
of all, the reader must understand the problems associated with conducting financial 
analysis of companies by using data from consolidated financial statements, problems 
especially challenging when researching defense firms. These problems were summarized 
by a fellow NPS student as follows, and are just as appropriate for this thesis, 
The study of financial condition of companies over time is 
inherently difficult because of accounting changes over time, management 
and technology changes over time, diversification of companies into 
various industry segments, ... variations in data reported by financial 
information (statements), and tax policy changes. The financial condition 
of DoD contractors is further complicated by timing differences of reports, 
Government procurement policy changes.... [Ref. 77: p. 65] 
Another limitation was the use of several financial ratios which may hold negative values 
when computed. Although such conditions (caused by either negative working capital, net 
income, or equity) still allow the researcher to make judgments about a firm's financial 
condition, the magnitudes of such negative ratios are meaningless, and would skew 
statistical computations. Chapter II ~ METHODOLOGY ~ provides a more detailed 




A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature was obtained from the following sources: the libraries of the Naval 
Postgraduate School and the Monterey Institute for International Studies, the Defense 
Logistics Studies Information Exchange, and the Defense Technical Information Center. 
The literature review focused on two areas: previous studies on the defense industry, and 
previous financial ratio analyses. The economic impact of the defense drawdown on the 
defense industrial base in general, and selected industry sectors (i.e., aerospace, 
electronics, etc.) in particular, is somewhat uncertain since the market appraisals depend 
on the prognosticator/analyst. In order to show the different perspectives on the 
conditions (financial and otherwise) experienced by defense industry firms, it was 
important to seek literature published by a variety of sources from both industry and 
Government. Although some might consider reports from industry groups such as the 
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) 
biased, they are good sources for identifying the hopes and fears of firms doing business 
with the Government in general and specifically the DoD. Reports published by 
Government sources such as the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), the Defense Conversion Commission (DCC), and the DoD's 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) might also reflect the biases of the executive 
and legislative branch leaders they serve, but are no less useful in showing the Government 
perspective on defense industrial base concerns. Finally, there are a number of studies 
which attempted to be unbiased, some of which were conducted by fellow NPS students. 
1. Defense Industry Studies 
In 1983, the DoD chartered the Defense Financial and Investment Review 
(DFAIR), an organization with the objective of studying and making recommendations 
concerning defense contract pricing, financing, and profit policies to determine if public 
29 
funds were being spent efficiently. Covering the period of 1975 to 1983, the DFAIR was 
also to determine the status of the defense industrial base. The DFAIR concluded that the 
interests of the taxpayer were being protected, and companies in the defense industry were 
achieving equitable returns on their defense business. [Ref. 62] 
In a separately published Appendix 3 entitled Financial Community Perceptions of 
the Defense Industry, the DFAIR examined the perceptions and concerns of leaders in the 
nation's financial community concerning defense contractors. Financial institutions 
contacted for the study included: commercial banks, life insurance companies, accounting 
firms, investment rating agencies, investment banking firms, and venture capital firms. 
Perhaps the perceptions of investment bankers best summarizes the rosy financial picture 
of a defense industry which was building up prior to 1985, 
...investment bankers consider defense contractors to be in excellent 
financial condition at the present time, especially the top dozen or so firms 
in the industry. They have sufficient cash and are using it for debt 
reduction, acquisitions of other companies, adding to plant and equipment, 
increasing dividends, repurchasing stock, and reducing their liabilities for 
deferred taxes... (defense) contractors are considered profitable, 
managements are well regarded, and... the outlook for these major firms is 
bright,... and they can get all of the money that they want. [Ref. 62: p. 39] 
The study also concluded that defense contractors: possessed ample liquidity; had little 
need for bank financing; had little demand for long-term funds; and were not highly 
leveraged. [Ref. 62] 
A 1986 GAO report on the DFAIR study questioned the methodology used in the 
review, and concluded that defense contractor profits were actually greater than those in 
the commercial sector [Ref. 69]. A 1985 NPS thesis entitled DoD Contractor 
Profitability 1980-1984 similarly concluded that, during this period, defense contractors 
were more profitable and exposed to less risk than like-sized commercial businesses [Ref. 
34], 
The Defense Conversion Commission, a DoD organization formed in April 1992 
to assess the consequences of the defense drawdown, published a December 1992 report 
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entitled Adjusting to the Drawdown.   The report concluded that, "the financial viability of 
the 25 largest DoD prime contractors is not at risk and that they will probably manage the 
drawdown successfully." The DCC report also addressed the trend of acquisitions and 
mergers within the defense industry as an effective means of adjusting to reduced defense 
spending and excess capacity problems. Lastly, the report identified three basic strategies 
adopted by defense firms to cope with the drawdown: rationalizing (i.e., concentrating on 
their core defense capabilities through acquisitions and mergers while shedding 
unprofitable defense business segments), increasing exports, and diversifying into new 
markets (particularly commercial markets). [Ref. 61] 
The outlook within the communications-electronics segment of the defense market 
is somewhat mixed. In a 1993 analysis of the industrial base, the U.S. Army Industrial 
Engineering Activity predicts, "Of all the U.S. industries which have an involvement in 
production of defense-related products, the electronics industry will be the least affected 
by major defense budget reductions now being implemented." [Ref. 44: p. 4-3] However, 
a study conducted by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces cautions that, since DoD 
procures its communications-electronics equipment from a small number of large defense 
contractors, market conditions within this sector are dependent on the future strength of 
the major defense companies [Ref. 20: p. 6]. According to the Logistics Management 
Institute's (LMI) Defense Economic Impact Modeling System (DEIMS), DoD purchases 
50% of the nation's communications and search and navigation equipment from an 
industry grouping projected to suffer a 21% reduction in its business base between 1991 
and 1997 [Ref. 80: p. iv]. However, the Electronics Industry Association (EIA) projects 
that, while overall defense spending will decrease during the next 10 years, defense 
spending on electronics hardware is expected to remain relatively unchanged over the 
same period [Ref. 44: p. 4-3]. 
The outlook for the aerospace segment of the defense industrial base is also 
somewhat mixed, as reflected in the Aerospace Industries Association's (AIA) 1992 
Year-end Review and Forecast. According to the AIA review, segment sales fell 4% 
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during 1992 from a record high of $139 billion the previous year. A 7% ($4 billion) 
reduction in DoD purchases of aerospace products and services caused much of this 
decline in sales. Sales of military aircraft and parts were down 9% ($3.6 billion). The 
review also showed a slight increases in the sales of civil aircraft and space-related 
products and services. However, sales within these sectors actually fell in terms of 
constant dollars. This year marked a change in these two sectors of the aerospace industry 
as both had experienced strong growth over the previous decade. Although aerospace 
industry net profits rose marginally in 1992, profits for the years 1991 and 1992 were 
lower than at any time since 1982. The AIA stated that these lower profits were caused 
by extraordinarily large non-operating expenses brought on by restructuring charges 
related to defense downsizing, and implementation of Financial Accounting Standard 
(FAS) 106, which required firms to account for costs of employee post-retirement benefits 
other than pensions. FAS 106 affected all U.S. companies, and manifested itself as a 
balance sheet adjustment by increasing liabilities and reducing equity. FAS 106 
additionally affected income statements by lowering net profits. The '92 AIA review 
additionally found that profits as a percent of sales, assets, and equity improved for the 
aerospace industry (as they did for all of manufacturing), but industry profitability, as 
measured by these ratios, still underperformed the averages for all manufacturers. [Ref. 1] 
The mere title of a 1988 study prepared by the Air Force Association (AFA) is 
indicative of the "Chicken Little" fears among certain Government and industry officials 
concerning survival of a strong defense industrial base. Despite its biases, this document, 
entitled Lifeline in Danger; An Assessment of the Defense Industrial Base, provides a 
thorough evaluation of the defense industry, and what Government efforts have been or 
should be adopted to rectify problems. The study primarily focuses on problems 
associated with mobilization of the defense industry to meet surge production in the event 
of a major conflict. According to this study, a key contributor to mobilization problems is 
the increasing U.S. reliance on foreign sources of supply for both raw materials and 
high-tech military components (e.g., semiconductors). While this problem and its root 
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cause are beyond the scope of this thesis, it shows the "isolationist" attitude among U.S. 
defense industry interests who want to sell their wares abroad, but vehemently oppose 
defense imports and foreign penetration into U.S. markets. The report also provides 
helpful perspective on problems associated with defense research and development 
(R&D). Despite total Government outlays for R&D rising by 40% over the period 1983 
to 1988, the defense share of these expenditures has slowly been decreasing since 1965. 
The report claims the R&D deficit is exacerbated by Government policies which expressly 
disallow reimbursement of defense contractor Independent Research and Development 
(IR&D) costs. Not only has the DoD underfunded R&D, but during the 1980s, in an 
attempt to encourage private industry to take on more of the financial and development 
risks associated with defense R&D programs, fixed-price contracts became the norm 
within DoD. These fixed-price R&D contracts caused huge losses for many defense 
contractors. The study also reported the results of a survey of the AFA's Industrial 
Associates. Regarding profitability, 98% of respondents reported profitability had been 
affected by changes in tax laws and procurement regulations and such changes were unfair 
to defense contractors. The survey also indicated that two-thirds of the respondents felt 
that these changes had a negative impact on their decisions to bid on some Government 
contracts. Also, 95% of survey respondents reported stretchouts of defense programs, 
which had a negative impact on their financial situation and that of their subcontractors. 
[Ref. 2] 
The Air Force funded a 1994 RAND study entitled Financial Condition of U.S. 
Military Aircraft Prime Contractors. The study examined the effects of declining defense 
spending on the financial conditions of the seven military aircraft prime contractors active 
during the 1980s: Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, 
Northrop, and Rockwell. The RAND study summarizes its findings as follows: 
Overall, a correlation is apparent between size, profitability, level of 
debt, R&D spending, and the degree of dependence on U.S. Government 
sales. The less defense-dependent firms generally are larger in terms of 
sales and more profitable, and have lower debt/capital ratios and higher 
R&D/sales ratios, but this pattern has a few exceptions. [Ref. 42: p. 94] 
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The study also found that, with the possible exception of McDonnell Douglas (MDC), 
none of the sample contractors currently appeared to be in danger of going bankrupt. To 
support its position regarding MDC, the report cited the firm's recent liquidity crisis, and 
impending liabilities on several contracts which are not being acknowledged on the 
company's balance sheet. The report also cautions that the apparently healthy financial 
conditions within the defense aircraft market do not fully reflect the effects of declining 
defense budgets because of lags in defense spending. RAND also echoed the negative 
financial effects of the preferred use of fixed-price R&D contracts by the Government 
during the '80s. These contracts resulted in reducing profits and increasing debt for all 
seven military aircraft prime contractors. Finally, the report reiterated the effect of FAS 
106, as previously addressed by the AI A study. [Ref. 42] 
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a congressional support 
organization, published a report entitled After the Cold War; Living with Lower Defense 
Spending. This report discusses several aspects of the defense drawdown as they affect: 
policy issues and options, displaced defense workers, displaced military, states and 
communities, and defense companies. Only the first and last aspects of the report are 
applicable to this thesis. The report offers opinions and recommendations on various 
programs to assist the transition of defense technologies and production capabilities to 
more commercial use. It also discusses efforts such as: tax incentives for defense 
conversion, intellectual property rights, and contractor IR&D cost recoupment. The OTA 
report addresses the strategies undertaken by the major defense prime contractors to cope 
with the defense drawdown. It also groups the major contractors according to business 
base characteristics such as industry segment and percent of DoD sales. [Ref. 54] In an 
ironic twist of fate, the office which produced this report has recently been closed by the 
Congress — an apparent victim of the very defense drawdown it reported on. 
2. Financial Ratio Analyses 
Although its methodologies were not applied to this thesis, a book entitled A 
Cross-Industry Analysis of Financial Ratios, provided some useful insight into the 
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financial conditions within the defense industry over the period of its study, 1978-1987. 
The following quote summarizes the authors' conclusions regarding the defense industry: 
In general, we find that short-term effects are much more volatile in 
this industry whereas most of the long-term ratios are stable, and higher 
levels of fluctuation are observed in working capital from other than 
operations and in current debt numbers. These represent the significant 
lead times needed to adapt to economic changes, a direct result of the 
highly specialized and capital-intensive production technologies involved. 
[Ref. 24, p. 200] 
In a 1991 study conducted for the Center for Naval Analysis entitled Financial 
Analysis of the Major Defense Contractors, Michael Treglia analyzed the financial 
performance (using nine financial ratios) of twelve major DoD prime contractors from 
1984 to 1989. Tregila's conclusions were: (1) the major DoD prime contractors had 
trouble adjusting to the decline in DoD spending in the second half of the '80s; (2) low 
returns by these firms made their ability to attract equity financing more difficult; (3) 
increased debt by these firms raised the cost of financing for these firms; (4) with 
decreased DoD procurement, the trend will lead to fewer resources and fewer firms in the 
defense industry. [Ref 53] 
A graduate thesis by NPS student Michael Vormbroke entitled An Analysis of the 
Relationship Between the Financial Condition of Major Defense Contractors and DoD 
Spending examined the relationship between defense contractor financial condition and 
defense spending from 1975 to 1990. The thesis examined this relationship at two levels: 
the defense industry in the aggregate, and the individual contractor level. The 
methodology included the use of two financial distress/bankruptcy models to examine 
financial variables of 18 defense prime contractors. The major findings of this thesis were: 
(1) the defense industry in the aggregate has experienced a declining financial condition 
over the period studied; (2) a positive relationship seems to exist between the financial 
condition of the defense industry and the amount of defense spending (i.e., as the amount 
of DoD contract awards decreases, the financial condition of the defense industry as a 
whole will probably continue to decline); (3) no consistent relationship between the 
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financial condition of the 18 different individual defense contractors and the amount of 
defense spending is apparent. [Ref. 77] 
In his thesis entitled The primary Dimensions of Financial Condition for Firms 
Within the Defense Industry, NPS student Robert White examined the primary dimensions 
of financial condition for firms within the defense industry. White conducted a factor 
analysis of 32 financial ratios for 50 defense firms over the period 1983 to 1992. He 
further examined whether such dimensions were represented by a specific subset of 
financial ratios and whether these dimensions and ratios are stable across time. The thesis 
concludes that the following nine factors indicate the primary dimensions of financial 
condition in the defense industry: profit, working capital, cash position, cash flow, 
inventory, debt, liquidity, sales, and receivables. He also found that the following ratios 
most effectively captures the full range of these financial dimensions: Total Income (plus 
depreciation) to Total Assets, Working Capital to Total Assets, Cash Flow to Total 
Assets, and Current Assets to Sales. Finally, White concluded that these dimensions and 
ratios are stable across time. [Ref. 79] 
Another NPS thesis, Financial Ratio Patterns in the U.S. Defense Industry, by 
Guner Gursoy, researched the effect of the dramatic political and economic changes 
(during the period 1983 to 1992) on financial ratio pattern of defense industry firms. He 
compiled 15 financial ratios for a sample of 38 defense contractors over the ten year 
period of study. The author's methodology included the use of statistical techniques such 
as t-tests and analysis of variance (ANOVA). The thesis concluded: (1) profitability 
declined and risk increased in the defense industry; (2) recent years had shown increasing 
dispersion (less uniformity) in financial condition across defense industry firms; (3) there 
was some indication that ratios in the most recent years of the study had become more 
stable, suggesting that the period of greatest turmoil for the defense industry may have 
passed. [Ref. 18] 
The aforementioned RAND study also provided financial analysis using ratios. 
The study states that declining shareholder equity, debt to sales ratios over 20%, and debt 
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to capital ratios over 50% are all indicative of financial weakness. In order to get a rough 
estimate of potential future financial problems, the debt to sales ratios were projected for 
all seven defense aircraft manufacturers. This was done by holding their debt levels 
constant while reducing their military sales (a portion of the denominator) by incremented 
percentages. [Ref 42] The study found that, 
Although several firms appeared to have potential problems on the 
basis of 1990 and 1991 debt levels, most of them have reduced debt 
dramatically over the past few years. Only Lockheed and McDonnell 
Douglas have debt/sales ratios that could exceed 20 percent if their U.S. 
defense sales fell by 25 percent. The remaining firms do not appear to be in 
danger unless their U.S. Government sales fall by 75 percent or more, and 
Boeing and Rockwell's debt/sales ratios would be below 20 percent even if 
their U.S. Government sales fell to zero. [Ref. 42: p. xvii] 
A graduate thesis by Georgia Tech student Romeleo Punsalan, entitled Bankruptcy 
Prediction in the Construction Industry: Financial Ratio Analysis, studied the application 
of two manufacturing industry financial distress/bankruptcy models (those used in the 
Vormbroke thesis) in the construction industry [Ref. 43]. While the findings and 
conclusions of this thesis are irrelevant, its analytical techniques (i.e., t-tests and 
hypothesis testing) help to validate statistical assumptions made during the conduct of this 
thesis. These assumptions, principally that financial ratio variables are normally 
distributed, are also supported by the text Analysis of Financial Statements: Financial 
Accounting and the Capital Market [Ref. 15] and the Gursoy thesis mentioned previously 
[Ref. 18]. 
B. FINANCIAL RATIOS 
While there are a variety of techniques used to conduct financial analysis, most 
include the use of various financial ratios as metrics for determining and conveying 
financial information. Such ratio analysis involves the collection of data elements from 
financial statements such as balance sheets and income statements, and combining these 
data to form fractions. The mathematical relationships between numerator and 
denominator values serve as measures of financial effectiveness and performance. But a 
37 
ratio value, whether represented as a whole number, percentage value, or number of days, 
is meaningless by itself. It is only when such ratios are compared with other ratio values 
that they can be used for analysis. "Ratios help analysts make meaningful comparisons of 
one firm with another by removing most of the effects of size differences." [Ref 8: p. 690] 
Because financial ratios are so widely used in both Government and industry for a 
variety of purposes, there are a large number of them (well over 100, depending on the 
source). Financial ratios are generally categorized by function, and are thus classified as: 
solvency, efficiency or profitability ratios. While there are other ratio classifications, these 
are the ones most commonly referred to in accounting literature. 
1. Solvency Ratios 
Solvency ratios, also known as liquidity ratios, measure the ability of a firm to 
meet both its short and long-term debt paying obligations. These ratios are very important 
to credit managers and lending institutions. If a firm is to remain solvent as a going 
concern, it must obviously pay its creditors and stockholders. The term liquidity refers 
primarily to short-term assets. Liquid assets (such as accounts receivable or marketable 
securities) are cash and those assets that can be easily converted to cash in order to meet 
financial obligations. The solvency ratios selected for this thesis were: debt to equity ratio, 
current ratio, and collection period. They are defined as follows: 
• Debt to Equity = Total Liabilities -*- Total Equity. 
• Current Ratio = Current Assets 4- Current Liabilities. 
• Collection Period = 365 x Average Accounts Receivable ■*- Net Sales. 
The debt to equity ratio measures the proportion of a firm's total liabilities (or 
debt) provided by creditors relative to that provided by stockholders. It is measured either 
as an absolute numeric value or as a percentage. [Ref. 8: p.693] In general, total liabilities 
should not exceed total equity (i.e., a ratio of 1.0 or 100%) since, in such cases, creditors 
have more at stake than owners. For this ratio, lower data values are considered better 
when compared to debt to equity values of other firms. This ratio is termed total liabilities 
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to net worth in Dun & Bradstreet's Industry Norms & Key Business Ratios. Since this 
reference represents this ratio value as a percentage, so too does this thesis. 
An assessment of a firm's short-term liquidity, the current ratio measures the 
degree to which a firm's current assets will cover its current liabilities. The ratio is 
presented as a numeric number representing the number of times current assets are to 
current liabilities (i.e., a value of 3.0 indicates that current assets are three times the 
amount of current liabilities). While no ratios have absolute desirable values, a current 
ratio value of 2.0 or higher is considered good. Creditors typically prefer a firm's current 
ratio be as large as possible, but since current assets earn very small returns relative to 
earnings from investments in long-lived assets, management must minimize the proportion 
of capital invested in current assets in order to maximize profits. [Ref. 8: p. 692] For this 
ratio, this thesis considers higher values to be better when compared to current ratio 
values of other firms. 
A measure of both solvency and efficiency, a firm's collection period indicates the 
average number of days required to collect its receivables (i.e., how long to get paid). It 
also provides an indicator of the quality of a firm's receivables, and serves as a measure of 
the efficiency of a firm's credit policies. [Ref. 60: p. C-l] The lower a firm's collection 
period, the more solvent and efficient the firm is. 
2. Efficiency Ratios 
Efficiency is defined as the ratio of outputs to inputs. Efficiency ratios (also 
known as operating ratios) indicate how effectively a firm uses and controls its resources 
in order to generate sales revenues. These ratios are frequently presented in terms of the 
length of time required to consume or replace (i.e., turnover) selected assets. The shorter 
the asset turnover period, the more efficiently a firm is operating. [Ref. 14: p. 695] The 
efficiency ratios selected for this thesis are defined as follows: 
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• Working Capital to Total Assets = (Current Assets - Current Liabilities) -s- 
Total Assets. 
• Inventory Turnover = Cost of Goods Sold + Average Inventory. 
• Collection Period = (see solvency ratios above). 
Working capital is defined as the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities. The working capital to total assets ratio measures the relative degree to which a 
firm is invested in short-term/quick assets and long-lived/fixed assets. When compared to 
the same ratio values of other firms or industry norms, higher values are better, and 
indicative of more efficiently operating firms. Firms with a negative value for this ratio 
(i.e., current assets less than current liabilities) also have current ratio values less than 1.0. 
Such firms are not only extremely inefficient, but are also relatively insolvent. The 
magnitudes of such negative ratio values are meaningless. 
Inventory turnover refers to the length of time required to record a purchase and 
then sell the purchased goods to customers. The inventory turnover ratio measures the 
number of times a firm's inventory is turned over each year. More efficient firms turn their 
inventories over more frequently, and thus have higher ratio values. Because the value of 
inventories may fluctuate seasonally, the numerator measures a firm's average inventory 
throughout the year. Average inventory is computed by summing the inventory values at 
the beginning and ending of the year, and dividing by two. [Ref. 8: p. 696] 
3. Profitability Ratios 
Profitability refers to a firm's ability to generate earnings or "returns" for its 
owners. Profitability is a key parameter used by a firm's management when selecting 
candidate firms for merger or acquisition [Ref. 6]. Profits are also important to creditors 
as they provide a source for debt coverage. Profit ratios are generally measured relative 
to a number of bases such as assets, sales, or investment. When calculating these ratios, 
the effects of discontinued operations, extraordinary items, or accounting changes are 
excluded. [Ref. 14: p.325]   Profitability will be indicated by the following ratios: 
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• Return on Assets = [Net Income + Interest (Net of Tax)] 4 Average Total 
Assets. 
• Return on Investment = [Net Income + Interest (Net of Tax)] 4- Average Total 
Equity. 
• Gross Margin Ratio = (Net Sales - Cost of Goods Sold) *■ Net Sales. 
Return on assets (ROA) measures the profits earned by a firm through the use of 
all of its capital (i.e., the total capital investment of both creditors and owners). These 
ratios are displayed as percentages. The key indicator of a firm's profitability, this ratio 
matches operating profits with the assets available to earn them. Profit, or return (the 
numerator) is computed by adding net income from operations (after taxes, and before 
extraordinary items and effects of accounting changes) to interest net of tax. Interest net 
of tax is computed by multiplying interest expenses by one minus the effective tax rate. 
The effective tax rate is computed by dividing income taxes by pre-tax income. Average 
total assets is computed by summing beginning and ending assets and dividing by two. 
[Ref. 8: p. 698] Firms which efficiently use their assets to turn higher profits will have 
higher ROA values while poorly run firms will be less profitable and will have lower ratio 
values. Firms which lose money in a given year (i.e., negative net income value on income 
statement), will have a negative ROA. Such a value is meaningless for comparison. While 
the negative value is indicative of poor profitability, the magnitude of the ROA is without 
meaning since a firm must achieve a positive value for net income in order to receive any 
return. During this analysis, negative ROA values were assigned values of zero. In order 
to prevent these data from skewing the results of graphical analysis, medians were 
determined (in lieu of means) where averages were called for. For statistical tests, these 
negative values were assigned a numerical value of zero to counter such an effect. 
Return on investment (ROI) measures the profit earned by a firm through the use 
of capital (equity) supplied its owners. Also displayed as a percentage, this ratio is an 
effective measure of management's performance in maximizing returns for a firm's 
stockholders. [Ref. 8: p. 699] Generally, a value of at least 10% is regarded as a desirable 
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objective for providing funds for dividends as well as future growth. ROI is computed 
similarly to ROA with the exception of the denominator. Like ROA, ROI presents the 
same anomaly involving negative net income, and was treated similarly. 
Gross margin is the difference between net sales revenues and the cost of goods 
sold. The gross margin ratio is a measure of the portion of each sales dollar that is gross 
margin (or gross profit). This ratio indicates the effectiveness of pricing, marketing, 
purchasing, and production decisions within a firm. Higher values are indicative of more 
profitable firms. Although one might expect this ratio value to increase by simply 
increasing selling prices of merchandise, such an action may actually lower a firm's gross 
margin ratio if sales volume were decreased by higher prices. [Ref. 8: p. 698] 
C. THE SAMPLE 
In selecting a sample of defense contractors, a representative and manageable 
number of companies was desired. Since samples from previous NPS theses researching 
the defense industry contained from 15 to 50 companies, this range was considered 
manageable. In order to select a representative sample, two selection criteria were used. 
First, the firms' DoD contract dollar amounts were considered. In order to ensure a 
representative sample, a target of 50% of all DoD contract dollars awarded in given years 
was established. Data on defense contractor rank and annual contract dollar amounts 
were collected from two periodicals: Military Forum [Ref 37] and Government Executive 
[Ref. 36]. These data are presented in Table 2-1. 
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Company '85 Rank '88 Rank •91 Rank •94 Rank •85 $Ms •88 $Ms •91$Ms •94 $Ms 
Boeing 5 12 10 10 $5,462 $3,432 $2,424 $2,068 
E-Systems 52 67 43 27 $370 $286 $434 $748 
FMC 32 43 32 33 $834 $455 $650 $501 
General Dynamics 2 3 2 9 $7,574 $6,043 $6,569 $2,817 
General Electric 4 2 3 4 $5,880 $6,284 $5,823 $3,312 
General Motors 19 11 4 3 $1,578 $3,609 $4,306 $4,368 
Grumman 11 13 9 12 $2,736 $2,935 $2,725 $1,696 
GTE 38 52 16 29 $603 $376 $1,305 $678 
Harris 37 41 77 42 $693 $473 $184 $392 
Honeywell 14 18 36 56 $1,905 $1,509 $546 $261 
IBM 15 21 18 22 $1,785 $1,372 $1,235 $899 
ITT 17 28 22 31 $1,603 $792 $947 $611 
Litton Industries 20 14 14 14 $1,497 $2,477 $1,562 $1,563 
Lockheed 6 7 7 2 $5,085 $4,354 $3,855 $5,739 
Loral 66 55 35 11 $280 $355 $557 $1,746 
LTV 18 25 21 41 $1,579 $998 $1,055 $403 
Martin Marietta 10 4 5 7 $2,742 $5,092 $4,246 $3,188 
McDonnell Douglas 1 1 1 1 $8,953 $8,264 $8,923 $7,218 
Motorola 48 45 51 55 $461 $432 $358 $279 
Northrop 25 33 29 8 $1,195 $613 $748 $2,963 
Raytheon 9 8 6 5 $2,990 $4,124 $4,167 $3,290 
Rockwell International 3 6 13 16 $6,260 $4,437 $2,230 $1,334 
Tenneco 24 5 11 23 $1,250 $4,987 $2,371 $878 
Texas Instruments 21 34 30 20 $1,425 $611 $746 $1,028 
Textron 13 24 17 17 $1,951 $1,118 $1,246 $1,190 
Unisys (Sperry) 16 17 15 28 $1,620 $1,554 $1,457 $707 
United Technologies 7 9 8 6 $3,917 $3,754 $2,951 $3,236 
Westinghouse 12 10 12 13 $1,953 $3,613 $2,274 $1,575 
% of DoD Contract $s 49.3% 50.46% 49.11% 44.74% 
Table 2-1. Contractor Rank & Contract Dollars. 
Secondly, in order to ensure a representative sample, it was important to classify 
sample companies into various subindustries within the defense industry. As classified in 
the August '89 issue of Military Forum, the top defense firms are further segregated into 
the following product/service groups (among others): Ships; Vehicles (including both 
combat and non-combat); Aircraft (including both fixed and rotary wing, and engines); 
Missiles; Weapons; Computer Systems; Electronics and Communications; and Research 
and Development: [Ref. 37] 
• Ships:     Tenneco, Litton,  General Dynamics, Westinghouse,  GE,  Unisys, 
Rockwell, GM, Textron, Raytheon. 






Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas, United Tech., GE, General Dynamics, 
Grumman, Boeing, Lockheed, Rockwell, Textron, GM, Martin Marietta, LTV, 
Northrop, Raytheon, Westinghouse, Loral, E-Systems, IBM, Litton, 
Honeywell, Harris. 
Missiles: Raytheon, Lockheed, General Dynamics, GM, TI, McDonnell 
Douglas, Martin Marietta, Rockwell, LTV, Boeing, FMC, GE, Textron, 
Northrop, Westinghouse, Honeywell, Motorola, GTE, Loral. 
Weapons: General Dynamics, GM, GE, Boeing, FMC, McDonnell Douglas, 
Textron, Loral, Westinghouse, Honeywell, Lockheed, Unisys, TI. 
Computer Systems: Unisys, IBM, Honeywell, GM, Lockheed, Grumman, 
Boeing, Harris, Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, GE. 
Electronics & Communications: Martin Marietta, Raytheon, Unisys, GE, ITT, 
Westinghouse, GM, IBM, Litton, TI, Grumman, Lockheed, Rockwell, 
Honeywell, GTE, Loral, Boeing, Harris, Northrop, Motorola, E-Systems, 
United Tech., General Dynamics, Textron. 
• Research & Development: McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta, Boeing, GE, 
Raytheon, Grumman, Rockwell, Lockheed, GM, General Dynamics, United 
Tech., Textron, Westinghouse, Honeywell, Litton, Unisys, IBM, LTV, 
Northrop, ITT, TI, FMC, Motorola, Harris, GTE, Loral. 
Since all of the proposed sample defense companies fall within one or more of the above 
product segments, the sample was considered representative of the defense industry as a 
whole. 
1. The Boeing Company 
Value Line classifies Boeing as a member of the aerospace/defense industry [Ref. 
76: p. 554]. Prior to 1992, Boeing operated primarily in three industries: commercial 
transportation products and services; military transportation products and related systems; 
and missiles and space. The company now has consolidated and streamlined its operations 
into two business segments: commercial aircraft; and defense and space. The world's 
leading manufacturer of commercial jet aircraft, its product line includes the 737, 747, 
757, 767, and 777. Boeing space systems efforts include(d) the Space Station Freedom 
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and the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) booster rocket. Its defense programs include(d): the 
Avenger; Short Range Attack Missile; Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) Rail Garrison; the Sea Lance and Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) missiles; the B-2 
Bomber (with Northrop); F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) (with Lockheed and 
General Dynamics); V-22 Osprey (with Textron); the 707 and 767 versions of the 
Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS); CH-47D Chinook helicopter; RAH-66 
Comanche helicopter (with Sikorsky); and E-6 submarine communications aircraft. 
Despite operating losses totaling $1.098 billion in its military segment for '88-'91, Boeing 
continues to be competitive and profitable in the defense market. Its strategy of 
involvement in broadly diversified defense and space business is seen by the CEO as a 
clear strength despite ongoing and inevitable cancellations and scale-backs in defense 
programs. Additionally, Boeing has downsized and reorganized its defense, space and 
missiles operations, by combining six divisions into a single profit and loss center ~ The 
Defense & Space Group. By this consolidation, the company hopes to streamline 
operations to lower costs and improve productivity. [Ref 4] 
2. E-Systems Incorporated 
Classified by Value Line in the aerospace/defense industry, the company develops, 
produces, operates, integrates, and supports high tech electronic systems for use in 
intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, navigation, and communications systems. 
E-Systems has five significant product segments: reconnaissance and surveillance 
(formerly electronic warfare); command, control and communications; navigation and 
controls; aircraft maintenance and modification; and other products and services. More 
than half of its business is classified by its primary customer — the U.S. Government. Its 
'94 sales by customer were as follows: U.S. Government 89%, foreign Governments 9%, 
commercial 2%. The company is in a unique position relative to other defense 
contractors. It is not an aerospace company, although aircraft serve as platforms for many 
of its surveillance systems. Although not considered a "black box" company, it integrates 
such components into complex weapons and combat support systems. Key products and 
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services include(d): communications security devices; UHF shipboard communications 
systems; antennae systems for airborne NavStar Global Positioning System (GPS); ground 
and airborne reconnaissance platforms; and Government-Owned Contractor-Operated 
(GOCO) depot maintenance facility management. There are four basic elements of 
E-Systems' business strategy: renewed emphasis and commitment to its traditional 
business and customers; calculated expansion into non-traditional business; continuous 
performance improvements; and continued search for favorable acquisitions. Despite 
defense drawdowns, corporate management expects defense electronics budgets in general 
and the reconnaissance and surveillance segments in particular to continue along a level or 
increased path. As new-start programs become less affordable, more legacy systems will 
be enhanced via improved electronics. As the U.S. withdraws forces and weapon systems 
from various areas world-wide, greater emphasis is expected to be placed on intelligence 
collecting and processing, thereby enhancing the company's growth. Recently the 
company announced it is pending a purchase by Raytheon. [Ref. 9] 
3. FMC Corporation 
Classified by Value Line as a member of the machinery business sector, the 
company makes and sells a broad range of machinery and chemicals. Machinery is sold to 
industrial, agricultural, and defense customers. FMC is the world's leading producer of 
soda ash, and a major producer of phosphorus, hydrogen peroxide, agricultural chemicals, 
and lithium compounds. It operates 99 manufacturing facilities and mines in 21 countries. 
[Ref. 76: p. 1315] The company operates in five industry segments: performance 
chemicals; industrial chemicals; machinery and equipment; defense systems; and precious 
metals. FMC's key defense programs include(d): the Ml 13 Armored Personnel Carrier; 
the M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles; the chassis for the Multiple Launch Rocket 
System (MLRS); Trident missile tubes; various naval gun and launch systems (MK41 and 
45); the Armored Gun System (AGS); and the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS). 
While the company is well entrenched as a sole or dual source supplier of armored ground 
vehicles, it has experienced declining returns on its defense business. In a strategic move 
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to further secure its strong position in this market, FMC combined its defense operations 
with complementary defense operations of Harsco Corporation's BMY Combat Systems 
Division to form United Defense Limited Partnership effective January, 1994. The 
company is jointly owned by FMC (60%) and Harsco (40%). The company is also 
expanding its defense business via international opportunities such as Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) and joint ventures with customers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, 
Australia, Taiwan, Greece, Japan, and Pakistan. [Ref. 10] 
4. General Electric Company 
Classified as a member of the electrical equipment industry by Value Line, GE is 
one of the largest and most diversified industrial companies in the world. It operates in 
the following industry segments (percent of'94 sales shown): aircraft engines (14%); 
appliances (15%); broadcasting (8%); industrial products and systems (23%, includes 
lighting, locomotives, motors and industrial automation); materials (14%, primarily 
plastics); power generation (15%, turbine generators); and technical products and services 
(11%, medical systems and computer services). The company also owns GE Capital 
Services which provided the parent company with $2 billion in other earnings in '94. [Ref. 
76: p. 1009] Major defense systems include(d): the Fl 10 jet engine (for F-14 and F-16 
aircraft); the F404 engine (for the Advanced Tactical Fighter and F/A-18); the Fl 18 
engine (for the B-2 bomber); the Aegis air fleet defense system; the Phalanx anti-missile 
defense system (second source); combat systems for the Seawolf submarine; systems 
engineering and integration for Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programs; antisubmarine 
warfare systems on surface ships; and the Army Tactical Command and Control System 
(ATCCS). However, except for military aircraft engines, the company exited the defense 
industry through its April, 1993 divestiture of its aerospace business segment. [Ref. 12] 
5. General Dynamics Corporation 
According to Value Line, the company operates in the aerospace/defense industry. 
Almost all of General Dynamics' revenues are derived from the U.S. Government. [Ref. 
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76: p. 560] During the period of this thesis, the company reorganized its business 
segments three times as follows: '86-'90 Government aerospace, submarines, land systems, 
and general aviation; *91 military aircraft, submarines, missile systems, land systems, and 
space systems; and '92-'94 nuclear submarines, and armored vehicles. U.S. Government 
sales (as a percent of total sales) over the period were as follows: '86-'91 84%-87%; and 
■92-'94 94%. Major defense systems include(d): the F-16 Falcon, the F-22 ATF (teamed 
with Lockheed and Boeing), and the A-12 (now canceled) aircraft (teamed with 
McDonnell Douglas); the Trident, the SSN-688 Los Angeles class, and the SSN-21 
Seawolf nuclear attack submarines; the Ml, Ml Al, and M1A2 Abrams main battle tank; 
the Standard, Phalanx, Sparrow, Stinger and Tomahawk cruise missiles; the 
Inter-vehicular Information System (IVIS); and the Single Channel Ground and Airborne 
Radio System (SINCGARS). Since 1990, GD's strategy toward declining defense budgets 
has been to shrink itself. The principal focus of management has been to increase 
shareholder value which in '90 had declined by 71% from its '86 high. The main tenet of 
this strategy has been to sell off all business segments except those in which the company 
is either the top or second place producer. The outcome of this strategy has been the 
selling of its Missile Division ('91), Tactical Aircraft Division ("93), and its Space Launch 
Systems ('94) business units. The company is now a lean one which is the top producer of 
two products: submarines and armored vehicles. [Ref. 11] The A-12 debacle, whereby the 
Government terminated the contract for default in '91 due to excessive costs and schedule 
delays, caused GD's exit from the military aircraft market. However, the company hopes 
to gain a settlement likely ranging in the hundreds of millions, as the Federal Claims Court 
has ruled the Navy at fault for program termination [Ref. 76: p. 560]. 
6. General Motors Corporation 
GM is the world's largest auto manufacturer. Automotive products accounted for 
over 81% of'94 sales. [Ref. 76: p. 105] Currently, the company has broken down its 
operations into five business sectors: North American Automotive Operations; 
International Operations; General Motors Acceptance Company (GMAC, principally an 
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auto financing/credit subsidiary); Electronic Data Systems (EDS, purchased in '84); GM 
Hughes Electronics (GMHE, purchased in '86 as Hughes Aircraft). All of the company's 
defense business is conducted via GMHE, a wholly-owned subsidiary, which operates 
three business segments: automotive electronics; telecommunications and space; and 
defense electronics. Although the company does not break out its defense business, 
GMHE accounted for 21.4% of GM's consolidated '94 earnings. In fact, GM boasts of 
GMHE's record earnings and revenues, as they have steadily increased since '92. GMHE's 
two business segmentd doing defense work, telecommunications & space and defense 
electronics, contributed 17.9% and 39.6% respectively to GMHE's '94 revenues. Key 
defense systems include(d): laser rangefinders and thermal imaging systems for the Ml 
tank; guidance electronics and sensors for Trident missiles; other missile programs 
including the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), Phoenix, 
Sparrow, Stinger, Maverick, Tomahawk cruise, and Tube-launched Optically-tracked 
Wire-guided (TOW); airborne radar systems for the F-14, F-15, F/A-18, AV-8B, TJ-2R, 
B-2, and AC-130 aircraft; the Army's Enhanced Position Location Reporting Systems 
(EPLRS); and the MK-48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) torpedo.  Recognizing the 
opportunities of the defense drawdown, GMHC's strategy to: (1) use acquisition 
(purchased GD's missile business in '92) and strategic alliances to increase market 
penetration; (2) leverage technology base into businesses that are extensions of core 
competencies with sustainable competitive advantages; and (3) consolidate defense 
business is rationalized in its '92 annual report [Ref. 13: p.20], 
With the reduction of new defense program starts for aircraft, ships, 
tanks, and communications systems, the trend toward upgrading existing 
platforms and systems should accelerate. Such modernization will require 
the type of advanced electronics systems that are GMHE's strengths. 
7. Grumman Corporation 
Grumman operates in the aerospace/defense industry. Prior to its '94 merger with 
Northrop, the company operated four business segments: aerospace; electronic systems; 
49 
information and other services; and special purpose vehicles. Grumman's key defense 
systems include(d): the F-14 Tomcat, A-6 Intruder, E-2C Hawkeye, EA-6 Prowler, 
EF-111 Raven, OV-1 Mohawk aircraft programs; the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS); and the Integrated Family of Test Equipment (IFTE). 
Its strategy in the face of falling defense budgets has been to consolidate and restructure 
its military aircraft manufacturing operations. In '93 the results of these efforts were 
expected to be: a one-third reduction of its 15 million square feet of manufacturing, office, 
and warehouse space; and a 46% reduction in its number of employees since '87. [Ref. 16] 
The following quote from Grumman's last annual report ('93), serves as a precursor of its 
'94 merger (although Northrop actually purchased Grumman) with Northrop: 
Forty years ago, there were about 18 manufacturers of tactical 
aircraft. Today there are about five ~ and the Department of Defense has 
said that within 10 years there will be only two. We cannot ~ will not ~ 
gamble Grumman's future on the dim chance that we will be one of them. 
[Ref. 16: '93, p. 3] 
8. GTE Corporation 
Value Line reports GTE as a member of the telecommunications service industry. 
The company owns the largest non-Bell telecommunications system, and serves 22.8 
million access lines in 29 states, the Dominican Republic, Canada, and Venezuela. It is the 
second largest provider of cellular service, with a controlling interest in 77 metropolitan 
and 42 rural service areas. [Ref. 76: p. 757] GTE's operations are broken down into two 
segments: telephone operations (80% of revenues); and telecommunications products and 
services (20% of revenues). All of the company's defense business is conducted by its 
Government Systems Division, one of six business units within the telecommunications 
products and services segment. GTE Government Systems' products and services include: 
command, control, communication and intelligence systems; electronic defense systems; 
systems integration; tactical and strategic communication systems; communication 
switching and information systems. GTE's key defense systems include(d): the Army's 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) tactical communications system; data processing for 
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the Air Force's Joint Space Command Intelligence Center; the Magic Mast antenna mast 
supporting the Patriot missile system; telephone switching systems providing secure 
communications for DoD at military command centers worldwide; and radio receivers as 
part of the Navy's Extreme Low Frequency (ELF) submarine communications system. 
Despite the defense drawdown, GTE's Government Systems business unit has continued 
to increase its customer base, receiving orders valued at $1.2 billion in '94. As a strategic 
protective measure, GTE is effectively obtaining customers from other Government 
agencies such as: the Departments of Agriculture and Transportation; the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the National Weather Service. 
Additionally, as defense sales have declined, GTE Government Systems has maintained its 
profitability by reducing costs more than enough to offset revenue declines. [Ref. 17] 
9. Harris Corporation 
A member of the electronics industry, Harris develops, designs, manufactures, 
markets, and services high-tech electronics systems (34% of'94 sales), semiconductor 
devices (19% of'94 sales), communications systems (19% of'94 sales), and office 
equipment and business communication products (Lanier Worldwide, 28% of'94 sales). 
[Ref. 76: p. 1037] These four product lines equate to the company's business segments. 
U.S. Government sales by all segments (although primarily from electronics systems) have 
been around 35% of total sales for the past three years. Since '90, the company has 
maintained 23-26% of its business base from the DoD. Key defense systems include(d): 
advanced communications and information processing systems for aircraft such as the 
Army's LHX (Comanche) helicopter, the Navy's A-12, and the Air Force's F-22 ATF; the 
Global Positioning System (GPS); Ground Mobile Forces SATCOM terminals and 
Jam-Resistant Secure Communications terminals for the Army and Air Force; and various 
HF, UHF, and VHF radio equipment. Harris' corporate strategy toward declining defense 
business includes efforts to expand into international military and commercial satellite 
applications. Because of its role as a supplier of high tech microelectronics subsystems 
and components, the company expects to maintain its defense business base, as many of its 
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products will be used to upgrade existing defense systems in lieu of new-start programs. 
[Ref. 19] 
10. Honeywell Incorporated 
A member of the electrical equipment industry, Honeywell is a worldwide 
manufacturer and marketer of control systems and components for use in its three business 
sectors: homes and buildings (44% of'94 sales); industrial (30%); and space and aviation 
(24%) [Ref. 76: p. 1012]. As part of its corporate strategy to reduce its dependence on 
weapons markets, the company divested its Defense and Marine Systems businesses in 
'89-'90, thereby setting a goal of relying on Government contracts for less than 15% of its 
sales. Key defense systems include(d): the MK-46 and MK-50 torpedoes; the Sense and 
Destroy Armor (SADARM) precision munition; the 120mm ammunition for the Ml tank; 
the AT-4 dismounted antitank weapon; the Combined-Effects Munitions (an air-delivered, 
free-fall cluster munition); cockpit displays, air data computers, electronic flight controls, 
and a flight management systems for the Air Force C-17; avionics and flight management 
systems for the F-15 fighter and the CH-47 Chinook helicopter; helmut-mounted displays, 
flight controls, cockpit displays and an integrated avionics suite for the Army Apache 
helicopter; the Army's Volcano modular mine dispensing system; and the Embedded GPS 
Inertial Navigation System for military aircraft. Despite declining defense budgets, 
Honeywell management is expecting the need for its products to remain stable. The 
company is targeting profitable growth in military business by focusing its efforts on: cost 
control, global retrofit market for aging aircraft, and taking a leading role in converting 
commercial avionics applications to military uses. [Ref. 21] 
11. International Business Machines Corporation 
A member of the computer and peripherals industry, IBM is the world's largest 
supplier of advanced information processing products, including computers and 
microelectronic technology, software, networking systems and information 
technology-related services. The company operates the following business segments: 
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hardware (51% of 94 revenues); software (18%); maintenance (11%); services (15%); 
and rentals and financing (5%). Foreign business accounted for 52% of IBM's '94 
revenues. [Ref. 76: p. 1096] In '92 IBM formed a business unit known as the Federal 
Systems Company (FSC) by consolidating Federal Systems (which marketed specialized 
products and services to defense and other Government agencies) and Federal Systems 
Marketing (which offered commercially-available IBM products to Government agencies). 
However, FSC was divested to Loral in January, '94 in a strategic move to "right size" 
IBM by eliminating assets and expenses not fundamental to its core business. This, and 
other divestitures, were brought on by three consecutive years of loss. Although Federal 
Systems Marketing was not sold during the divestiture to Loral, IBM no longer sells 
Government customer-unique systems. [Ref. 22] 
12. ITT Corporation 
Value Line classifies ITT as a diversified industry participant. The company 
operates the following business segments: insurance (50% of'94 operating profits); 
automotive parts (20%); defense and electronics (5%); hospitality and entertainment 
(10%); fluid technology (6%); and communications and information services (9%, 
principally international Yellow Pages directories). [Ref. 76: p. 1372] Key defense 
systems include(d): the SINCGARS tactical radio; the AN/ALQ-165 Airborne 
Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) system for F/A-18 fighter aircraft; the Army's Advanced 
Threat Radar Jammer (ATRJ); the AN/AVS-6 Aviator's Night Vision Imaging System, 
and the AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles; the AN/SPS-48E air search radar system; the 
AN/ALQ-172 Electronic Countermeasures system for use by the special operations C-130 
fleet; and the Integrated Data Transport System (IDTS). During '94, ITT Defense and 
Electronics increased its income by 52% over the previous year, as sales grew due to 
successful implementation of its corporate strategy toward the defense industry: increase 
international defense sales; introduce defense technologies into civilian markets; focus on 
new product development; and restructure to reduce unnecessary costs. [Ref. 23] 
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13. Litton Industries Incorporated 
Value Line classifies Litton as a member of the aerospace/defense industry. U.S. 
Government sales were 73% of'94 revenues. [Ref. 76: p. 564] Litton is a leader in the 
high-tech markets of navigation; guidance and control; electronic warfare; and command, 
control, and communications. It also manufactures, overhauls, repairs, and modernizes 
large multi-mission surface combat ships for the Navy. Prior to '93, the company operated 
in three business segments: advanced electronics; marine engineering and production; and 
industrial systems and products/services. As part of the corporate strategy to devote all 
management concentration and financial resources to building a stronger 
aerospace/defense business, the latter business unit was spun-off to shareholders in '93. 
Key defense systems include(d): the Aegis guided missile cruiser; the Navy's LHD 
amphibious assault ships; overhaul of selected destroyers (with vertical launch missile 
systems) and submarines; Tactical Air Operations Modules (TAOC) and Modular Control 
Equipment (MCE) for Air Force and Marines command, control, and communications; the 
AN/ALR-67 and AN/ALR-56M airborne threat radar warning system for attack and 
fighter aircraft; second generation laser gyro systems used in the Apache Longbow and 
Comanche helicopters; electronic warfare and inertial navigation systems for the Navy 
A-12; and avionics for the Air Force F-22. The corporate strategy of focusing all efforts 
on defense business was further manifested by the January '94 formation of Western Atlas, 
a new independent public corporation for Litton's commercial business. [Ref. 26] 
14. Lockheed Corporation 
Until '93, Lockheed was already a major player in the aerospace/defense industry, 
with 64% of its '93 sales to DoD customers. However, in '94 the company shocked the 
financial world when it merged with fellow defense industry giant Martin Marietta to form 
the world's largest aerospace/defense company — Lockheed Martin. Through '93, 
Lockheed operated in various combinations/reorganizations of the following four business 
segments: aeronautical systems; missiles and space systems; electronic systems; and 
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technology services (formerly information systems). Lockheed segregated its customers 
into three groups: U.S. Government, foreign Government, and commercial. From its '87 
high of 90%, Lockheed's Government sales steadily decreased to its '93 low of 77%. 
Similarly, its defense sales declined from 83% to 64% over this same period. Key defense 
systems include(d): the F-22 ATF (with Boeing and General Dynamics); the F-l 17A 
Nighthawk stealth fighter; the C-130 and C-5B strategic airlift aircraft; the P-3 Orion 
antisubmarine warfare patrol aircraft; the Navy's Trident fleet ballistic missile program; the 
MILSTAR military communications satellite program; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
program development; engineering and technical support for the Army's White Sands 
Missile Range and Dugway Proving Grounds test facilities; and the Army's Theater High 
Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD). One cannot discuss Lockheed's contribution to 
the DoD without mention of its "Skunk Works" advanced development company, a 
renowned industry leader in creating innovative aeronautic technology. In '92, as a move 
to strengthen its position in the defense segment, Lockheed purchased General Dynamics' 
aircraft business which included the F-l6 aircraft. This acquisition also provided 
Lockheed a robust component of international business through F-l 6 sales to allied 
nations. As a result of this purchase, the company anticipated its business mix to shift 
from 67% to about 55% in U.S. defense sales, while total sales continued to grow. Its '93 
corporate strategy consisted of five elements: (1) focus on core business to sustain the 
corporation; (2) maintain premier technology which distinguishes Lockheed from its 
competitors; (3) enter related markets to develop a more balanced business base; (4) 
capitalize on acquisitions which enhance technical and financial strength; and (5) reduce 
costs to improve competitiveness. In support its strategic pillar of seeking new 
non-defense markets, Lockheed entered into two business ventures in '93. First, an 
agreement with Motorola to launch the satellites for its IRIDKIM commercial 
communications satellite network. Secondly, Lockheed established a foothold in the 
commercial space launch market when it entered into a joint venture with two Russian 
companies (Khrunichev and Energia). The Russian companies will provide the Proton 
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booster while Lockheed provides the payload launch vehicle and markets the operation. 
[Ref. 27] 
15. Loral Corporation 
Value Line also reports Loral as an aerospace/defense company. Loral is a 
high-tech company specializing in defense electronics, telecommunications, space, and 
systems integration. About 80% of the company's '94 sales were to U.S. Government 
customers. [Ref. 76: p. 567] Since '86 Loral has restructured from strictly a defense 
electronics business to one that operates in the following broad business segments: 
defense- sectors include electronic combat, training & simulation, tactical weapons, and 
command, control communications & intelligence (C31)/reconnaissance; systems 
integration; and telecommunications and space. Key defense systems include(d): various 
aircraft self-protection devices such as the ALR-56, ALQ-131, ALQ-178, ALQ-157, 
ALQ-123, ALE-39, AAR-47; flight simulators for the F-4, E-2, A-6, F-15; the Multiple 
Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES) laser-based training simulation system; 
the Army's Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) for the Ml tank; the Rotodome 
antenna for AWACS aircraft; the AIM-9M/P & R Sidewinder missile; the NITE Hawk 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) targeting system for the F/A-18; the Chaparral mobile 
air-defense system for the Army; Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine (VLA) rockets for 
Navy guided missile cruisers and destroyers; the Army's Maneuver Control System 
(MCS); the Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) weapons system; the Extended Range 
Interceptor (ERINT) missile; the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Army 
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS); the Marine Corps' Predator short-range antitank 
weapon; the Navy's Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) MKIII antisubmarine 
warfare helicopter; and the Army's Command and Control Vehicle (C2 V). Loral's two 
principal strategic thrusts in dealing with the defense drawdown are: to maintain leadership 
in key military technologies by leveraging research and development investments in core 
business while continuing to improve its low-cost productivity; and to acquire valuable 
defense-related companies whose availability is the result of the industry's consolidation. 
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The latter strategy manifested itself in the following acquisitions: Goodyear Aerospace 
('87); Electro-Optic Division of Honeywell ('89); a 51% stake in Ford Aerospace ('90); 
LTV's Missiles business unit ('92); and IBM's Federal Systems ('94). [Ref. 29] 
16. The LTV Corporation 
Listed as an integrated steel manufacturer in Value Line, LTV is the nation's third 
largest steel producer. The company emerged from seven years of bankruptcy protection 
in June, '93. [Ref. 76: p. 1412] With the '92 selling off of the company's Air Products, 
Missiles, and AM General Divisions, LTV ceased to be in the aerospace/defense business. 
LTV now operates in two business segments: (1) the steel segment which produces a 
diversified line of carbon steel products consisting of hot rolled and cold rolled sheet, 
galvanized, tin mill and other flat rolled coated products, tubular products and iron ore 
mining; and (2) the energy products segment which manufactures and sells oil and gas 
drilling equipment, oil field supplies, and industrial supplies. While in the defense industry, 
the company's key defense systems included: the Army Tactical Missile System 
(ATACMS) artillery weapons system; the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV or "Hummer"); rockets and launchers for the MLRS; sections/components of 
the B-1B, B-2 and C-17 aircraft; the Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) warhead for 
the MLRS; the Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) weapons system; and the Extended 
Range Interceptor (ERINT) missile system. Although currently solvent and profitable, 
LTV gives no indication of reentry into the defense industry. [Ref. 30] 
17. Martin Marietta Corporation 
Until '93, the company was already a major player in the aerospace/defense 
industry, with 67% of its '93 sales to DoD customers. However, in '94 the company 
shocked the financial world when it merged with fellow defense industry giant Lockheed 
to form the world's largest aerospace/defense company — Lockheed Martin. Through '93, 
Martin Marietta operated in various combinations/reorganizations of the following four 
business segments: electronics (41% of'93 sales); space (36%); information systems 
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(13%); and materials (5%). Key defense systems include(d): the Titan IV rockets; the 
Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) system; the Small ICBM program; 
SDI programs; the TADS/PNVS electro-optical navigation and targeting system for the 
AH-64 Apache helicopter; laser guidance system for the Hellfire missile; the Low-Altitude 
Navigation and targeting system (LANTIRN) for the F-15 & F-16; the Copperhead 
laser-guided artillery shell; components of the Patriot missile system; the Army's Pershing 
II intermediate-range missile program; components of the B-1B; advanced electro-optical 
systems for the Comanche helicopter; the Advanced Antitank Weapon System- Medium 
(AAWS-M), later renamed the Javelin, shoulder-fired infrared missile system (joint 
venture with Texas Instruments); the Vertical Launching System (VLS) antiaircraft, 
surface and submarine missile systems aboard Navy cruisers and destroyers; the Mark 50 
antisubmarine torpedo; and GOCO management of the Milan Army Ammunition Plant. 
Martin Marietta's corporate "Peace Dividend" strategy called for: (1) growing the 
company's share of the defense market through cost competitiveness, technology 
advances, and exploitation of acquisition and consolidation of defense business units; (2) 
continued expansion into closely related civil Government and commercial markets; (3) 
and enhancing share value by maintaining a strong balance sheet and pursuing avenues that 
promise good returns to stockholders. This strategy was manifested in the '93 
combination (although GE reports its selling) with GE Aerospace, and the '94 purchase of 
General Dynamics' Space Systems Division. The GE Aerospace deal was expected to 
enable Martin Marietta to consolidate facilities in order to reduce its capacity by 
approximately five million square feet. [Ref. 32] 
18. McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
Prior to the aforementioned formation of Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas 
was, in terms of dollar amounts of contracts, the number one defense contractor. Its '94 
customer base consisted of 62% Government sales. The company remains the world's 
largest builder of military fighter and transport aircraft; the third largest commercial 
aircraft maker; and a leading producer of helicopters, missiles, and satellite launch 
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vehicles. The company currently operates four business segments: military aircraft; 
commercial aircraft; missiles, space and electronics systems; and financial services. The 
company's commercial aircraft include the MD-80, MD-90, MD-11, and KC/DC-10 
airliners. Key defense programs include(d): the F-15 Eagle, F/A-18 Hornet, AV-8B 
Harrier fighter aircraft; the C-17 transport aircraft; the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter; 
the now canceled A-12 aircraft program; the T-45 Goshawk trainer aircraft; the Harpoon 
anti-ship missile; the Delta II rocket; the Dragon shoulder-fired antitank weapon; 
co-production of the Tomahawk cruise missile; the Standoff Land Attack Missile 
(SLAM); and the Mast Mounted Sight electro-optical system mounted on the OH-58D 
helicopter. Corporate strategy toward the defense drawdown is a "here we stand" 
strategy based on what it perceives to be unique strengths as an aerospace company. The 
company has no intention of diversifying into new and unfamiliar business. Unlike its 
aerospace industry competitors, McDonnell Douglas has chosen not to rely on 
consolidation and merger to tackle the problems of excess capacity and decreasing 
demand. Instead the company has reduced capacity directly by closing four major 
fabrication plants, and making better use of remaining facilities. The company further 
indicates that it has not attempted to buy military aircraft market share because it already 
has it. Indeed, the company is the prime contractor for 46 of the 55 fixed-wing aircraft 
ordered by the U.S. Government in the FY 95 defense budget. Further, the company 
believes the upgrading of its aircraft to be a cost-effective alternative to new systems 
development. [Ref 33] 
19. Motorola Incorporated 
According to Value Line, the company is a member of the semiconductor industry. 
Motorola operates predominantly in the wireless communications, semiconductor 
technology, and advanced electronics industry segments. Product line includes two-way 
radios, pagers, cellular telephones and systems; semiconductors (including integrated 
circuits and microprocessor units); data communication and distributive processing 
equipment and systems; and electronic equipment and industrial electronic products. [Ref. 
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76: p. 1067] Only 44% of the company's '94 sales were to U.S. customers. Almost all of 
the firm's Government business is conducted by the Government and Space Technology 
Products (formerly Government Electronics) business unit, which has declined steadily 
from 9% of total sales in '86 to 4% in '94. Key defense products and systems include(d): 
FMU-139/B and FMU-140 fuses and FZU-48 generators supporting Air Force and Navy 
requirements; the FZU-93/B proximity sensor used on the Combined Effects Munitions 
System; the MK-45 target detection devices for the Navy's Standard Missile; Navy UHF 
Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) units, and electronic maintenance 
components; a down-sized Ground Station Module for the Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS); the Secure Telephone Unit III (STU-III); the Navy's 
Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS); the Future Secure Voice System (FSVS); the 
KG-94A digital encryption/decryption device; the Lightweight Satellite Terminal 
(LST-5C); and the 21st Century Land Warrior Generation II Soldier system. The 
company attributed steadily declining sales in the Government business segment to defense 
programs being scaled back or drawn out. In '86 the company was concerned with 
controlling the excessive costs to comply with Government regulation and oversight. The 
strategy in '87 was to reduce cycle time in order to improve productivity and lower costs. 
This productivity improvement strategy was designed to improve competitiveness in the 
company's core businesses while penetrating related new domestic and international 
markets with commercial business potential. [Ref. 35] 
20. Northrop Corporation 
An aerospace/defense company, over 88% of Northrop's '93 sales were to the U.S. 
Government. In '94 the company merged with a competitor, the Grumman Corporation, 
to form Northrop Grumman. Government sales for the new merged company were 85% 
of'94 sales. The company operated in four industry segments: aircraft; electronics; 
missiles and unmanned vehicle systems (MUVS); and services. Northrop commercial 
aircraft business provided fuselages for the Boeing 747 airliners. Major defense systems 
include(d): the B-2 stealth bomber; guidance systems for the MX and AMRAAM missile 
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systems; subcontractor to McDonnell Douglas for several components/sections of the 
F/A-18; the AGM-136A Tacit Rainbow missile vehicle (an aerial radar-searching drone); 
electronic countermeasures systems such as the AN/ALQ-135, 161, 162 and 171 for use 
on numerous attack and bomber aircraft; the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile 
(TSSAM) program; and the BAT "brilliant" anti-armor submunition. Prior to the '94 
merger, Northrop's corporate strategy was to remain a significant part of the U.S. defense 
technology base while expanding its commercial aircraft structures business. The strategy 
was brought about by the company's belief that it has and will continue to anticipate 
aerospace customer requirements in a post Cold War environment. Northrop further 
rationalized this strategy by believing its product line to compliment the emerging defense 
need for long reach, quick-strike, survivable, standoff, precision weapon systems. [Ref. 
40] 
21. Raytheon Company 
Although classified as an aerospace/defense firm, Raytheon produces a diverse 
variety of products. Prior to '94, the company was organized into the following four 
business segments: electronics (41% of'94 sales); aircraft products (17%); major 
appliances (14%); and energy (and environmental) services. In '94, the latter business unit 
was replaced by a segment reported as engineering and construction which produced 28% 
of Raytheon's '94 sales. Over the period of'86 to '94, the company's customer base has 
gone from 53% Government (including foreign military sales) and 47% commercial, to 
35% Government and 65% commercial. Its commercial products include: corporate jets 
and turboprop jets; and home appliances under the brand name Amana, Caloric, and Speed 
Queen. Key defense systems include(d): the Patriot, Hawk, Sparrow, Sidewinder, 
Maverick, Standard Missile-2, Phoenix, and AMRAAM missiles; electronic 
countermeasure systems such as the AN/ALQ-99, 142, 184, and AN/SLQ-32; the Navy's 
Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Program (NESP); key elements of the Aegis 
defense system aboard Navy cruisers and destroyers; the C-12 operational support and 
utility aircraft; aerial missile targets such as the AQM-37, BQM-126, MQM-107; 
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mine-hunting sonar systems such as the AN/SQQ-32 and AN/SQS-20; the AN/TRC-170 
troposcatter radio system; Air Force Military Strategic Tactical and Relay (MILSTAR) 
terminals; computer systems for JSTARS; composite winglets and landing gear doors for 
the C-17; and the Ground Based Radar for the THAAD missile defense system. Raytheon 
plans to remain a formidable competitor in defense during existing and future periods of 
intensified competition and lower defense spending. To meet this objective, the company 
has restructured its operation by consolidating all missile manufacturing into a single 
facility, and consolidating all defense-related business units into the Raytheon Electronics 
Systems Division. Additionally, Ratheon plans to continue to apply defense technologies 
in those commercial markets where a strong match exists between the company skills and 
existing and emerging global opportunities. Two examples of promising dual-use 
technology development are infrared imaging technology, and optical phased array radar 
technology. [Ref. 45] 
22. Rockwell International Corporation 
Another aerospace/defense firm, Rockwell is a diversified high tech company with 
leadership positions in global markets. In '94, 65% of Rockwell's sales were to its U.S. 
and international commercial customers, and only 35% to the U.S. Government (DoD 
20%, NASA 15%). The company's customer base has changed radically over the past ten 
years, as its sales to DoD customers have decreased by 49%, and sales to NASA U.S. 
commercial, and international customer sales have increased 17%, 133%, and 249% 
respectively. In '84 DoD business accounted for over one half of corporate sales, whereas 
in '94 it accounted for only one fifth of total sales. Over the same period, Rockwell has 
also undergone a shift in its product line, as its aerospace sales have decreased by 39%, 
while its automotive, graphic systems, and electronics business segment sales have 
increased 65%, 119%, and 145% respectively. The company currently operates in seven 
industry segments: automation, avionics, telecommunications, defense electronics, 
aerospace, automotive, and graphic systems. Most of its U.S. Government business is 
conducted in the aerospace and defense electronics segments. Key defense systems 
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include(d): the B-1B bomber aircraft (prime contractor); the Peacekeeper ICBM; the 
NAVSTAR GPS satellite; Hellfire missiles; conversion of C-130 cargo aircraft to 
AC-130U gunships; SDI programs; the Automatic Target Handover System for the 
Apache helicopter; Very Low Frequency (VLF) strategic communications equipment; the 
Air Force's AGM-130 and GBU-15 standoff weapon systems; inertial navigation systems 
for attack and ballistic missile submarines; the Joint Tactical Information Distribution 
System (JTIDS); drive axles for many Army heavy vehicles; teamed with Lockheed on 
THAAD program; the MILSTAR communications satellite command posts; and the 
Secure Mobile Anti-jam Tactical Terminals (SMART-T) for MILSTAR tactical ground 
users. The company's strategic focus has been to become a leader in the global 
marketplace. Rockwell has attained a more balanced mix of high-tech commercial and 
defense/aerospace business. [Ref. 46] 
23. Tenneco Incorporated 
Value Line reports Tenneco as a member of the natural gas industry. It is a 
holding company whose subsidiaries in the following diversified business sectors: natural 
gas (20% of'94 revenues); automotive parts (16%); packaging (18%); shipbuilding 
(14%); and farm and construction equipment (32%). [Ref. 76: p. 469] The firm's defense 
business is conducted by its Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) subsidiary. Since '86, 
when Shipbuilding was 12% of sales, this line of business has been a steady contributor to 
corporate profits. NNS designs, builds, repairs, refuels, and overhauls U.S. Navy aircraft 
carriers, other surface ships, and submarines. It also builds, repairs, and overhauls 
commercial ships. Although NNS has been relatively unaffected by defense drawdowns, 
its key strategies for continued success are: (1) to protect its core business of Navy 
nuclear work while aggressively pursuing other Naval opportunities in ship construction, 
refueling, overhaul, repair, and nuclear engineering; (2) to build new business in 
commercial markets; and (3) to continue to reduce costs by consolidating and simplifying 
work processes. [Ref. 50] 
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24. Texas Instruments Incorporated 
As a member of the semiconductor industry, TI manufactures electronic products 
based principally on its semiconductor technology. The company operates in four industry 
segments: components (65% of'94 sales); defense electronics (17%); digital products 
(16%); and metallurgical materials (2%). Nearly all of the firm's DoD business is 
conducted with the defense electronics business segment, which has steadily declined since 
'86 when its sales were over 34% of total sales. Defense programs include(d): terrain 
following radars for the LANTIRN program; Thermal Imaging Systems for the Chaparral 
air defense system; phased array radar for the F-22 ATF; the focal plane array for the 
Javelin/AAWS-M shoulder-fired antitank weapon; the High-speed Anti-radiation Missile 
(HARM); the Navy's Advanced Interdiction Weapon System (ATWS); and the Army's 
Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS). As early as '86, TI recognized the 
opportunities brought on by the defense drawdown. The realities of fewer new-start 
programs and a trend toward a higher electronics content of existing defense systems 
favor high-tech companies like TI. One aspect which favors TI's strength in defense 
markets is the fact that many of its products are used and expended in "smart" weapons. 
As a result of the Gulf War, not only are such weapons in high demand, but their stocks 
needed to be replenished. TI hopes to benefit accordingly. [Ref. 51] 
25. Textron Incorporated 
Value Line reports Textron as a diversified industry participant, with products and 
services such as: helicopters, turbine engines, airframe parts, consumer lending, insurance, 
and auto parts. Its '94 U.S. Government sales were 20% of corporate totals. [Ref. 76: p. 
1396] Textron operates five business segments: aircraft (23% of'94 revenues); 
automotive (16%); industrial (14%); systems and components (16%); and financial 
services (31%). The company's Government business is conducted by the aircraft and 
systems and components business segments. In '90, the company's commercial aerospace 
business overtook its defense aerospace business both in terms of sales and profit. Key 
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defense systems include(d): teamed with Boeing on the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft; 
gun turret drives, stabilization systems, and turbine engines for the M-l Abrams tank; 
Army Cobra attack and Kiowa Warrior scout helicopters; the Landing Craft Air 
Cushioned (LC AC) amphibious assault craft; systems for the Peacekeeper MX missile; 
wings for the B-1B bomber and C-5B cargo aircraft; and the TH-67 Creek training 
helicopter. Textron's strategy towards its defense aerospace business is to continue to 
diversify into more commercial aerospace business. As part of this strategy, in '92 the 
company purchased Cessna, a leading producer of small commercial jet aircraft. While 
this acquisition serves to reduce Textron's reliance on business from the DoD, the 
company expects DoD to rely more on Textron for more affordable upgrades of existing 
helicopter systems in lieu of expensive new start programs. [Ref. 52] 
26. Unisys Corporation 
Listed in Value Line as a computer and peripherals manufacturer, Unisys designs 
and produces these products and services for a variety of domestic and foreign commercial 
and Government customers. Foreign customers accounted for 51% of'94 sales. [Ref. 76: 
p. 1115] The company is broken down into three business segments: equipment sales 
(including enterprise systems and servers, departmental servers and desktop systems, 
software, and custom defense systems) (55% of'94 revenues); information services and 
systems integration (27%); and equipment maintenance (18%). The firm's defense 
business is conducted by the custom defense systems business unit of the equipment sales 
segment, and it was responsible for 16% of'94 corporate sales. Defense programs 
include(d): the navigation system for the Trident II nuclear-powered submarine; 
integration of fire control, weapons, and electronics systems aboard Navy frigates; the 
AN/UYK-43 and 44 computers used aboard Navy vessels; the combat subsystem of the 
Seawolf submarine; the Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System (MATCALS); the 
AEGIS combat system; and the AN/TRC-170 troposcatter microwave communications 
system. Its '94 strategy toward defense business was: (1) to leverage and diversify defense 
skills and technologies for growth in selected public sector and commercial markets; and 
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(2) to emphasize open systems and dual-use technologies. However, with the company's 
recent announcement of an agreement to sell its defense segment business to Loral, it 
appears to have abandoned defense industry participation entirely. [Ref. 74] 
27. United Technologies Corporation 
A manufacturer of a highly diversified product line, the company operates in the 
following business segments: Otis (22% of'94 revenues) produces elevators and 
escalators; Carrier (23%) produces air conditioning equipment; Automotive (13%) 
produces electrical and electo-mechanical products for the auto industry; Pratt & Whitney 
(27%) produces aircraft engines; and Flight Systems (15%) which produces helicopters, 
rocket motors, and fuel and environmental control systems. Its key defense systems 
include(d): the F-404 engine for the F/A-18; the F-100-PW-220 and 229 engines for the 
F-15 and F-16; the F-l 17 engine for the C-17; the Fl 19 engine for the F-22 ATF; the 
T-406 engine for the V-22; the T-800 helicopter engine; the RL-10 rocket engine used on 
the Titan IV; the Sea Dragon, Blackhawk, Seahawk, and Super Stallion helicopters; the 
A-6F radar system; the J-STARS radar system; and the Multi-Mode Radar System 
(MMRS); and teamed with Boeing on the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program. 
Globalization remains the company's top strategic priority. To carry out this strategy, the 
company is marketing its products internationally through overseas business alliances. 
Attesting to the company's successful diversification efforts, its Government sales have 
leveled off over the past decade, while its commercial sales have grown steadily. [Ref. 75] 
28. Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
Although classified by Value Line as a member of the electrical equipment 
industry, Westinghouse is a diversified, global, technology-based corporation operating in 
the principal markets of: television and radio broadcasting (10% of'94 sales); defense 
electronics (29%); environmental services (4%); transport refrigeration (Thermo King 
subsidiary, 10%); and electric utilities (Power Generation business unit, 19%); and nuclear 
power plant services (Energy Systems Group, 14%) [Ref. 76: p. 1020]. Defense business 
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is conducted primarily in the Electronic Systems Group. The company's defense programs 
include(d): the radar system for F-16 fighter aircraft; the AWACS radar system; F-22 
avionics; the launch system for the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile; the MK-48 and 
50 torpedo programs; radars for the Navy's A-12 aircraft and the Army's Apache 
Longbow helicopter; Navy Airborne Self-Protection Jammers; the AN/SQQ-89 
Antisubmarine Warfare System; and weather radars for the C-130. Westinghouse's 
Electronic Systems Group's strategy during declining defense budgets includes: (1) to 
grow existing core businesses through program extensions, retrofits of existing systems 
and transitions onto new platforms, such as ships, aircraft and satellites; (2) extend its 
strong DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) products to key international 
markets; and (3) expand its business base through selected U.S. and international 
acquisitions and joint ventures. The Group's goal (expected to be reached in '95) is to 
diversify its business base such that half of its sales come from DoD customers and half 
are from non-DoD customers. [Ref. 78] 
D. DATA COLLECTION AND SYNTHESIS 
Data were collected primarily from the annual reports of the sample companies. 
Although to varying degrees, all 28 companies responded to a telephonic request for 
financial statements. After repeated phone calls over a one month period, all but two 
companies (Boeing and IBM) provided all requested data. Since these companies each 
provided only three of the requested nine annual reports, the data were supplemented by 
Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys where available. As noted earlier, data collection 
was complicated by the lack of a standard format for consolidated balance sheets and 
income statements. After weeding through the notes to the financial statements and 
applying some judgment, the data in the following table were collected from the sample 
contractors for the duration being studied: 
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Balance Sheet Items Income Statement Items 
Total Liabilities Net Sales 
Total Equity (Current & Previous Year) Cost of Goods Sold 
Current Assets Interest Expense 
Current Liabilities Income Taxes 
Total Assets (Current & Previous Year) Income Before Taxes 
Inventory (Current & Previous Year) Effective Tax Rate 
Accounts Receivable (CY & PY) Net Income 
Table 2-2. Financial Statement Data Items. 
These data were entered into a series of Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheets which computed the 
eight ratios used in this thesis. The ratios were then organized/compiled and synthesized 
into various groups to facilitate statistical computations and graphical displays for the 
thesis analysis. 
As previously stated, financial ratios are useless unless they are compared with the 
same ratios of other firms or compiled industry ratio averages. Since the analysis required 
a comparison between ratio values of the sample defense firms and industry ratio averages, 
selected averages were collected from Dun & Bradstreet's (D&B) Industry Norms & Key 
Business Ratios. This reference reports ratio values by Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes which will be discussed below. D&B provided the median (AKA the Norm), 
upper quartile (UQ), and lower quartile (LQ) values for the following ratios: current ratio, 
collection period, debt to equity, and return on assets. This reference also provided an 
average (mean) value for the ratio of working capital to total assets. These data were also 
entered into spreadsheets for statistical computation and graphical presentation. 
Because the above reference provided comparative industry average ratio values 
according to SIC codes, the sample firms were segregated by the SIC codes which 
corresponded to their various lines of business. Based on line of business information 
provided to the Census Bureau by U.S. firms, the Office of Management and Budget 
produced the Standard Industrial Classification Manual. The SIC industry classification 
system divides economic activities into eleven broad industrial divisions, and subdivides 
each division into two-digit major groups, three-digit industry subgroups, and four-digit 
detailed industries. [Ref 57] While the sample firms participated in a number of 
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industries, the industrial division of interest to this thesis was the Manufacturing Industry 
(major group SICs 20-39, and detailed industry/product SICs 2011-3999). A SIC analysis 
was conducted in order to determine which firms participated in which lines of business. 
The particular four-digit SICs (equating to lines of business in which each firm 
participated) were gleaned from the Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, 
Directors and Executives. 
Sample firms were not only segregated by lines of business or SIC, they were also 
separated according to their level of participation in the defense industry. The criteria 
used to group sample firms were: the Value Line industry classification of each firm; the 
amount of defense/Government business relative to commercial business; and strategy 
toward their existing and future participation in the defense industry. For instance, firms 
which are classified by Value Line as aerospace/defense firms; and/or receive a large 
portion of their sales revenue from DoD; and/or have adopted strategies which indicate a 
desire to remain competitive in the defense industry are classified as "defense-dependent" 
firms. On the other hand, those firms which Value Line classification, defense sales 
volume, and corporate strategies so indicate are classified as "defense-indifferent" firms. 
These groupings facilitated statistical analysis of the data. 
E. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Visual/Graphical Analysis 
In order to evaluate the solvency, efficiency, and profitability of the sample firms, 
the ratio data were used to create a series of line charts displaying the value of all eight 
ratios for each firm over the entire period of study. These charts were used to display and 
evaluate trends and anomalies over the nine year period '86-94. The charts and a brief 
evaluation of the financial ratios of each of the sample firms are presented in Chapter III of 
this thesis » DATA PRESENTATION 
Similarly, line charts were used to visually display and evaluate sample defense 
contractor ratio values compared to industry averages or "norms" for these same ratios. 
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In order to create these charts, an analysis was conducted to determine the SICs in which 
sample defense contractors most often operated. As a result of this SIC analysis, and the 
availability of data on industry averages for various ratios and SICs, the following 
four-digit SICs were selected: 
SIC Short Title 
3571 Electronic Computers 
3577 Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC 
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 
3663 Radio & TV Communications Equipment 
3669 Communications Equipment, NEC 
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 
3679 Electronic Components, NEC 
3699 Electrical Equipment & Supplies 
3721 Aircraft 
3728 Aircraft Parts and Equipment, NEC 
3812 Search and Navigation Equipment 
3829 Measuring & Controlling Devices, NEC 
Table 2-3. Four-Digit SICs Used for Visual/Graphical Analysis. 
The ratios used for this portion of the analysis were: current ratio, collection 
period, debt to equity, and return on assets. These ratios are common to this thesis and 
D&B's Industry Norms & Key Business Ratios. The UQ, LQ, and median (referred to as 
the industry "norm") values obtained from this reference, along with the median ratio 
values of participating sample firms, were plotted on line charts for graphical presentation. 
The sample median of each of the 12 SICs was selected from among only those sample 
firms which conducted business within the given category. Industry norms (or medians), 
UQs and LQs for selected SICs are derived from the Dun & Bradstreet Financial Data 
Base which contains data from over one million financial statements. This data base 
contains financial data from U.S. firms in over 800 lines of business, and is used to 
produce the desk-top reference Industry Norms & Key Business Ratios. The industry 
norms in the D&B reference represent the mid-points from among all of the companies 
which participate in (i.e., manufacture products in this business line) the particular SICs 
and provide input to the D&B data base. For instance, financial data from 189 
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establishments were used to compute the industry norm, UQ and LQ values for various 
financial ratios for the SIC 3571 in 1988 [Ref 6: '88-'89, p. 111]. The UQs and LQs 
represent the midpoint values of the upper and lower halves, respectively, of the 
participating D&B sample firms. Note however, the UQ figures are not always the highest 
numerical value, nor are the LQ figures always the lowest numerical values. Since these 
quartiles represent judgmental ranking, the UQ represents the best condition or ratio 
value, whereas the LQ represents the worst condition or ratio value. [Ref. 6] These charts 
are presented in Chapter IV - COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS -- of this thesis, and 
indicate which conditions (numerically lower or higher values) are most desirable. 
2. Statistical Tests 
The quantitative analysis of this thesis consisted of statistical tests of a variety of 
hypotheses about the average (or mean) values of various ratios of the sample firms as 
compared to each other and to industry averages. The statistical concept of hypothesis 
testing allows researchers to assess the validity of some conjecture about an unknown 
population parameter based on data from a representative sample of the population. The 
population of interest in this thesis consists of all defense firms. If a sample is to be taken 
from a population, with the aim of making valid statements about the population at large, 
it is important that the sample be representative ofthat population. In order to prevent the 
selection of a sample which is unrepresentative of the population, statisticians often select 
samples randomly. However, the time required to request, receive, compile, and analyze 
the financial data for this thesis precluded the use of random sampling. As previously 
mentioned, the 28 sample defense firms, although not randomly selected, are 
representative of the defense industry population in that, over the period of study, they 
have conducted nearly one-half of all U.S. defense business. 
Statistical hypotheses consist of several components which merit mention here. 
First of all, a null hypothesis (H0) is a maintained position about various parameters that 
is held to be true unless sufficient evidence is presented to the contrary. When sample 
data are collected, this hypothesis is put in jeopardy, or tested. If the null hypothesis turns 
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out to by untrue, then some alternative hypothesis (H,) must be true, and in conducting 
hypothesis testing, the researcher tests the null hypothesis against this alternative. 
Alternative hypotheses can be either one-sided or two-sided alternatives. A one-sided 
(or one-tailed) alternative hypothesis is one involving all possible values of a population 
parameter on either side of (i.e., either greater than or less than) the value specified by the 
null hypothesis. On the other hand, a two-sided (or two-tailed) alternative hypothesis 
involves all possible values of a population parameter other than (i.e., not equal to) the 
value specified in the null hypothesis. Once H,, and U{ have been established, and the 
sample data have been collected and computed, the researcher must make a decision 
regarding H„. The data must support one of two possible decisions regarding the null 
hypothesis: to reject H,,, or to accept H^ (or, more precisely, fail to reject HQ). However, 
since the true population parameter is unknown, whatever the decision regarding the null 
hypothesis, there is some chance of reaching an erroneous conclusion about the population 
parameter. There are only two possible states of nature — either H,, is true or it is false. 
One possible error, a Type I error, is the rejection of a true null hypothesis. The 
probability of committing a Type I error is known as the significance level. This 
probability is expressed as a percentage, and is represented by the symbol a. Since H,, can 
either be accepted or rejected, it follows that the probability of accepting H,, when it is true 
is (1 - a). The most commonly used level of significance among researchers, and the 
value used in this thesis, is a=.05. This means that in such a test of hypothesis, there is a 
5% chance that the researcher will erroneously reject a true null hypothesis, and a 95% 
chance that he will accept a true null hypothesis. Finally, the particular statistical 
hypothesis testing method used in this thesis is the t-test. This technique gets its name 
from the test statistic t, which researchers use to decide whether to accept or reject the 
null hypothesis, H,,. [Ref. 39] The various formulae and decision criteria for the t-statistic 
will be defined during the following discussion of t-tests. 
A series of one-sample, one-sided t-tests of hypothesis were conducted to 
determine whether or not, with regard to selected financial ratios, the defense industry (as 
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represented by the sample firms) was either better off, the same as, or worse off than all 
manufacturing firms in selected industry groups. The financial ratios used for these tests 
were: the current ratio (CR), collection period (CP), and return on assets (ROA). A 
one-sample t-test is used to test an unknown mean against a standard. In this case, the 
unknown means of selected financial ratios for the entire defense industry were 
represented by the sample means of these ratios. These sample means are compared to 
industry norms or average ratio values for the following manufacturing industry groups 
depicted by their two-digit SIC codes: Fabricated Metal Products (34); Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment (35); Electronics and Other Electric Equipment (36); 
Transportation Equipment (37); Instruments and Related Products (38). Industry norms 
for the financial ratios of these two-digit industry segments were obtained from the '93-'94 
and '94-'95 Desk-Top Editions of D&B's Industry Norms & Key Business Ratios. During 
thesis analysis, the following one-sample, one-sided t-tests were conducted for all five 
manufacturing industry groups for years '93 and '94: 
• Ho :XCR ^\XCR versus Hi :XCR <\^CR',   where XCR is sample mean current 
ratio value;   and \XCR is manufacturing industry norm (average) current ratio. 
Reject Ho if t<-ta,n-i', where t = -^r with s being the sample standard 
Jn 
deviation, and n referring to the sample size; and ta,n-i referring to a tabular 
value representing a t-distribution for parameter comparison. 
• Ho : Xcp ^ \icp versus Hi : XCP > \icp ',  where Xcp is sample mean collection 
period; and \XCP is manufacturing industry norm collection period. Reject H^ if 
t>ta^l. 
• Ho : XROA ^ V^ROA versus Hi : XROA < \IROA ', where XROA is sample mean ROA; 
and \1ROA is manufacturing industry norm ROA. Reject H,, if / < -t^n-i. 
These formulae and rejection criteria are appropriate when, as is the case with the entire 
manufacturing industry, the population variances are small relative to the sample 
variances. [Ref. 39] 
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Similarly, a series of two-sample, one-sided t-tests of hypothesis were conducted 
to determine whether or not, with regard to selected financial ratios, the defense- 
dependent firms within the sample were either better off, the same as, or worse off than 
the defense-indifferent firms within the sample. The financial ratios used for these tests 
were: the current ratio (CR); inventory turn over (ITO); and the gross margin ratio 
(GMR). A two-sample t-test is used to test for a significant difference between two 
sample means. In this case, the means of selected financial ratios, for the years '86-'94, for 
the defense-dependent firms are compared with those of the defense-indifferent sample 
firms for the same period. The following two-sample, one-sided t-tests were conducted 
for every year of the study, and the results (along with those of the one-sample tests) are 
presented in Chapter IV ~ COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS- of the thesis: 
• Ho : XCR > YCR versus H\ : XCR < YCR ; where X represents the mean CR, ITO 
and GMR values for the defense-dependent sample firms, and Y represents the 
mean CR, ITO and GMR values for the defense-indifferent sample firms. 
Reject H0 if t < -ta,y', where t =  ,X~Y    with si and s* being the sample variance 
V nx    ny 
of the defense-dependent and defense-indifferent firms respectively; and nx and 
ny being the sample sizes of the defense-dependent and defense-indifferent 
firms respectively. Again, the value t^ refers to a comparison value found in a 
t-distribution table. However, depending on the similarity of the sample 
variances, y , known as the degrees of freedom, is computed differently. This 
comparison value, as well as the test statistic t, was computed using Quattro 
Pro computer software. 
• Ho : Xrro ^ Yrro versus H\ : Xrro < Yrro ', where the variables represent the 
mean ITO values for the sample firms as above. Reject H0 if t < -t^. 
• Ho : XQMR > YGMR versus Hi : XGMR < YGMR ', where the variables represent 
the mean GMR values for the sample firms as above. Reject HQ if t < -t^y. 
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III. DATA PRESENTATION 
A. GENERAL 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the financial ratio data for each of the 
sample firms over the nine year period of study. As previously stated, a graphical method 
is used in order to identify trends and outliers. Such a presentation of the data also allows 
the reader to compare and contrast the ratio values of various firms. The eight financial 
ratios are graphed according to financial condition grouping (i.e., solvency, efficiency, or 
profitability). Although collection period is classified as both a solvency and an efficiency 
ratio, it is presented only on the efficiency graphs. Where the magnitude of specific data 
elements are meaningless, notes on the graphs so indicate. This condition occurs in the 
following cases: two firms experienced negative equity (affecting DE and ROI); ten firms 
experienced negative working capital, whereby current liabilities were larger than current 
assets (affecting WCTA); and fourteen of the firms experienced losses of net income 
during the period of study (affecting ROA and ROI). In the legend of each graph, the 
letter "H" or "L" beside the ratio name indicates the more desired state of nature for the 
ratio, higher or lower respectively. 
B. INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE FIRM FINANCIAL CONDITION 
1. The Boeing Company 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-1 displays Boeing's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Although CR data were not available for '86-'87, the upward trend is a positive indicator 
of the firm's solvency. This position is reinforced by the downward trend in the 
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DE ratio. These trends indicate that the firm's current assets are growing relative to 
current liabilities, and its debt is shrinking relative to equity. 
Boeing Solvency Ratios ] 
h Current Ratio (H)   ♦Debt to Equity (L) 
0.8 
87 89 93 94 
Figure 3-1. Boeing Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-2 displays Boeing's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
firm's efficiency ratios give a mixed view of its operating efficiency. While the downward 
trend in CP is a positive sign, the downward trend in WCTA indicates lower efficiency 
over the period of study. The graph indicates shrinking working capital, and faster 
collection of receivables. The firm's ITO is stable. 
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Figure 3-2. Boeing Efficiency Ratios (*86-'94). 
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c. Profitability 
Figure 3-3 displays Boeing's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Over this period, the firm's ROA and ROI increase to double their magnitudes only to 
return to their original modest values by '94. The firm's increasing GMR trend indicates 
increasing profitability. 
Boeing Profitability Ratios ] 
I Return on Assets (%) (H) 
* Return on Investment (%)(H) 
r Gross Manjin Ratio (%) (H) 
Figure 3-3. Boeing Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
2. E-Systems Incorporated 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-4 displays E-Systems' solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph shows an extremely solvent firm, in that its DE ratio is steady and less than one, and 
the trend for its CR is increasing. 
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Figure 3-4. E-Systems Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
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b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-5 displays E-Systems' efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows a mixed picture of the firm's efficiency. While the WCTA appears 
relatively stable, both the CP and ITO increase steadily. The upward trend in CP is a sign 
of inefficiency in that the firm is slower to collect its receivables. However, the upward 
ITO trend indicates that the firm is becoming more efficient by turning its inventory over 
more frequently. 
E-Systems Efficiency Ratios    | 
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Figure 3-5. E-Systems Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-6 displays E-Systems1 profitability ratios for the period of study. 
While the downward trends in ROA and ROI indicate shrinking profitability, this position 
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Figure 3-6. E-Systems Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
3. FMC Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-7 displays FMC's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Indicative of extreme insolvency, the firm experienced an equity deficit from '86-'89. 
However, once positive equity was reestablished, the downward DE trend indicates 
increasing solvency, but the magnitude of the firm's debt offsets any such positive 
outcome. Although the firm's CR trend remains relatively stable, the magnitude (less than 
2) might be considered less solvent. 
FMC Solvency Ratios ] 
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NOTE: Negative Equity (Deficit)for 86-89 
Figure 3-7. FMC Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
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b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-8 displays FMC's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
negative working capital experienced by the firm during four years of the period, indicates 
inefficiency. The upward CP trend also indicates inefficiency as the firm has become 
slower to collect its receivables. However, the upward ITO trend indicates the firm's 
increasing efficiency at turning over its inventory. 
FMC Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-8. FMC Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-9 displays FMC's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
While ROI is somewhat meaningless due to equity deficit, ROA shows a downward trend, 
thus indicating decreasing profitability. The GMR remains steady over the period of 
study, indicating steady profitability. 
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FMC Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-9. FMC Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
4. General Electric Company 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-10 displays GE's solvency ratios for the period of study. In terms 
of its upward trend and its magnitude, the DE ratio indicates decreased solvency. 
Although the firm's CR shows a slightly upward trend, its value remains less than 2. 
General Electric Solvency Ratios ] 
r Current Ratio (H)   -•»-Debt to Equity (L) 
Figure 3-10. General Electric Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-11 displays GE's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph shows a mixed picture of the firm's efficiency. The upward WCTA and ITO trends 
indicate growing efficiency, while the upward CP trend tends to counter such a finding. 
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General Electric Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-11. General Electric Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-12 displays GE's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Again, the graph shows a mixed view. The increasing ROI, and steady GMR indicate 
increased profitability. However, this finding is somewhat offset by the downward ROA 
trend. 
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Figure 3-12. General Electric Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
5. General Dynamics Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-13 displays GD's solvency ratios for the period of study. Despite 
the spike in '90 (caused by reduced equity), the graph shows the firm to be quite solvent. 
The firm's upward CR trend and downward DE trend both indicate favorable solvency. 
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General Dynamics Solvency Ratios    1 
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Figure 3-13. General Dynamics Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-14 displays GD's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
trends of all three ratios reflect increasingly efficient operations. The upward WCTA 
trend indicates growing working capital. The downward CP trend indicates more rapid 
collection of receivables. And the upward ITO trend indicates more rapid inventory turn. 
|       General Dynamics Efficiency Ratios       | 
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Figure 3-14. General Dynamics Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-15 displays GD's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Except for '86 and '90, when the firm lost money, the firm's profitability remains fairly 
stable. As indicated by the sharp reduction in GMR in '90, the company was unprofitable 
that year (despite increased sales revenue) due to increased expenses. 
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General Dynamics Profitability Ratios    I 
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Figure 3-15. General Dynamics Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
6. General Motors Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-16 displays GM's solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph shows trends indicating relative insolvency. The firm's DE ratios increase steadily 
from '86-'91, and then increase drastically over the next two years, and remain at a value 
whereby liabilities were nearly 15 times greater than equity in '94. The slight downward 
CR trend and magnitudes also indicate poor performance in terms of solvency. 
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Figure 3-16. General Motors Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-17 displays GM's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph shows a somewhat mixed picture of the firm's efficiency. The downward CP trend 
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indicates faster collection of receivables, but the downward WCTA trend indicates 
decreasing amounts of working capital available to finance ongoing operations. The ITO 
remains steady over the period of study. 
General Motors Efficiency Ratios : 
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Figure 3-17. General Motors Efficiency Ratios (*86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-18 displays GM's profitability ratios for the period of study. The 
indicators of the firm's profitability are also somewhat mixed. The company lost money 
from '90-'92, but the GMR trend is upward, thus reflecting increasing profitability. 
General Motore Profitability Ratios               1 
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Figure 3-18. General Motors Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
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7. Grumman Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-19 displays Grumman's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows a somewhat mixed review of the firm's solvency. Despite dropping 
below 2 in '94, the CR indicates solid solvency. Despite climbing over 3.5 in '94, the DE 
ratio indicates relative stability in the amounts of debt and equity. 
Grumman Solvency Ratios ] 
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Figure 3-19, Grumman Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-20 displays Grumman's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
As indicated by the graph, the firm's efficiency is somewhat unclear. Despite an upward 
trend during the first half of the study, the CP declines steadily over the last half of the 
period, thus indicating increasingly efficient operations. Likewise, except for '94, when 
the WCTA ratio dropped drastically, the trend is upward, indicating increased efficiency. 
Regarding ITO, the graph indicates inefficiency in that there is a downward trend during 
the first half of the study. However, the ITO values during the latter half of the time 
period indicate more efficient operations, as the ITO trend climbs steadily. 
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Grumman Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-20. Grumman Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-21 displays Grumman's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Until '92, when the company lost money, the trends for ROI and ROA are upward, 
indicating increased profitability. Although profits are achieved for '93 and '94, returns 
decreased. The GMR trend is upward, indicating increased profitability. 
Grumman Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-21, Grumman Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
8. GTE Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-22 displays GTE's solvency ratios for the period of study. As 
indicated by the upward DE trend and the downward CR trend, the graph shows 
decreasing solvency for the firm. 
87 
GTE Solvency Ratios               | 











,»-r,      A.,,,.        *-"'^ 
      : zz. * _  zzzi3zl  
—w 
~^w 
■     i     i     i     i     i     i     i     i 0 
86 87         88          89         90          91         92          93         94 
Figure 3-22. GTE Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-23 displays GTE's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
firm's efficiency ratios are somewhat mixed. Negative working capital indicates extremely 
inefficient operations, a view reinforced by an upward CP trend. However, this evaluation 
is tempered by the upward ITO trend. 
GTE Efficiency Ratios I 
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Figure 3-23. GTE Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-24 displays GTE's profitability for the period of study. Although 
there are fluctuations, the graph shows the firm's profitability to be steady to increasing. 
The upward GMR and ROI trends indicate increased profitability. ROA remains relatively 
stable. 
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Figure 3-24. GTE Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
9. Harris Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-25 displays Harris1 solvency ratios for the period of study. Except 
for '89, the firm's solvency improves from year-to-year. Excluding '89, the firm's upward 
CR trend and downward DE trend indicate increased solvency. The '89 conditions are 
probably brought about because of two key acquisitions that year. 
Harris Solvency Ratios              1 






, L_,    .—■                      ■» u  
»—-«—A  ^        J^ ^            ^r 
Y 2>^*^,— 
 1 ■                                                       -»  
—~^_^^y 
i        i        i        i        i        i        i        i        i 
86 87 88           89           90           91           92           93 94 
Figure 3-25. Harris Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-26 displays Harris' efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
impact of the '89 purchases is also shown by the sharp decline in the firm's working capital 
during that year. Excluding this year, the firm's WCTA trend is increasing. Also 
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indicative of efficient operations, the ITO trend is similarly upward. The CP trend remains 
relatively unchanged. 
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Figure 3-26. Harris Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-27 displays Harris' profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Despite fluctuations between '89 and '91, the firm's profits remain relatively steady. Lower 
returns in '89 can also be attributed to the aforementioned acquisitions. 
Harris Profitability Ratios ] 
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Figure 3-27. Harris Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
90 
10. Honeywell Incorporated 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-28 displays Honeywell's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows the firm's solvency is well established. The downward DE trend and 
magnitudes, and the upward CR trend and magnitudes, reinforce this view. 
Honeywell Solvency Ratios      1 
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Figure 3-28. Honeywell Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-29 displays Honeywell's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows a mixed interpretation of the firm's efficiency. Despite negative working 
capital in '86, the firm experiences an upward WCTA trend, indicating efficient operations. 
This view is supported by the increasing ITO trend. However, indicative of relatively 
inefficient operations, the firm experiences growing collection periods. 
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Figure 3-29. Honeywell Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-30 displays Honeywell's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
The graph indicates the firm's profitability has declined somewhat. This is indicated by the 
low returns in '86, no returns in '88 (when the company lost money), and steadily declining 
returns thereafter. However, except for '88, the GMR shows slight increases in value. 
Honeywell Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-30. Honeywell Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
11. International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-31 displays IBM's solvency ratios for the period of study. While 
the trends (DE rising and CR dropping) are moving toward a generally less solvent 
position, the magnitudes of these ratios are indicative of a relatively solvent firm. 
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IBM Solvency Ratios 
tCuirent Ratio (H)   ■•■ Debt to Equity (L) 
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NOTE: Selected data not available for 86-88 
Figure 3-31. IBM Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-32 displays IBM's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
Although much of the efficiency ratio data are unavailable, the graph reflects a somewhat 
mixed picture of the efficiency of the firm's operations. Until '92, the WCTA trend drops 
steadily, thus reflecting inefficient operations. However, the upward trend thereafter 
indicates efficient operations. The trends for the other efficiency ratios (downward CP 
and upward ITO) reflect more efficient operations. 
IBM Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-32. IBM Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-33 displays IBM's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Although much of the data are unavailable, the graph indicates that profits over the first 
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half of the study period are stable. However, the downward GMR trend and loss of 
income from '91-'93 reflect a lower profitability position over the latter half of the study. 
IBM Profitability Ratios 2 
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Figure 3-33. IBM Profitability, ('86-'94). 
12. ITT Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-34 displays ITT's solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph shows a trend toward extreme insolvency for the firm. The DE trend moves 
drastically upward, while the CR plummets. 
ITT Solvency Ratios 
r Current Ratio (H)   -♦-Debt to Equity (L) 
16 
8  M 
I E 






86 87 89 
=3» 
Figure 3-34. ITT Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
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b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-35 displays ITT's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
Indicative of extreme inefficiency, the firm experienced negative working capital for most 
of the period. Additionally, the increasing CP trend indicates growing inefficiency. 
However, this view is tempered by an increasing ITO trend. 
ITT Efficiency Ratios 3 
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Figure 3-35. ITT Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-36 displays ITT's profitability ratios for the period of study. For 
every measure, the profitability trend is downward, showing decreasing profitability. 
Profitability in '92 was particularly poor as the firm not only lost money, but its expenses 
exceeded its sales revenues. Although '87 appears to have been exceptionally profitable, 
the ratios steadily declined afterward. 
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Figure 3-36. ITT Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
13. Litton Industries Incorporated 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-37 displays Litton's solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph shows the firm to be moderately solvent in that DE is declining and the CR values 
remain above one. However, the CR trend declines over the last half of the period, and 
the DE rises significantly in '94. 
Litton Solvency Ratios 1 
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Figure 3-37. Litton Solvency Ratios ('86-*94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-38 displays Litton's efficiency ratios for the period of study. As 
indicated by the graph, the firm's efficiency is somewhat unclear. Despite an upward trend 
during the first half of the study, the CP declines steadily over the last half of the period, 
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thus indicating increasingly efficient operations. However, the WCTA curve is identical to 
the CP curve, thus countering it by showing opposite efficiency trends. Regarding ITO, 
the graph indicates inefficiency in that there is a downward trend during the first half of 
the study. However, the ITO values during the latter half of the time period indicate more 
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Figure 3-38. Litton Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-39 displays Litton's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows profitability ratios that indicate increasing profitability during the first 
five years of study, followed by declining profits over the remainder of the period. 
Returns drop significantly in '91, although GMR continues to climb through '92. 
Litton Profitability Ratios ] 
I Return on Assets (°/Q(H)        -A-GrossMargiiRatioO^CH) 
' Return on Investment (°/Q(H) 
Figure 3-39. Litton Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
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14. Lockheed Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-40 displays Lockheed's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Although the CR values are under 2 and the DE values are over 1, the ratio trends and 
magnitudes indicate relative solvency. 
Lockheed Solvency Ratios | 
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Figure 3-40. Lockheed Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-41 displays Lockheed's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows a mixed view of the firm's efficiency over time. Until '90 the CP is 
increasing, thereby indicating decreasingly efficient operations. However, the CP trend 
over the latter half of the study indicates more efficient operations. Low WCTA in '86 and 
negative working capital in '87-'88 reveal inefficiency. However, this situation is improved 
during the remainder of the period, as the WCTA trend moves upward. The ITO trend 
moves steadily downward, indicative of inefficient operations. 
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Lockheed Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-41. Lockheed Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-42 displays Lockheed's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Except for '89, the firm's GMR and ROA are relatively stable. However, the downward 
ROI trend indicates decreasing profitability. The drastic reduction in profits in '89 are due, 
in part, to restructuring costs and write-offs on fixed-price contracts. 
Lockheed Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-42. Lockheed Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
15. Loral Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-43 displays Loral's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Although there is some fluctuation over the years, the graph shows the firm to be quite 
solvent. This view is reinforced by the downward CP trend shown in figure 3-44. 
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Loral Solvency Ratios              1 
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Figure 3-43. Loral Solvency Ratios ('86-*94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-44 displays Loral's efficiency ratios for the period of study. Like 
so many other sample firms, the firm's efficiency picture is unclear. As mentioned above, 
the downward CP trend is a positive sign of both solvency and efficiency. However, the 
declining WCTA trend indicates less efficient operations. Finally, the upward ITO trend 
indicates increasingly efficient operations. 
Loral Efficiency Ratios I 
ftSCTA(%)(H)    + ITO (times) (H) 
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£ 
Figure 3-44. Loral Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-45 displays Loral's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
While ROA remains relatively steady, ROI and GMR seem to mirror each other. This 
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reciprocal relationship is shown by the declining trend in GMR, while the ROI trend is 
upward, indicating increasing profitability. 
Loral Profitability Ratios ] 
\ Return on Assets (%)(H) ^GrossMargmRatio(%){H) 
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Figure 3-45. Loral Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
16. The LTV Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-46 displays LTVs solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
firm emerged from bankruptcy protection in '93, and therefore was highly insolvent until 
then. Between '93 and '94, the company further reduced its debt, as shown by the reduced 
DE ratio. Although CR declines sharply in '93 (perhaps to pay off debt), its stable value of 
around 3 indicates relative solvency despite the firm's bankruptcy. 
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Figure 3-46. LTV Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
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b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-47 displays LTV's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph indicates the effects of the firm's emergence from bankruptcy in '93 in that it 
experiences negative working capital, longer CP, and lower ITO ~ all signs of inefficient 
operations. Prior to '93, the firm's WCTA and CP remains relatively unchanged, while the 
ITO trend moves downward, thus reflecting less efficient operations. 
LTV Efficiency Ratios                    | 
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Figure 3-47. LTV Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-48 displays LTV's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Because of the firm's bankruptcy, ROI and ROA are either meaningless or unreliable 
indicators of profitability. Through '92, the trend for the GMR is downward, indicating 
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Figure 3-48. LTV Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
17. Martin Marietta Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-49 displays Martin Marietta's solvency ratios for the period of 
study. The graph indicates changing solvency trends over time. Through '92 the firm's 
CR and DE trends both move in more solvent directions. Although the magnitudes are 
not severe, these trends reverse themselves after '92. 
Martin-Marietta Solvency Ratios | 
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Figure 3-49. Martin Marietta Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-50 displays Martin Marietta's efficiency ratios for the period of 
study. The graph shows a mixed interpretation of the firm's efficiency over time. Through 
103 
'92, the WCTA trend rises upward, only to fall afterward. Similarly, the ITO trend 
remains steady through '92 then climbs and falls during the last two years of study. A sign 
of less efficient operations, the trend for CP increases upward. 
1          Martin-Marietta Efficiency Ratios           1 
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Figure 3-50. Martin Marietta Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-51 displays Martin Marietta's profitability ratios for the period of 
study. Although, prior to '93, the firm's ROA and GMR remain relatively stable, and its 
ROI steadily decreases, in '93 the returns drop drastically. This profitability drop is 
temporary, and probably the result of the acquisition of GE Aerospace and the pending 
purchase of a division of GD. 
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Figure 3-51. Martin Marietta Profitability Ratios (*86-'94). 
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18. McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-52 displays MDC's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Although the firm has been relatively solvent, the graph indicates that its solvency has 
changed over time. Although it declines over the latter part of the study, the DE trend 
moves upward. The CR trend, on the other hand, remains relatively stable after '88. 
Another indicator of more solvent operations, is the decreasing CP in Figure 3-53. 
McDonnell Douglas Solvency Ratios   | 
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Figure 3-52. McDonnell Douglas Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-53 displays MDC's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
firm's efficiency ratios give a mixed interpretation of its efficiency. The downward CP 
trend indicates efficiency, while the downward ITO trend indicates relative inefficiency. 
Although the WCTA trend is upward from '86-89, since then it declines steadily, thus 
giving a somewhat unclear indicator of the firm's operating efficiency. 
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McDonnell Douglas Efficiency Ratios       [ 
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Figure 3-53. McDonnell Douglas Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-54 displays MDC's profitability ratios for the period of study. The 
graph also shows a confusing profitability picture. Except in '89, when the company lost 
money, the ROA remains relatively unchanged, while the GMR trend moves slightly 
downward, and the ROI trend moves upward. 
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Figure 3-54. McDonnell Douglas Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
19. Motorola Incorporated 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-55 displays Motorola's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows a firm which is extremely solvent. This is clear from the relatively stable 
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trends in CR, DE and CP ratios. Most noteworthy is the magnitude of the firm's DE ratios 
(approximately 1:1 debt to equity). 
Motorola Solvency Ratios         1 
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Figure 3-55. Motorola Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-56 displays Motorola's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
Although WCTA and CP remain relatively unchanged, the upward ITO trend indicates 
increasingly efficient operations by the firm. 
Motorola Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-56. Motorola Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-57 displays Motorola's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
The firm appears to have been quite profitable. This is indicated by the steady GMR, and 
the increasing ROA and ROI values over the period of study. 
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Motorola Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-57. Motorola Profitability Ratios (*86-'94). 
20. Northrop Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-58 displays Northrop's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Although the DE ratio shoots up in '94, the downward prior trend provides a positive 
indicator of the firm's solvency, as does the upward CR trend. 
Northrop Solvency Ratios ] 
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Figure 3-58. Northrop Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-59 displays Northrop's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows a somewhat confusing picture of the firm's efficiency. Although the 
negative working capital in '86-'87 is a sign of inefficiency, the WCTA trend increases 
despite some fluctuation. The CP curve also shows this fluctuation, but since '89 the trend 
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is toward more efficient collection of receivables. An indicator of decreasingly efficient 
operations is the downward ITO trend. 
Northrop Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-59. Northrop Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-60 displays Northrop's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows an unclear view the firm's profitability. Despite losing money in '88-'89, 
the firm's GMR trend moves upward to indicate a more profitable position. However, 
since the loss, the ROI and ROA trends both indicate declining profits. 
Northrop Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-60. Northrop Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
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21. Raytheon Company 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-61 displays Raytheon's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows the firm to be comfortably solvent. Note the two ratio curves are mirror 
images of one another. This reciprocal relationship, whereby the CR trend increases while 
the DE trend decreases, is strong evidence of a highly solvent firm. 
Raytheon Solvency Ratios           | 
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Figure 3-61. Raytheon Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-62 displays Raytheon's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
The efficiency ratios clearly give conflicting views of how efficient the firm's operations 
have been. While the CP remains stable, the ITO trend moves downward (less efficient), 
and the WCTA trend moves upward (more efficient). 
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Figure 3-62. Raytheon Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-63 displays Raytheon's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Although somewhat unclear, the graph shows profitability generally declining. Although 
the GMR trend is indicative of slightly increasing profitability, the downward ROA and 
ROI trends indicate a more steep decrease in profitability. 
Raytheon Profitability Ratios               1 
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Figure 3-63. Raytheon Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
22. Rockwell International Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-64 displays Rockwell's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
While the increasing CR trend (more solvent) and DE trend (less solvent) tend to 
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contradict one another, the magnitude of these ratios supports the more solvent position. 
However, the upward CP trend (Figure 3-65) shows the firm to be potentially less solvent. 
Rockwell Solvency Ratios           1 
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Figure 3-64. Rockwell Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-65 displays Rockwell's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
The previously mentioned upward CP trend (indicating less efficient operations) is 
countered by an upward WCTA trend (indicating more efficient operations). The ITO 
trend is also toward more efficient operations. 
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Figure 3-65. Rockwell Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
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c. Profitability 
Figure 3-66 displays Rockwell's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
The graph shows that the firm's profits have been relatively stable throughout the period of 
the drawdown. 
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Figure 3-66. Rockwell Profitability Ratios (*86-'94). 
23. Tenneco Incorporated 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-67 displays Tenneco's solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph gives a mixed picture of the firm's solvency. While the upward CR trend is positive, 
the CR values remain relatively low. Except for an anomaly that occurred in '92, the firm's 
DE ratios remain fairly stable. The '92 spike on the graph was due to an accumulated 
deficit in retained earnings, which lowered total equity. 
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Figure 3-67. Tenneco Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-68 displays Tenneco's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
Like most of the sample firms, Tenneco's efficiency position is confusing. The negative 
working capital and low values of WCTA ratios reflect inefficiencies associated with 
financing ongoing operations. The firm's erratic CP ratio, which fluctuated from 35 to 
over 100 days, is also indicative of inefficient operations. However, the rising trend in 
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Figure 3-68. Tenneco Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-69 displays Tenneco's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
The firm was largely unprofitable since it lost money during four of years of the study. 
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Although the GMR trend remains relatively steady over the span of the study, these ratios 
fell during the unprofitable years, thereby indicating that shrinking margins contributed to 
the firm's poor profitability. 
Tenneco Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-69. Tenneco Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
24. Texas Instruments Incorporated 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-70 displays TI's solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
graph (and Figure 3-71) shows the firm to be extremely solvent in terms of trends and 
magnitudes of all three solvency ratios. 
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Figure 3-70. Texas Instruments Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
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b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-71 displays TI's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
Although there is some fluctuation, the trends of all of the firm's efficiency ratios indicate 
fairly efficient operations. 
Texas Instruments Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-71. Texas Instruments Efficiency Ratios (*86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-72 displays TI's profitability ratios for the period of study. Over 
the period representing the defense drawdown, the firm experiences successive periods of 
declining profits, no profits (loss on net income), and increasing profits. 
Texas Instruments Profitability Ratios 
»Return on Assets <%)(H)         •*■ Gross Maigin Ratio (%)(H 








_-=—*———                                                           -Jp^^jt^ 
^-"*"                            ~*~~-~^                                      ./^               / 
A"" 
"J                       \.                                      ~~*                 / f                              ^^                                                   "" 
J                                                                                                                 _=—-=^' 
/     y-             "*■-■-—.                                                                   Js* 
-iy^- —'r^:~::::::_::::~: ifz i_ _.i.. 
¥             i              i               i               i               i               i              i              i 
86 87             88               89              90              91              92              93 
NÖTE: ROI &ROA meaningless for°0-91due to income loss 
94 
Figure 3-72. Texas Instruments Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
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25. Textron Incorporated 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-73 displays Textron's solvency ratios for the period of study. The 
trends of both the CR and DE ratios indicate the less solvent position in which the firm has 
operated. Most alarming is the magnitude of the growth of the firm's debt relative to its 
equity. Note however, that Figure 3-74 shows a declining CP, thus supporting a more 
solvent operating position. 
Textron Solvency Ratios             1 
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Figure 3-73. Textron Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-74 displays Textron's efficiency ratios for the period of study. 
Once again the efficiency ratios support different efficiency positions. As noted above, the 
declining CP also indicates more efficient operations, but the negative working capital, and 
declining WCTA indicate less efficient operations. The ITO remains stable. 
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Textron Efficiency Ratios 
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Figure 3-74. Textron Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-75 displays Textron's profitability ratios for the period of study. 
Although the firm's profitability is clearly established, the graph shows a slight decrease in 
ROA, but a healthy increase in ROI. GMR remains relatively stable. 
Textron Profitability Ratios ] 
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Figure 3-75. Textron Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
26. Unisys Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-76 displays Unisys' solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Although the magnitudes do not support the position, the upward DE trend indicates a 
less solvent position. However, this is tempered by the stable CR values and declining CP 
values (see Figure 3-77). 
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Unisys Solvency Ratios 
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Figure 3-76. Unisys Solvency Ratios (*86-'94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-77 displays Unisys' efficiency ratios for the period of study. Since 
'88, the firm's downward CP trend and upward ITO trend indicate fairly efficient 
operations regarding collection of receivables and turnover of inventory. However, the 
downward WCTA trend is indicative of less efficient operations regarding the funding 
available for ongoing operations. 
Unisys Efficiency Ratios J 
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Figure 3-77. Unisys Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-78 displays Unisys' profitability ratios for the period of study. The 
company lost money during the years '86 and '89-91. This poor profitability position is 
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also shown by decreased values for the GMR for these years. Since profitability is 
reestablished in '92, all three ratios decline steadily. 
Unisys Profitability Ratios 
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Figure 3-78. Unisys Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
27. United Technologies Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-79 displays UTC's solvency ratios for the period of study. 
Although the upward DE trend might indicate a less solvent position, the magnitudes of 
the DE ratios indicate the firm's solvency is of little concern. The CR trend is steady and 
over 1.0 in magnitude, thus indicating a relatively solvent position. 
United Technologies Solvency Ratios   1 
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Figure 3-79. United Technologies Solvency Ratios ('86-'94). 
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b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-80 displays UTC's efficiency ratios for the period of study. The 
steady trend in CP values, and the increasing ITO trend support an efficient operating 
position, whereas the declining WCTA trend provides evidence to the contrary. 
United Technologies Efficiency Ratios i 
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Figure 3-80. United Technologies Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-81 displays UTC's profitability ratios for the period of study. The 
firm experienced low returns in '86 and '92, and losses in '91. However, all three 
profitability ratios increase over the last three years of the study. 
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Figure 3-81. United Technologies Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
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28. Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
a. Solvency 
Figure 3-82 displays Westinghouse's solvency ratios for the period of 
study. The graph is unclear concerning the firm's solvency. Except for '91, when the CR 
dropped below 1.0, the upward CR trend indicates relative solvency. However, the 
upward DE trend is contrary to such a position. The large increase in the DE ratio in '93 
was due mostly to pension liabilities. 
Westin^iouse Solvency Ratios ] 
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Figure 3-82. Westinghouse Solvency Ratios ('86-94). 
b. Efficiency 
Figure 3-83 displays Westinghouse's efficiency ratios for the period of 
study. The three curves move downward through '91, thus providing a mix of efficiency 
indicators. While the declining WCTA and ITO trends indicate less efficient operations 
over this period, the declining CP is a sign of more efficient operations. Although WCTA 
ratios climbed after '92, their values are still relatively low. The upward CP trend 
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Figure 3-83. Westinghouse Efficiency Ratios ('86-'94). 
c. Profitability 
Figure 3-84 displays Westinghouse's profitability ratios for the period of 
study. The company lost money in '91 and '93. The downward ROI and ROA trends 
further indicate declining profitability. Due to the fact that the shape of the GMR curve, 
since '90, is equivalent to that of the ROI and ROA, the declining trend in profitability 
over the latter half of the study is due to declining net sales and/or growing costs of goods 
and services sold. This means that the declining ROA and ROI values are due to lower 
net income (the numerator), more so than changes in assets and equity respectively. 
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Figure 3-84. Westinghouse Profitability Ratios ('86-'94). 
123 
124 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. SAMPLE STRATIFICATION 
As previously stated, financial ratios, such as those presented in the previous 
chapter, find their analytical utility only when compared to other such ratios. In order to 
facilitate this comparative analysis, it was necessary to separate the sample firms by line of 
business (or SIC), and by level of past, existing, and future defense industry participation. 
1. Classification by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code 
To better understand the business environments in which the sample defense firms 
operate, it was first necessary to identify which products and services they each provided 
for their various customers. Corporate annual reports were a good source for such 
information as provided in Chapter II. While this information was good for background 
and discussion, more definite line of business (SIC) information was required for the 
graphical and statistical analyses. In order to prevent comparisons of "apples and 
oranges" during these analyses, the sample was stratified by four-digit SIC codes. The 
results of this sample classification effort not only demonstrated the great diversity of 
products and services provided by these firms, but also identified the SICs in which the 
majority of the firms operated. 
The source consulted for SIC classification was S&P's Register of Corporations, 
Directors and Executives [Ref. 49]. First of all, the Ultimate Parent Index in Volume 3 of 
this reference was used to identify the divisions and subsidiaries of each firm. Volume 1, 
Corporations, was then used to identify the various SICs in which each of these business 
units participated. These data were then gathered into a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet, and 
appear in the Appendix. The "P", "S", and "D" in the spreadsheet indicate whether the 
line of business was conducted by the parent company, and/or a subsidiary, and/or a 
division of the parent company respectively. This information was used to identify the 
four-digit SICs in which many (if not most) of the sample firms operated. These twelve 
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SICs, identified in Table 2-3, were considered most representative of the various business 
lines of defense firms. As mentioned in Chapter II, selected financial ratios of sample 
firms operating in these particular SICs were graphically compared to the manufacturing 
industry norms for these ratios. The results of this graphical analysis appear in Section B 
below. However, two of the SICs in which many of the sample firms operated - 3761 
Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles; and 3769 Space Vehicle Equipment, Not Elsewhere 
Classified (NEC) ~ were not included in this analysis since industry norms for these SICs 
could not be found. The absence of industry norms (median and quartile values) for these 
SICs is indicative of the fact that only a statistically insignificant few firms operate in them. 
2. Classification by Level of Defense Industry Participation 
In order to evaluate the corporate strategic aspects of the defense drawdown, it 
was necessary to further classify the sample firms as either defense-dependent or 
defense-indifferent. Although somewhat more arbitrary than the previous classification by 
SIC, this classification was conducted using three criteria: the Value Line industry 
classification of each firm; the relative amounts of Government/defense versus commercial 
business conducted by each firm; and the firms' strategies toward past, present and future 
participation in the defense industry. Firms which were classified as members of the 
aerospace/defense industry, or received over one-third of their sales revenues from DoD, 
and expressed a strategy continuously reliant upon defense business were classified as 
defense-dependent. Those firms which were otherwise classified, received less than 
one-third of their business from defense, and expressed a strategy favoring increasing 
commercial business at the expense of defense business were classified as 
defense-indifferent. The one-third of sales figure was selected because it enabled a clear 
stratification when the other two criteria favored mixed outcomes. Table 4-1 below 
indicates the sample classification according to these criteria. While some might argue the 
resulting classification regarding firms which are "on the margin", it is the result of the 
reasonably-applied criteria of this researcher. This information was used during the 
two-sample hypothesis testing conducted later in this chapter. 
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Defense-Dependent Firms Defense-Indifferent Firms 
Boeing General Electric 
E-Systems General Motors 
FMC GTE 






Martin Marietta Texas Instruments 
McDonnell Douglas Textron 
Northrop Unisys 
Raytheon United Technologies 
Rockwell International Westinghouse 
Table 4-1. Defense Dependence Classification of Sample. 
B. VISUAL/GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
The figures in this section graphically portray the sample medians (along with the 
industry norms) for four different financial ratios, and the twelve SICs most commonly 
operated in by the sample defense firms. The terms in the legends of the graphs (UQ, 
NORM, MEDIAN, and LQ) refer to the upper quartile, industry norm (median), sample 
median, and lower quartile values for the various ratios respectively. The industry norm, 
UQ, and LQ values were provided by D&B's Industry Norms & Key Business Ratios [Ref. 
6], and are representative of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating in the selected SICs. 
Recall that the UQ refers to a more favorable condition (value) regarding a particular 
ratio, and the LQ refers to a less favorable one. The graphs indicate which condition 
(higher or lower) is more favorable for each ratio. The sample median values were 
derived from only those firms conducting business within the selected SICs. The graphs 
for each of the twelve SICs are preceded by an evaluation of the graphical comparison 
regarding trends and sample comparison with industry values. The financial ratios chosen 
for the graphical analysis were the current ratio (CR), debt to equity (DE), collection 
period (CP), and return on assets (ROA). Recall that CR and DE ratios are indicative of a 
firm's solvency, while the CP is indicative of both a firm's solvency and efficiency. The 
ROA ratio is representative of a firm's profitability. 
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1. SIC 3571: Electronic Computers 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-1 shows that, over the period of study, the sample defense firms 
are less solvent than the LQ of all U.S. firms manufacturing this product (i.e., the sample 
defense firms are less solvent than three-quarters of all U.S. manufacturers). However, 
the CR trend over the period of the drawdown is downward toward a less solvent position 
industry-wide. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
Similarly, the DE graph shows that, over the period of study, the sample 
firms are less solvent than three-quarters of all U.S. manufacturers of electronic 
computers. However, during the latter three years of study, median DE improves toward 
the norm, while the trend for the rest of U.S. manufacturing is upward toward a less 
solvent position. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
Although the sample defense firms performs below average (i.e., worse 
than the industry norm) over most of the period of study, during the latter years of study, 
median CP improves toward the industry average. The industry CP trend moves 
downward toward a more efficient operating position. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
Over the period of study, the sample firms mirror the industry average 
values for ROA, thus moving in equal magnitude, in the opposite direction, along the same 
trend. Note that the LQ ROA values are negative for most of the period, thus indicating 
that nearly one-forth of all U.S. firms in this line of business lost money over the period of 
study. 
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Figure 4-1. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3571: Electronic Computers. 
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2. SIC 3577: Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-2 shows that the sample defense firms were less solvent than over 
three-quarters of all U.S. manufacturing firms in this line of business, as the sample median 
fell below the LQ for most of the period of study. The CR trend for all computer 
peripheral manufacturers over the period of study was upward toward a more solvent 
position. However, the sample median remained stable with a magnitude of just over 1. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
Once again, the sample defense firms appeared to be less solvent than most 
U.S. manufacturers within this SIC. Although the sample median DE showed fluctuation, 
its trend was upward toward a less solvent position, while the industry norms varied very 
little, and moved downward toward increased solvency. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
Regarding efficiency of collection of receivables, the graph shows that the 
sample firms were, on average, less efficient than U.S. manufacturers, at large. The CP 
trend for the sample defense firms moved upward toward less efficient operations, while 
the industry norms generally moved downward toward more efficient operations over the 
period of study. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
Over the span of the drawdown, the sample median ROA and the industry 
norm were virtually the same. This ratio demonstrated a large dispersion of returns 
among industry participants, as evidenced by the large difference between the LQs 
(negative or less than 2%) and the UQs (moving steadily upward from 9% to 18%). The 
fluctuation shown in the curves indicate highly variable profitability among firms operating 
in this SIC. 
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Figure 4-2. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3577: Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC. 
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3. SIC 3661: Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-3 shows that the median CRs of the sample defense firms were 
equivalent to the LQs, thus indicating that, over the period of the drawdown, defense 
firms were less solvent than three-quarters of all U.S. firms operating within this line of 
business. While these average CR values (sample median and LQ) remained steady with 
values around 1.5, the firms in the UQ showed extremely solvent CR values, many of 
which were over 4. However, the CR trend among these UQ firms was downward toward 
decreasing solvency, while the industry norm remained relatively steady at magnitudes 
above 2. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
The sample median DE ratios were above the industry median throughout 
the period of study, and were higher than the LQ values over the last three years of the 
drawdown. This indicates that the sample defense firms operated less solvently than the 
majority of U.S. firms within this business line. While the trends for the industry DE ratio 
norms (UQ, LQ, and median) were relatively stable over the period of study, the DE ratio 
trend for the sample rose toward a less solvent position. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
The graph shows that the sample defense firms performed better than 
average at collecting their receivables over the early years of the study. Although the 
trend for the sample median CP moved upward, indicating less efficient operations over 
time, the sample defense firms performed more efficiently than the LQ throughout. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
With the median ROAs between the industry norm and UQ, the 
profitability of sample defense firms within this line of business was above average. 
Although many of the LQ firms operated at losses for much of the period, the ROA trends 
within the industry were upward toward more profitable positions. However, the ROA 
trend for the sample defense firms remained steady at values above 5%. 
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Figure 4-3. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3661: Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus. 
133 
4. SIC 3663: Radio and TV Communications Equipment 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-4 shows that the sample defense firms operated in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all radio and TV equipment manufacturers, as the sample 
median CRs were at or below the LQs throughout the study. The trends for all CR curves 
appears level, indicating steady solvency conditions among firms within this SIC. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
After the first two years of the study, the operating positions of the sample 
defense firms were considerably less solvent than the industry standards for this business 
line. While the DE trends for all three industry norms remained relatively level, the sample 
median DE trend climbed rapidly between '86 and *89, and remained at fairly high (less 
solvent) values for the remainder of the period. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
While the graph indicates that the operating efficiency of sample defense 
firms was below the industry average for much of the period of the drawdown, it shows 
improved efficiency for these firms during the last two years of study. The industry CP 
trends were relatively level, with half of all firms operating within the SIC collecting 
receivables within 35 to 80 days. The CPs for the sample defense firms varied between 50 
and 70 days. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The sample firms achieved profitability levels equivalent to the industry 
averages over the span of the study.   The average ROA values fluctuated between 5% 
and 7% for both the industry and sample medians. The graph shows a great deal of 
fluctuation in the ROA values of UQ and LQ firms, which indicates highly variable 
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Figure 4-4. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3663: Radio and TV Communications Equipment. 
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5. SIC 3669: Communications Equipment, NEC 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-5 shows that the sample defense firms operate in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all firms which operate within this line of business, as the 
sample median CRs are at or below the LQs throughout the study. Except for a sudden 
upward spike in UQ in '93, the trends for all CR curves appear level, indicating steady 
solvency conditions among firms within this SIC. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
With the sample median DE falling between the industry median and the 
LQ throughout the period, the graph indicates that the defense firms operating within this 
SIC achieved below average solvency levels. Although the graph shows some variability 
in the DE ratios of LQ firms, the relatively level DE trends of the industry norms and UQs 
indicate steady solvency conditions within this business line. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
The graph indicates that, regarding CP, the sample defense firms performed 
with average efficiency over the period of study. While there is some fluctuation among 
industry norm, UQ and LQ CP values over the nine year period, the magnitude of this 
variability is only 10 days, thus indicating that operating efficiency within this industry was 
fairly stable. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The graph shows that sample defense firms achieved average levels of 
profitability over the period of the study, as the sample median and industry norm ROAs 
were approximately equivalent. While the trends for all ROA curves increased upward 
slightly, ROAs for UQ firms varied between 11% and 18%, and ROAs for LQ firms varied 
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Figure 4-5. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3669: Communications Equipment, NEC. 
137 
6. SIC 3674: Semiconductors and Related Devices 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-6 shows that the sample defense firms operated in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all firms which operated within this line of business, as the 
sample median CRs were at or below the LQs throughout the study. The trends for all CR 
curves appear level, indicating steady solvency conditions among firms within this SIC. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
The graph indicates that the sample defense firms were less solvent than the 
average firm operating within this SIC, as sample median DEs were at or above the LQs 
throughout the study. While the graph shows a trend toward improving solvency among 
LQ firms, it shows an upward trend toward decreasing solvency among sample defense 
firms. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
The graph indicates that the operating efficiency of sample firms was 
slightly below average throughout most of the period of study. However, their efficiency 
at collecting receivables improved to slightly above average during the last two years of 
study. Although there is some fluctuation, the CP trends are relatively stable throughout. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The graph shows above average profitability among the sample defense 
firms throughout the period of the drawdown. Although the profitability of LQ firms was 
poor to non-existent, the trend for this and all ROA curves moved upward toward 
increased profitability within the semiconductor industry. 
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Figure 4-6. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3674: Semiconductors and Related Devices. 
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7. SIC 3679: Electronic Components, NEC 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-7 shows that the sample defense firms operated in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all firms which operated within this line of business, as the 
sample median CRs were at or below the LQs throughout the study. The trends for all CR 
curves appear level, indicating steady solvency conditions among firms within this SIC. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
The graph shows that the solvency for the sample firms went from below 
average to well below average over the period of study. While the DE trends for the three 
industry averages were steady, the DE trend for sample firms moved upward indicating 
decreasing solvency over the duration of study. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
Although the average CPs for the sample firms are approximately average 
at the beginning and end of the drawdown, the graph indicates decreasing efficiency over 
the first half of the period and increasing efficiency over the latter half. The CP trends 
among all U.S. manufacturers within this SIC are level, indicating steady operating 
efficiency with average CPs below 50 days. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The graph shows that the sample defense firms achieved average 
profitability throughout the period of study. The level to slightly increasing industry ROA 
trends, and the fact that all LQs are positive values, indicates sound profitability among 
participants within this line of business. 
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Figure 4-7. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3679: Electronic Components, NEC. 
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8. SIC 3699: Electrical Equipment and Supplies 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-8 shows that the sample defense firms operated in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all firms which operated within this line of business, as the 
sample median CRs were at or below the LQs throughout the study. The trends for the 
industry norm and LQ CR curves appear level to slightly increasing, indicating steady to 
increasing solvency conditions among firms within this SIC. This industry position is 
reinforced by the UQ curve which increases upward more steeply, indicating extremely 
improving conditions among the more solvent firms. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
The graph shows that, compared to average firms operating within this 
SIC, the sample defense firms were extremely less solvent and more debt laden. The 
magnitudes and trends of the industry norm, LQ, and UQ curves reflect stable and 
extremely solvent operating conditions among participating firms. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
The graph indicates that, with regard to the collection of receivables, the 
sample defense firms operated with slightly below average efficiency over the period of 
study. Note however, that the industry CP trends moved slightly upward toward less 
efficient positions, while the CP trend for the sample firms indicates improving efficiency. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The graph shows that the sample defense firms achieved average 
profitability throughout the period of study, as the sample median and industry norm 
ROAs were virtually the same. Although average firms within both the sample and the 
industry achieved steady returns of approximately 5-9%, the high variability and low to 
unprofitability among LQ firms is indicative of poor profitability within this line of 
business. 
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Figure 4-8. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3699: Electrical Equipment and Supplies. 
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9. SIC 3721: Aircraft 
The greater degree of variability (i.e., fluctuation) among the ratios for companies 
within this SIC is due to the relatively smaller number of firms which operate in it. 
tu Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-9 indicates below average solvency for the sample defense firms, 
as the CR curve approximately overlaps that of the LQ firms. The curves for the industry 
norm, UQ and LQ fluctuate too much to identify any industry-wide CR trend. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
As with the CR, the graph again indicates below average solvency for the 
sample defense firms, as the DE ratio curve approximately overlaps that of the LQ firms. 
Except for '94, the industry DE ratio trends are relatively steady, indicative of fairly stable 
solvency conditions within the aircraft industry over the period of study. However, 
indicative of decreasing solvency, the CR for the LQ firms more than doubled in 
magnitude over the previous year. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
While the CP trend for the sample firms was considerably more stable than 
the trends for the aircraft industry at large, the graph shows that the sample defense firms 
generally demonstrated below average efficiency at collecting receivables. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
While the graph indicates that the sample defense firms achieved average to 
above average profitability over the duration of the drawdown, the relatively low values of 
the UQ firms is indicative of smaller ROAs within the aircraft industry, in general. 
However, when the LQ firms achieved ROAs, they were relatively higher than those 
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Figure 4-9. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3712: Aircraft. 
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10. SIC 3728: Aircraft Parts and Equipment, NEC 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-10 shows that the sample defense firms operated in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all firms which operated within this line of business, as the 
sample median CRs were at or below the LQs throughout the study. The industry CR 
trends are all upward toward increasing solvency within the aircraft parts industry. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
The graph indicates that, with regard to DE ratios, the sample defense 
firms operated at below average to extremely below average solvency levels over the 
period of study. While the industry DE ratio trends moved downward toward more 
solvent positions, the DE trend for the sample median climbed to a comparatively less 
solvent position. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
Although the sample median CP values remained below (more efficient 
than) those of the LQ firms, the graph shows that the sample achieved below average 
efficiency for all but the first year of the study. As with the DE ratio, while the industry 
CP trends moved downward toward more efficient operating positions, the CP trend for 
the sample defense firms climbed to a comparatively less efficient position. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The graph shows that the sample defense firms achieved average 
profitability throughout the period of study, as the sample median and industry norm 
ROAs were virtually the same. However the industry ROA trends all moved downward 
toward less profitable positions, while the ROA trend for the sample defense firms 
remained relatively steady over this period. 
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Figure 4-10. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3728: Aircraft Parts and Equipment, NEC. 
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11. SIC 3812: Search and Navigation Equipment 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-11 shows that the sample defense firms operated in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all firms which operated within this line of business, as the 
sample median CRs were at or below the CRs of LQ firms throughout the study. While 
the sample median, industry norm and LQ CR trends were stable over time, the CR trend 
among UQ firms moved downward toward less solvent positions for these firms. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
The graph indicates that, with regard to DE ratios, the sample defense 
firms operated at below average to extremely below average solvency levels over the 
period of study. The industry norm, UQ and LQ curves show increasing DE trends 
toward less solvent position. However, the magnitudes of these ratios support a solid 
position of solvency among industry participants in this SIC. The DE trend for the sample 
defense firms climbed steadily to decreasingly solvent positions. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
The graph shows that the sample defense firms performed with average to 
slightly worse than average efficiency over the period of study. All of the CP curves 
indicate relatively stable efficiency over the period of study. However, the high LQ values 
show relatively inefficient operations among these LQ firms in that it takes them nearly 
three months to collect their receivables. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The graph shows that the sample defense firms achieved average to slightly 
above average profitability throughout the period of study. However the sample median 
ROA trend, as well as the industry ROA trends, all moved downward toward less 
profitable positions over the duration of the study. 
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Figure 4-11. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3812: Search and Navigation Devices. 
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12. SIC 3829: Measuring and Controlling Devices, NEC 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
Figure 4-12 shows that the sample defense firms operated in less solvent 
positions than three-quarters of all firms which operated within this line of business, as the 
sample median CRs were at or below the LQs throughout the study. The CR trends for 
the sample median, industry norm, and LQ were level, indicating steady solvency 
conditions. Except for the first year of the study, this was also true of the CR trend 
among UQ firms. 
b. Debt to Equity (DE) Ratio 
The graph indicates that, with regard to DE ratios, the sample defense 
firms operated at below average to extremely below average solvency levels over the 
period of study. The industry norm, UQ and LQ DE ratio curves remained level, 
indicative of firmly solvent conditions. Although the sample median DE ratio curve spiked 
upward in '88, its trend since then moved downward toward improved solvency. 
c. Collection Period (CP) 
Although the sample defense firms performed below average (i.e., worse 
than the industry norm) over most of the period of study, during the latter years of the 
study, median CP improved toward the industry average/norm. The industry CP trend 
moved downward toward a more efficient operating position. 
d. Return on Assets (ROA) 
The graph shows that the sample defense firms achieved average to below 
average profitability over the period of study. The high ROA values and upward trend 
among UQ firms, coupled with the fact that LQ firms achieved returns (although small) 
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Figure 4-12. Graphical Analysis of SIC 3829: Measuring and Controlling Devices, NEC. 
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C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The statistical analysis consisted of two types of hypothesis testing. First of all, a 
series of one-sample t-tests were conducted to determine whether the defense industry (as 
represented by the sample firms) was financially either better off, the same as, or worse off 
than all U.S. manufacturers within selected industry groups. During these tests, sample 
average ratio values were compared to established industry-wide averages/norms. 
Secondly, a series of two-sample t-tests were conducted in order to determine the effect of 
corporate strategic measures on the financial viability of defense firms during the defense 
drawdown. For these tests the firms were separated into two sample groups 
(defense-dependent and defense-indifferent, see Table 4-1) based on corporate strategies 
and degree of reliance (past, present and future) on defense business. Average financial 
ratio values for the two samples were compared to determine which group was financially 
better off over the period of the defense drawdown. 
1. One-Sample Hypothesis Testing 
The financial ratios used during these tests were: current ratio (CR), collection 
period (CP), and return on assets (ROA). These ratios are indicative of a firm's solvency, 
efficiency, and profitability respectively. The sample mean ratio values are compared with 
the industry ratio averages for the following five manufacturing industry sub-groups, as 
depicted by their two-digit SIC classification: Fabricated Metal Products (34); Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment (35); Electronics and Other Electric Equipment (36); 
Transportation Equipment (37); and Instruments and Related Products (38). A separate 
t-test was conducted for each ratio, for each two-digit SIC, for the years '93 and '94. 
Table 4-2 below shows the industry averages/norms used during these test. The source of 
these data was D&B's Industry Norms & Key Business Ratios. 
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CR 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.3 2.3 2 2 2.4 2.6 
CP 45.6 46.4 43.8 44.2 49.3 50 35.6 35.4 54 54 
ROA 6.2 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.5 7.1 4.2 5.3 6.4 6.4 
Table 4-2. Industry Norms for Selected Manufacturing Groups. 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
•    H0 : ^34,93 ^ H34,93VS.i7i : .¥34,93 < [134,93', t =   ' 074976 '   = -4.47;-t.05,27 = -1.703. 
Since f = -4.47<-1.703 =-f.05,27; reject Ho; the sample defense firms were 
worse off (i.e., less solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1993. 
Ho : X34,94 > ^34,94 vs. Hx : X34,94 < U34,94; / = h^L = -4.51 < -1.703. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1994. 
Ho '■ .#35,93 > (-135,93 VS. Hi \ .#35,93 < (0.35,93; t ■ 1.46616-2.0 0.74976 -3.77 <-1.703. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
•    Ho : .#35,94 ^ (035,94 VS. Hi : .#35,94 < U35,94; t ■ 1.497-2.0 0.70725 
/28 
= -3.76 < -1.703. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1994. 
HQ : .#36,93 > (036,93 VS. Hi '. .#36,93 < U,36,93i t ■ 1.46616-2.3 0.74976 
/28 
-5.88 <-1.703. 
Therefore, reject #0; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
i/o : 136,94 > U36,94 VS. HX \ 236,94 < U36,94;  t = ^ = ~6.01 < -1.703. 
Therefore, reject H0; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1994. 
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• Ho : X?7,93 ^ 1*37,93 VS. Hi I X37,93 < 1*37,93; t =    '  074976 '    = -3.77 < -1.703. 
Therefore, reject H0; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
• Ho :X37,94 ^ 1*37,94 vs. Hi :X}7,94 < 1*37,94; t = L4^ns° = -3.76 <-1.703. 
/28 
Therefore, reject Ho', the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1994. 
• Ho :X38,93 > 1*38,93 VS.//, ! X38,93 < ^38,93 J f = i*jg|^ =-6.59 £-1.703. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
• Ho : X38,94 > ^38,94 VS. Hy \ 238,94 < ^38,94; * = ^IF = ~825 * -1703- 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
solvent) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1994. 
b. Collection Period (CP) 
55.066-45.6 Ho : X34,93 £ 1*34,93 VS. Hi : Jf34,93 > 1*34,93; t =     WMi21 '   = 2.45 > f .05,27 = 1.703. 
Jos 
Since 2.45>1.703, reject H0; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
efficient) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
Ho : X34,94 < 1*34,94 VS. #1 ! X34,94 > 1*34,94; / = "Sf" = 1.74 > 1.703. 
/28 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
efficient) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
Ho : X35,93 < 1*35,93 vs. Hi : 235,93 > U35,93; t = Ks%j£* = 2.92 > 1.703. 
/28 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
efficient) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
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• Ho : ^35,94 ^ 1*35,94 vs. H\ : ^35,94 > |i35,94; t = "iSff2 = 2.34 > 1.703. 
Therefore, reject H0; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
efficient) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1994. 
• tfo:X36,93 ^36,93 VS. #1 I X36,93 > ^36,93; t= 55^3 = 1.49 < 1.703. 
Jig 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less efficient) than the rest of the U.S. manufacturing firms operating 
within this SIC during 1993. 
• Ho : X36,94 < ^36,94 VS. HX : X36,94 > 1*36,94; / = ^gg2 = 0.77 < 1.703. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less efficient) than the rest of the U.S. manufacturing firms operating 
within this SIC during 1994. 
• Ho : X37,93 < 1*37,93 VS. HX \ X37,93 > 1*37,93; / = "S5"6 = 5.04 > 1.703. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
efficient) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1993. 
• Ho : ^37,94 < 1*37,94 VS. HX \ X37,94 > L*37,94; / = ^ijjj1 = 4-71 > 1.703. 
Therefore, reject H0; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
efficient) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within this 
SIC during 1994. 
• H0: 138,93^ 1*38,93 VS. HX \ Z38,93 > L*38,93; /= ^^gg* = 0.28 < 1.703. 
J& 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less efficient) than the rest of the U.S. manufacturing firms operating 
within this SIC during 1993. 
• Ho : X38,94 < 1*38,94 VS. HX \ 138,94 > 1*38,94; t = ^gg1 = "0.31 < 1.703. 
JIB 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less efficient) than the rest of the U.S. manufacturing firms operating 
within this SIC during 1994. 
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c. Return on Assets (ROA) 
• Ho : X34,93 ^ M.34,93VS.//l \ X34,93 < 1^34,93^ =    ' 282~~6 '    = -1.75 < -f.05,27 = -1.703. 
Jig 
Therefore, reject H0; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within 
this SIC during 1993. 
• i/o : ^34,94 ^ 1*34,94 VS. Hi \ X34,94 < 1*34,94; t = ^.etm '    = ~0-87 > _1 703- 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1994. 
• #o:X,5,93 2^35,93 VS. ff, I !35,93 < !*35,93; /= ^g1 = "1.00 >-1.703. 
/28 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1993. 
• Ho : 235,94 > ^35,94 vs. Hx : X35,94 < H35,94; / = 5-6^f7 = "0.07 > -1.703. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1994. 
• Ho : ^36,93 > ^36,93 VS. Hy I X36,93 < H36,93; t = ^f|p = -0.44 > -1.703. 
,/28 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1993. 
• H0 : X36,94 > 1*36,94 VS. HX l X36,94 < |*36,94; / = ^^fr1 = -2.86 < -1.703. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within 
this SIC during 1994. 
• Ho : X37,93 > ^37,93 vs. Hx : !37,93 < H37,93; t = 5-%r = 199 > "I-703- 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1993. 
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Ho : X37;94 > |i37,94 VS. H\ \ X37;94 < U-37,941 t ■ 5.66445-5.3 2.65417 
^28 
0.73 >-1.703. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1994. 
Ho : !38,93 * u38;93 vs. Hl : X38,93 < ^i38,93; t = &&£*■ = -2.13 < -1.703. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the sample defense firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms operating within 
this SIC during 1993. 
Ho '■ ^38,94 ^ 1*38,94 VS. H\ \ ^38,94 < 1*38,94; t = 5.66445-6.4 2.65417 -1.47 >-1.703. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the sample defense firms were no less well off 
(i.e., no less profitable) than the average of all U.S. manufacturing firms 
operating within this SIC during 1994. 
(L Summary One-Sample t-test Results 
Table 4-3 summarizes the one-sample t-test results. The null hypotheses 
for all of the ratios were that the defense industry (as represented by the sample firms) was 
as well off, or better off financially (i.e., at least as well off) as the average of all U.S. 
manufacturers within the five major manufacturing sub-groups. The reject outcome in the 
table below means that the defense industry was either less solvent (lower CR values), less 
efficient (higher CP values), or less profitable (lower ROA values) than the average U.S. 
manufacturer. The do not reject outcome in the table means that the data support the null 
hypothesis — the defense industry was at least as financially well off (i.e., equally or more 
solvent, efficient, or profitable) as the average U.S. manufacturing firms. 




















CR reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject 




















reject do not 
reject 
Table 4-3. Summary One-Sample t-test Results. 
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2. Two-Sample Hypothesis Testing 
The financial ratios used during these tests were: the current ratio (CR), inventory 
turnover (ITO), and gross margin ratio (GMR). These ratios are indicative of a firm's 
solvency, efficiency, and profitability respectively. Based on the sample segregation by 
level of participation in the defense industry (see Table 4-1), the sample ratio means of the 
defense-dependent firms (X in the formulae below) were compared with those of the 
defense-indifferent firms (Y in the formulae below) to determine which firms were 
financially better off (i.e., more solvent, efficient and profitable) during the defense 
drawdown. A separate t-test was conducted for each of the three ratios, for every year of 
the study. Unlike the one-sample t-tests, where the t statistics were manually calculated 
from the descriptive statistics, these and the comparison t values were computed by 
Quatttro Pro computer software. 
a. Current Ratio (CR) 
• Ho : XK > T86 vs. #1 : Xu <Y96;t = 0.876 > -1.746 = -/«,T. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1986. 
• Ho : XS7 > ?87 vs. Hi : X87 < ?87; t = 0.585 > -1.734. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1987. 
• i/o : X88 > 788 vs. Hx : 288 < ?88; t = 1.606 > -1.725. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1988. 
• Ho : X%9 > YS9 vs. Hi : 289 < YS9; t = 1.88 > -1.73. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1989. 
• Ho : X90 > Y90 vs. Hi : X90 < ?90; t = 2.307 > -1.74. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 





Ho :Xn > Y9X vs. Hi :X9X <Y9X;t = 2.796 >-1.746. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1991. 
Ho : I92 > Y92 vs. Hx : X92 < Y92; t = 2.808 > -1.708. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1992. 
Ho : I93 > Y93 vs. H\ : X93 < Y93; t = 2.77 > -1.74. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1993. 
Ho : X94 > ?94 vs. Hi : X94 < Y94; t = 2.18 > -1.721. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more solvent) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1994. 
b. Inventory Turnover (ITO) Ratio 
Ho : XK * YS6 VS. HI : XK < YS6; t = 0.9036 > -1.72 = -/«,T. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1986. 
• Ho :Xg7 > 787 vs.Hi :Xi7 <Yil;t = 0.64>-1.72. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1987. 
• Ho : X88 > ?88 vs. Hi : 288 < ?88; t = -0.06 > -1.708. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1988. 
Ho : X89 > ?89 vs. Hi : X%9 < ?89; t = -0.2845 > -1.708. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1989. 
Ho : X90 > ?9o vs. Hi : X90 < Y90; t = 0.067 > -1.72. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1990. 
• Ho :X91 £Y9X vs.Hi :X9X <Y9x;t = 0.322>-1.725. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 






Ho : X92 > Y92 vs. Hi : X92 < Y92; t = 0.336 > -1.734. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1992. 
Ho : X93 > F93 vs. Hi : X93 < Y93; t = 0.505 > -1.725. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1993. 
Ho : X94 > ?94 vs. Hi : X94 < ?94; t = -0.77 > -1.708. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho, the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more efficient) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1994. 
c. Gross Margin Ratio (GMR) 
Ho : XK > r86 vs. Hi : X86 < ?86; t = -1.04 > -1.72 = ta.y. 
Therefore, do not reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1986. 
Ho : X87 > ?87 vs. Hi : X%1 < Y%1; t = -1.952 < -1.708. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1987. 
Ho : 288 > F88 vs. Hi : X88 < ?88; t = -1.806 < -1.708. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1988. 
Ho : 289 > YS9 vs. Hi : 289 < YS9; t = -2.08 < -1.71. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1989. 
• Ho : X90 > Y90 vs. Hi : X90 < Y90; t = -2.18 < -1.708. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1990. 
• Ho :X9l > ?9i vs. Hi :X9i<Y9l; r =-1.54 >-1.714. 
Therefore, do not reject H0; the defense-dependent firms were better off (i.e., 
more profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1991. 
• Ho : X92 > Y92 vs. Hi : X92 < Y92; t = -1.82 < -1.717. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1992. 
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• 
• Ho : X93 > Y93 vs. Hi : X93 <Y93;t = -2.34 < -1.708. 
Therefore, reject i/o; the defense-dependent firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1993. 
• Ho : X94 > Y94 vs. Hx : X94 < ?94; t = -2.196 < -1.71. 
Therefore, reject Ho; the defense-dependent firms were worse off (i.e., less 
profitable) than the defense-indifferent firms during 1994. 
d. Summary Two-Sample t-test Results 
Table 4-4 summarizes the t-test results. The null hypotheses for all of the 
ratios were that the more defense-dependent sample firms were equally well off, or better 
off financially (i.e., at least as well off) than the more defense-indifferent sample firms over 
the period of the drawdown. The reject outcome in the table below means that the 
defense-dependent firms were either less solvent (lower CR values), less efficient (lower 
ITO values), or less profitable (lower GMR values) than the defense-indifferent firms in 
the given year. The do not reject outcome in the table means that the data support the null 
hypothesis — the defense-dependent firms were at least as financially well off (i.e., equally 
or more solvent, efficient, or profitable) as the defense-indifferent firms. 
Ratio 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 




































GMR do not 
reject 
reject reject reject reject do not 
reject 
reject reject reject 
Table 4-4. Summary Two-Sample t-test Results. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if, in light of the post Cold War 
drawdown, all of the concern over the survival of the U.S. defense industrial base was 
warranted. Using financial ratios as measures of performance, this thesis attempted to 
measure the effect of the defense drawdown on the financial viability of defense firms. 
Defense industry financial viability was analyzed in terms of three aspects: solvency, 
efficiency, and profitability. This financial analysis employed graphical and statistical 
techniques to: (1) identify trends over the period of the defense drawdown; (2) measure 
defense industry performance (as represented by the sample firms) compared to U.S. 
manufacturing industry averages over this same period; and (3) identify the relationship 
between defense firm strategic commitment to/dependence on defense business and the 
financial viability of these firms over the period of the drawdown. Although the section 
below gives a more detailed report of the results of this thesis, the following broad 
conclusions were reached regarding the three aspects of financial viability investigated 
therein. The trends for solvency, efficiency, and profitability are mixed, with the ratios 
within each indicator group often contradicting each other. Regarding defense industry 
performance relative to the U.S. manufacturing industry as a whole, the defense firms 
generally were less solvent, less efficient, and more profitable. However, the more 
defense-dependent firms were generally more solvent, more efficient, and less profitable 
than the firms whose strategies and business bases indicated indifference toward defense 
business. In summary, while the findings of this thesis give cause for alarm, it appears that 
the firms of the U.S. defense industrial base are adopting strategies to adapt to their 
changing financial conditions brought about by the post Cold War defense drawdown. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Defense Contractor Strategies 
This thesis reported some of the various strategies undertaken by defense firms to 
survive and compete in the post Cold War era. These strategies ranged from the general 
classifications defined by Government agencies familiar with the defense industry, to the 
specific strategies declared by particular defense firms. While many of these strategies 
were given different labels by Government and industry, and neither party described a 
complete list of available strategies, one principle is clear. All of the various corporate 
strategies undertaken by defense firms are defined relative to the makeup of the firms' 
business bases (i.e., the amounts of defense/Government business versus commercial 
work). This thesis concludes that all corporate defense strategies are subordinate to one 
of two possible overarching strategies — defense-dependence and defense-indifference. 
An interesting observation was that many of the sample defense firms which 
operate in the communications and electronics business sectors are optimistic about the 
defense drawdown, because the DoD's reduction in the number of new start programs, in 
favor of less expensive upgrades to existing systems, favors the particular technical 
expertise of such firms. This niche in the defense market has and will continue to allow 
defense firms to more gradually transition toward commercial markets. Another important 
point to mention regarding the defense-indifferent strategy of commercialization is that 
many of the major defense prime contractors remain leery of such endeavors. They cite 
past failures of similar efforts by their own firms and those of sister defense firms as 
reasons for avoiding this strategy. 
An important defense-dependent strategy to note is that of acquisitions and 
mergers among defense firms. There is some concern that the recent rash of mergers 
(note: six of the sample firms in this thesis have merged into three firms) will reduce the 
level of price and technical competition for major defense systems. While this concern 
may be warranted, to evaluate these strategies only from the perspective of their effects on 
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competition overlooks the potential benefits afforded the DoD customer by such actions. 
By merging with former competitors, firms are able to bring to bear technical synergies 
and cost-reducing measures which were previously unachievable. 
2. Solvency 
Using current ratios (CR) and debt to equity (DE) ratios as performance measures, 
the effect of the drawdown on the solvency of the defense industry was analyzed. As a 
result of this analysis, this thesis makes several conclusions about defense firm solvency 
over the nine year period of study. The graphical presentation of the data in Chapter III 
indicates that the CR trends of 22 of the 28 sample defense firms were steady or increasing 
over the period of the drawdown, thereby indicating stable or improving solvency 
conditions over time. These graphs similarly indicate that the DE trends for a majority (17 
of 28) of the firms were steady or decreasing over the period, therefore supporting the 
conclusion that the overall trend for solvency conditions was steady or improved over this 
period. However, the comparative analysis of Chapter IV shows a more bleak picture of 
defense industry solvency. Both graphical and statistical tests indicate that, in all cases, 
the solvency ratio averages of sample defense firms fell below the established industry 
averages. The resulting conclusion is that, compared to the U.S. manufacturing industry 
at large, the defense industry was considerably less solvent over the period of the defense 
drawdown. However, this conclusion is tempered by the results of the comparison 
between the defense-dependent and defense-indifferent firms. In all cases, these tests 
indicated that the more defense-dependent firms were more solvent than their 
defense-indifferent counterparts within the sample. This finding supports the conclusion 
that defense industry solvency improves with the degree of dependency on defense 
contracts. 
3. Efficiency 
Using working capital to total assets (WCTA), collection period (CP), and 
inventory turnover (ITO) ratios as performance measures, the effect of the drawdown on 
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the operating efficiency of the defense industry was analyzed. As a result of this analysis, 
this thesis makes several conclusions about defense firm efficiency over the nine year 
period of study. The graphical presentation of the data in Chapter III indicates that the 
WCTA trends of only 13 of the 28 sample defense firms were steady or increasing over 
the period of the drawdown, thereby indicating unstable or decreasingly efficient operating 
conditions (i.e., less working capital as a percent of total assets) for most of the sample 
defense firms over time. These graphs also indicate that the CP trends for a majority (16 
of 28) of the firms were steady or decreasing over the period, evidence of increasingly 
efficient operations in terms of collection of receivables by most of the firms. The ITO 
trends, whereby 22 of 28 firms showed steady or increasing efficiency at turning over 
inventory, are indicative of stable to improving operating conditions within the defense 
industry over the period of study. The comparative analysis of Chapter IV supports these 
somewhat mixed conclusions regarding defense industry operating efficiency. Using CP 
as a measure of performance, the graphical analysis indicates that, in nearly all cases (10 of 
12 SICs studied), sample defense firms performed below the industry averages for efficient 
collection of receivables. However, the statistical tests indicate that, using the same metric 
of CP, the sample defense firms operated at least as efficiently as all U.S. manufacturers 
within two of the five industry sub-groups studied (Electronics and Other Electric 
Equipment, and Instruments and Related Products). The resulting conclusion is that, 
compared to the U.S. manufacturing industry at large, the defense industry was somewhat 
less efficient at collecting receivables over the period of the defense drawdown. However, 
this outcome is less a result of management decisions, and more a necessary result of the 
slower, paper-laden defense procurement process, whereby items which are built to 
complex specifications must be thoroughly inspected before they are accepted. Using ITO 
as a metric, the results of the statistical comparison between the defense-dependent and 
defense-indifferent firms indicate that, in all cases, the more defense-dependent firms were 
more efficient at turning inventory into finished goods than their defense-indifferent 
counterparts within the sample. This finding supports the conclusion that defense industry 
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operating efficiency, at least in terms of inventory turnover, improves with the degree of 
dependency on defense contracts. This outcome can be explained by the fact that virtually 
all defense products are "made-to-order", not sold from inventory. 
4. Profitability 
Using the gross margin ratio (GMR), return on assets (ROA), and return on 
investment (ROI) ratios as performance measures, the effect of the drawdown on defense 
industry profitability was analyzed. As a result of this analysis, this thesis makes several 
conclusions about defense firm profitability over the nine year period of study. The 
graphical presentation of the data in Chapter III indicates that the ROA and ROI trends of 
less than half of the sample defense firms (12 of 28 and 13 of 28, respectively) were steady 
or increasing over the period of the drawdown, thereby indicating fairly unstable or 
decreasingly profitable conditions for most of the sample defense firms over time. 
However, these graphs also indicate that the GMR trends for a great majority (23 of 28) 
of the firms were steady or increasing over the period, evidence of stable to increasingly 
profitable conditions within the defense industry. The comparative analysis of Chapter IV 
supports these somewhat mixed conclusions regarding defense industry profitability during 
the drawdown. Using ROA as a measure of performance, the graphical analysis indicates 
that, in all cases, sample defense firms achieved either average or above average 
profitability compared to the industry averages for U.S. manufacturers operating within 
selected SICs. Similarly, the statistical tests, using the same metric of ROA, indicated that 
the sample defense firms operated at least as profitably as all U.S. manufacturers within 
three of five and four of the five industry sub-groups studied during '93 and '94 
respectively. The resulting conclusion is that, compared to the U.S. manufacturing 
industry, at large, the defense industry was somewhat more profitable over the period of 
the defense drawdown. However, using GMR as a metric, the results of the statistical 
comparison between the defense-dependent and defense-indifferent firms indicate that, 
during seven of the nine years studied, the more defense-dependent firms were less 
profitable than their defense-indifferent counterparts within the sample. This finding 
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Supports the conclusion that defense industry profitability, in terms of the GMR, tends to 
decrease with the degree of dependency on defense contracts. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although not a part of the original purpose of this thesis, a number of 
recommendations have occurred to the author as a result of this research. While all of 
these recommendations may not be original (in fact, some are quite commonly accepted), 
they all originated from or were reinforced by this effort. Recommendations are addressed 
to the following three groups of readers of this thesis: Government officials, defense 
industry officials, and future researchers. 
1. Recommendations to Government Officials 
• Avoid the use of Firm-Fixed-Price contracts for defense R&D. Many of the 
firms in this study reported large write-offs associated with such contracts. 
Although defense acquisition management personnel both inside and outside 
Government recognize the importance of selecting a contract type according to 
the degrees of risk faced by both parties, the use and misuse of either cost-type 
or fixed-price contracts exclusively has been a cyclical occurrence over the past 
four decades. 
Recognize the role economic security plays in national security. These two 
aspects of American democracy are complementary and mutually supporting, 
such that one cannot exist without the other. However, DoD and service 
officials, as well as members of the Congress, must balance each of these tenets 
of a free society to prevent interference between them. Defense officials often 
complain of Congressional interference with defense program decisions. While 
Congress should recognize that it is the responsibility of the services and the 
Defense Department to determine defense system requirements based on 
mission needs, DoD officials should also take into account the economic and 
political impacts of these program decisions. While such recommendations are 
easy to make, they are quite difficult to implement. 
With an eye on the competitive effects of such moves, the DoD should continue 
to encourage and support mergers and acquisitions among defense firms when 
they offer potential for technical synergies, reductions of excess capacity, and 
reduced overhead costs associated with defense contracts. Instead of being 




Government officials should see these reactions to declining defense budgets as 
necessary and beneficial measures taken by prudent business executives to 
secure returns to shareholders, and remain financially viable and competitive. 
Continue to reform the defense acquisition system by seeking defense industry 
input. The only thing that is constant about the defense acquisition system is 
reform. Such ongoing reform efforts as the use of commercial business 
practices and specifications, the use of electronic commerce measures, reduced 
Government oversight and audit, and the use of Integrated Process and Product 
Development Teams, if correctly implemented, will provide a huge leap forward 
toward fixing a system which all agree is broken. 
The current Government position of leaving the free market to decide the fate 
of the defense industry in the post Cold War era is, in this researcher's opinion, 
fundamentally sound, but requires continuous monitoring by Government 
agencies to ensure that sufficient capacity and technical capability exist to meet 
anticipated future needs. While the DoD should remain concerned over foreign 
sourcing of key defense materials, the isolationist views of certain advocates are 
counterproductive, since they reflect ignorance of the increasingly global nature 
of defense markets. The efforts of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Economic Security, regarding the assessment of defense industrial 
capabilities, will facilitate the monitoring of key defense industrial base 
capabilities, while providing defense PMs tools to decide appropriate 
alternatives for the preservation of capabilities vital to national security. 
2. Recommendations to Defense Industry Officials 
• Continuously evaluate the impacts that corporate defense industry strategies 
have on the various aspects of corporate financial viability. Analytical 
approaches such as those used in this thesis, whereby financial conditions of 
defense-dependent firms were compared with those of defense-indifferent firms, 
provide useful insight into the relationship between financial viability and 
defense dependency. 
• Defense corporations which decide, as a strategy to face the defense drawdown, 
on increasing their commercial business bases through acquisition of 
commercial business units should attempt to acquire enterprises which are 
related to particular defense business applications, expertise, or assets. 
However, if this is not possible and the defense firm acquires such a commercial 
firm solely for commercial business opportunities, the new acquisition should be 
operated as a subsidiary or at least a profit center if operated as a division of the 
parent defense firm. 
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Conduct a financial analysis comparing the financial conditions of defense firms 
before and after their mergers with former defense industry competitors. The 
mergers of the six sample firms within this thesis, along with a possible merger 
of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, provide situations ripe for investigation. 
Conduct a financial analysis comparing a parent company (e.g., General 
Motors) with its primary subsidiary/division which produces defense products 
(e.g., GM Hughes Electronics). 
Conduct a financial analysis of selected defense firms using the procedures 
outlined by the DoD in A DoD Handbook, Assessing Defense Industrial 
Capabilities (Ref 66). 
Using a methodology similar to that used in this thesis, conduct a financial 
analysis comparing the financial conditions of samples of defense-dependent, 
defense-indifferent, and defense-independent (i.e., strictly commercial) firms. 
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